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Both interventionist and anti-interventionist scholars have advanced the view that the 2011 
Libyan conflict probes the need to establish an international organisation to settle disputes 
between nations with a view to maintaining international peace and security. Ironically, 67 
years after the founding of the United Nations, post-colonial African states remain deeply 
troubled and affected by conflicts that are often exacerbated by United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolutions. The 2011 Libyan conflict was not a war for democracy; rather, 
it represented and demonstrated clearly the asymmetrical relations between Africa and 
Europe. This study therefore, is anchored on the thesis that the Western Countries—
especially Britain and France—within the UNSC ignore the values that are embodied in the 
Treaty of Westphalia which established state sovereignty.  Some Permanent five (P5) 
members of the UN were typically insensitive to Libya’s sovereignty and to the creed of 
democracy and this inevitably undermined the national security of the state in favour of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ clause. 
 
The outsourcing of the UNSC’s mission, among other things, in Libya to ensure 
‘international peace and security’ to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was a 
critical reason for the loss of human lives and values in the 2011 Libyan pogrom. The 
introduction of a no-fly zone over Libya and the use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
contained in UNSC Resolution 1973 clearly stoked the conflict in Libya in order to further 
the political and pecuniary interests of some of the P5 members. The involvement of NATO 
and the attendant bombing campaign in Libya served to undermine the militarily weak 
continent of Africa in its effort to broker peace under the umbrella of the African Union 
(AU). In order to secure these political and economic interests, the NATO jet bombers 
declared war against a sovereign UN member state and openly participated in the eventual 
overthrow and death of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. 
 
In essence, this study underscores that the use of Responsibility to Protect in Libya was 
orchestrated at the highest level of international politics to justify external interference and 






The net effect of the outcome of the 2011 Libyan conflict is the post-war imperial control of 
Libya’s natural resources facilitated by the National Transition Committee established by 
these imperial forces. The extent of the damage caused by the UN-backed NATO 
intervention in Libya is also the result of the collective failure of the African Union to assert 






Historical background of Libya 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The end of World War II saw the creation of the United Nations (UN) on 24 October 1945; 
since then, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has championed the cause of global 
peace and security (United Nations, 1989: 2). It has mediated in conflict-affected areas and 
sought to manage global conflict through its resolutions as well as direct military intervention 
when required. This was the case with Libya following the outbreak of the 2011 conflict. The 
history and politics of the UNSC resolutions on Africa and other areas of the world since the 
1960s cannot be understood without reference to the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UNSC Resolution logbook.  
 
Policy-makers, scholars and commentators have debated the UNSC’s intervention and 
mediation in conflicts as well its resolutions on global security since 1945 (Arne, 1948: 6; 
Diehl, 2012: 45). This study examines why the 2011 Libyan crisis occurred; its indirect and 
immediate causes; the implications of the 2011 Libyan crisis for state and human insecurity 
in Libya and the rest of Africa and the lessons that can be learnt in terms of how to deal with 
African political problems. This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter One 
outlines the historical background of Libya; a literature review is presented in Chapter Two; 
the roles of the African Union (AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the 
UNSC are discussed in Chapter Three; Chapter Four examines the doctrine of Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P); and the summary, conclusion and recommendations based on the study are 
set out in Chapter Five. 
 
1.2. Historical Background: a brief overview of Libya 
 
It is generally assumed that the history and politics of Libya and the 2011 uprising are 
associated, not only in terms of the country’s strategic geographic and economic position in 
the world, but also due to Muammar Gaddafi’s political formula of pan-Arabism, pan-





(1987) Libya is the ninth largest oil producer in the world, and has the largest oil reserve in 
Africa with 41.5 billion barrels of proven reserves in 2008. It has a population of 
approximately six million people and is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea in the north, 
Egypt and Sudan in the east, Chad and Niger in the south, and Tunisia and Algeria in the 
west; Libya is 685,000 square miles a third of the size of the United States. 
 
According to Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui (1996: VI) and Wright, (1982), Libya, 
which gained independence on 24 December 1951, incorporates Arab, African and 
Mediterranean features. The Maghreb, composed of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and 
Mauritania straddles its one side, while the Mashreq, composed of Egypt and the rest of 
Middle East, stands on its other. However, at the end of World War II, Libya suffered 
successive, competing colonial invaders - Turkey, Germany, Britain, France and Italy. Britain 
occupied Cyrenaica and Suez as “convenient staging grounds for the British troops, 
Tripolitania was under the Italian’s control and a trusteeship was gained over Fezzan by 
France” (Hahn, 1981:45). These colonial occupants divided Libyans along ethnic lines with 
the Western tradition of divide and rule which assisted colonial administration in Libya and 
created ethnic groups as opposed to the desired nationalism among the citizenry. Figure 1 







Figure 1: Ethnic Map of Libya  
 
(Source: Adapted from data provided by Associated Press, 2010)  
Ethnic divisions enabled the colonial powers to exploit both human and natural resources in 
Libya with sheer impunity. 
 
The state’s vigorous effort to unite these ethnic groups in post-colonial Libya explains the 
nature of the Gaddafi regime from his emergence as Libyan Leader in 1969 following a 
military putsch. According to Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui (1996: 15), Gaddafi 
developed a domestic political formula that sought to unify Libya’s pre-colonial political 
consciousness, the assertion of a hinterland culture in national life, a pan-Islamic and pan-
Arabic identity, and an anti-Westernisation outlook. This formula, enshrined in his famous 
Green Book, was Gaddafi’s mode of national and international governance and interaction, 
especially in relation to Western governments. Scholars such as Bearman (1986: 15) and 
Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui (1996) foresaw that the political and economic 
orientations of the Green Book, which were the foundations of Gaddafi’s regime, would 





According to Elbendak (2008: 135), before the Gaddafi regime came to power, Libya was a 
stratified society with about 99% of its people living along ethnic lines.  However, during the 
Gaddafi regime, more than 88% of the populations lived in urban cities. The regime did away 
with the ethnicity imposed by Britain, France, Germany, Turkey and Italy. Owen Roger 
(2004: 56) claim that ethnicity allowed the colonial powers to control the lives and activities 
of Libyans and created disunity, allowing the colonial powers to play one ethnic group off 
against the other in order to achieve their imperial objectives. They add that not only did this 
destroy any sense of nationhood and national unity, but also that it negated the civic 
obligations of the polity. Conversely, Chipaike (2012: 42) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 23) 
opine that the sense of nationhood in African countries bears from poor leadership by the 
leaders of Africa. The African Union, for example, failed to educate the African people on 
the importance of nationhood through exemplary headship. In their view, it is difficult to 
have a country with a strong sense of nationhood, if the state and people are ravaged by 
poverty, unending conflict, and incessant political and economic crisis. 
 
1.2.1. Libya: before, during and after-the Gaddafi regime 
1.2.2. The pre-Gaddafi regime 
 
Italy’s monopoly on the colonisation of Libya ended in 1931. In 1943, Britain, France and 
Italy divided Libya among themselves, with Tripolitania under Italy; Cyrenaica under British 
control, and Fezzan under French command (Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui, 1996: 15). 
In an effort to conquer Libya, Britain, with the support of the United States, developed a 
British military base in Cyrenaica. In 1948 Britain, France and the US agreed in a treaty that, 
while the provinces under their control were eager for independence, they were not yet ready 
for self-government; without any consultation, they appointed themselves as trustees. 
 
Under heavy pressure from the United Nations General Assembly to grant independence to a 
united Libya, Britain, France, Italy, the US colonial attaché in Libya and Egypt and Pakistan 
agreed to supervise a two-year transition process. The colonial masters installed Emir Sayyid 
Idris Sanussiy, their friend, as Libyan leader. At a convention in Tripoli in 1951, Emir Idris 
declared Libya an independent state under the name, United Kingdom of Libya. In 1953 and 





years and concessions were granted to US oil companies in 1956 after Libya joined the Arab 
League in 1953 and the UN in 1956 (Lavender,  2012: 3) 
 
Podeh (2004) and Mary Kaldor (2007) note that the roles played by the British and US allied 
troops based in Libya in the Arab-Israeli war which ended in 1967 exasperated Libyans who 
saw the British and US troops as instruments of violence within the Arab nation. This 
inspired a sense of nationalism among Libyans and ultimately, became one of the principal 
reasons why Colonel Gaddafi’s decision to topple the leadership of King Idris in a military 
putsch on September 1, 1969 enjoyed the combined support of the Libyan army and the 
civilian population. Colonel Gaddafi remained at odds with the West in some political and 
economic issues until he was murdered in 2011. 
 
1.2.3. The Gaddafi regime: the foundations and objectives of the Green Book 
 
The Green Book was a decree that provided not only the basis for the regulations and rules 
but also formed the creed of Libyan citizenry under Gaddafi. It provided the pillars on which 
all administration; governance and leadership rested. Implemented in phases, The Green 
Book had three parts. Part I, discusses The instrument of government, in which the solution 
to the problem of democracy was lucidly discussed. Part I of The Green Book 
became a useful political document in 1974. While the overall intention of The 
Green Book waste serves the basis for Libya's development, Part I describes how 
Western ‘democracies’ are not the best form of governance and may not be a 
preferred alternative in Libya. The Green Book, for example, argues that the party 
systems whether one-party, two-party or multi-party versions of Western 
‘democracies’ are clearly dictatorship regimes. It explains that: 
[the] premise of all contemporary political systems are merely the 
result of the struggle for power between instruments of governing. 
Those instruments of governing—parliaments, electoral systems, 
referenda, party government—are all undemocratic, divisive, or 
both. Parliaments are based on indirect democracy or representation. 
Representation is based on separate constituencies; deputies 
represent their constituencies, often against the interests of other 
constituencies. Thus, the total national interest is never represented, 
and the problem of indirect (and consequently unrepresentative) 





While this view may be popular among scholars of popular sovereignty such as 
Jacques Rousseau in his book, The Social Contract, it runs counter to the teachings 
of 20
th
 century democracy exporters such as the US and other proponents of 
democracy like Britain and France (Hajjar, 1980: 5). In the principles of democracy 
espoused by the West, democracy is not only a form of peaceful government that 
rarely fights wars against each other but also a model of governance that provides 
for economic improvement and human development (Katzenstei, 1996: 296). 
Clearly, in many ways, Gaddafi's political ideology contained in Part I of The Green Book, is 
part of a radical strain of Western democratic thought. The Green Book continues in Part I of 
that: 
 
The problem of democracy in the world will finally be solved. But 
before that, the masses must struggle to eliminate all prevailing 
forms of dictatorial governments, be they parliament, sect, ethnicity, 
class, one-party system, two-party system or multi-party system, 
which falsely call themselves democracies. True democracy has but 
one method and one theory. The dissimilarity and diversity of the 
systems claiming to be democratic do, in fact, provide evidence that 
they are not so. Authority of the people has but one face which can 
only be realised through Popular Conferences and People's 
Committees. There can be no democracy without Popular 
Conferences and Committees everywhere. 
 
It is against this backdrop that Gaddafi argues that true democracy entails the supervision of 
the people by the people and not supervision of the government by the people, as espoused by 
Western ideologies (The Green Book, 1974: 8). 
 
While Part I of The Green Book discusses the connection between democracy and people, 
Part II: The Economic basis of the third universal theory seeks to find solutions to the 
economic problems that exist within democratic regimes and people. Part II notes 
that capitalism accounts for human economic suffering. It sees capitalism as a tool for 
the exploitation of the employee by the employer and insists that socialism is a preferred 
alternative to capitalism. 
 
Part II examines the relationship between workers and employers. It contends that capitalism 
as propounded and practiced in the West is responsible for the poor economic condition of 





legitimate purpose of the individual's economic activity is solely to satisfy his [material] 
needs; it is not to create a surplus in order to gain a profit” (The Green Book, 1978: 17). 
Gaddafi believed that profit and money would eventually disappear as basic human needs 
were met and that capitalism would lose its popularity and Western democracy would fail. 
Gaddafi insists in the book that the Western democracy is merely an instrument for forcing 
capitalism on a resistant population that has adopted other forms of political leadership and 
economic models. As democracy - including all party systems - is the basis of the relationship 
between the West and developing countries, capitalism is also the dominant mode of 
production. However, the elementary principles guiding The Green Book are against the 
tenets of Western democracy and capitalism which the Book insists, destroy nationalism and 
humanity. 
 
In light of the above, the need for clarity on the differences between The Green Book and 
Western governments’ values and ethics in the management of people and resources, 
informed Part III of The Green Book. Part III: The Social Basis of the Third Universal 
Theory was published in 1980 to explain the disconnections found within Western 
democracy and capitalism. Part III examines the meaning and essence of nationalism - 
humanity. Gaddafi argues that whereas Karl Marx maintained that class struggle is the crucial 
variable accounting for change, nationalism is the real constant, dynamic force of history. He 
maintains that: 
Nations whose nationalism is destroyed are subject to ruin. 
Minorities, which are one of the main political problems in the 
world, are the outcome. They are nations whose nationalism has 
been destroyed and which are thus torn apart. The social factor is, 
therefore, a factor of life - a factor of survival. It is the nation's 
innate momentum for survival. Nationalism in the human world and 
group instinct in the animal kingdom are like gravity in the domain 
of material and celestial bodies. … For this reason, human 
communities struggle for their own national unity, the basis for their 
survival. The national factor, the social bond, works automatically to 
impel a nation towards survival, in the same way that the gravity of 
an object works to keep it as one mass surrounding its centre. When 
the factor of unity in those component systems is destroyed and 
gravity is lost, It is an established natural law. Similarly, man’s [sic] 







The Green Book concluded that great nations had disappeared off the map of the earth to give 
way to the rise of other nations. It insists that family is a social structure rather than a political 
one. The same applies to the ethnic group, because it is a family which has reproduced and 
enlarged itself to become many families. Equally true, the nation is an ethnic group after it 
has grown and its branches have multiplied and become ethnic groups.  
 
In this light, The Green Book (1980) contends that Libyans constitute a nation, and that the 
nation is a social structure whose bond is nationalism; the ethnic group is a social structure 
whose bond is ethnicity - this is opposed to the ethnic groups that were recognised by the 
colonial forces to aid disintegration. The family is a social structure whose bond is family 
ties; and global society is a social structure whose bond is humanity. The Green Book refers 
to these notions as self-evident facts of humanity and life. The Green Book argues that 
elements such as family, ethnicity, and nation are the structures that make up a society. It 
contended that “there is then the political structure of states which form the political map of 
the world” (The Green Book, 1980: 24). But why does the map of the world keep changing 
from one age to the next? The reason is that political structures may, or may not, be 
consistent with social structures. The Green Book (1980: 24) argues that when a political 
structure and associated social reality are congruent—as in the case of the nation-state—the 
world does not change. The Green Book (1980: 24) argues that: 
 
If a change is forced by external colonialism or internal collapse, it 
reappears under the banner of national struggle, national revival or 
national unity. When a political structure embraces more than one 
nation, its map will be torn up by each nation, gaining independence 
under the banner of its respective nationhood. Thus, the maps of the 
empires which the world has witnessed have been torn up because 
they were composed of a number of nations. When every nation 
clings strongly to its national identity and seeks independence, 
political empires are torn up and their components revert to their 
social origins. This is evidently clear through the history of the 
world when reviewed through the ages. 
 
The above argument is founded on The Green Book’s insistent claim that all states which are 
composed of several nationalities for whatever reason - religion, economics, military power 
or man-made ideology - will be destroyed by national conflict until each nation obtains its 





Clearly, these dictates of The Green Book are directly opposed to the numerous guiding 
principles of life in the Western world. Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui’s (1996) and 
Gurr’s (1970) argument that Western governments would wage war against any government 
[Libyan government] operating under the philosophy of The Green Book is borne by Britain, 
France and the US’s huge financial investment in the rebel groups, Transitional National 
Council (TNC) and in NATO to dislodge the Gaddafi regime which ended with his murder 
on October 20, 2011 in Libya. 
 
1.2.3.1. The implementation of The Green Book  
 
The Green Book grew to eventually comprise three slim volumes. According to Metz (2004: 
222), many foreign observers who had compared Libya's Cultural Revolution with the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution naturally compared The Green Book with Mao's Red Book. 
Like Mao's Red Book, The Green Book has been widely distributed both inside and outside 
the country. Both are written in a simple, understandable style with many memorable slogans. 
In size, both are rather modest, but their impact cannot be exaggerated. In a sense, The 
Green Book has vied with the Quran as the basis for Libya's development, much as The Red 
Book attempted to supplant the Confucian system of thought. 
 
1.2.3.2. The Green Book, Part I 
 
In April 1974, Gaddafi relinquished his governmental duties to devote his time to ideological 
concerns and mass organisation. A year later, he announced the reorganisation of the Arab 
Socialist Union (ASU) to include popular congresses, led by the General Popular Congress 
(GPC). In March 1977, the GPC became, at least formally, the primary instrument of 
government in Libya. The reorganisation of the ASU and the elevation of the GPC were 
carried out in conjunction with Gaddafi's political theories in The Green Book, Part I: The 
Solution of the Problem of Democracy (The Green Book, 1974: 15). 
 
The Green Book begins with the premise that all contemporary political systems are merely 
the result of the struggle for power between instruments of governance. These instruments-
parliaments, electoral systems, referenda, political party are all undemocratic, divisive, or 





on separate constituencies; deputies represent their constituencies, often against the interests 
of other constituencies. Thus, the total national interest is never represented, and the problem 
of indirect (and consequently unrepresentative) democracy is compounded by the problem of 
divisiveness. 
 
Moreover, an electoral system in which the majority vote wins all representation means that 
as much as 49% of the electorate is unrepresented (a win by a plurality can have the result 
that an even greater percentage of the electorate is unrepresented; electoral schemes to 
promote proportional representation increase the overall representative nature of the system, 
but small minorities are still left unrepresented.) Gaddafi argues in The Green Book that 
referenda are undemocratic because they force the electorate to simply answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to 
complex issues without being able to express fully their will. He adds that because parties 
represent specific interests or classes, multiparty political systems are inherently 
factionalised. In contrast, a single-party political system has the disadvantage of 
institutionalising the dominance of a single interest or class. 
 
Gaddafi observed that political systems have used these kinds of indirect or representative 
instruments because direct democracy, in which all participate in studying and debating the 
issues and policies confronting the nation, is ordinarily impossible to implement in 
contemporary times. Populations have grown too large for direct democracy, which remained 
merely an ideal until the formulation of the concepts of people's committees and popular 
congresses. 
 
Most observers would conclude that organizations like congresses or parliaments obviously 
involve some degree of delegation and representation. Gaddafi, however, argued that with 
their creation, contemporary direct democracy had been achieved in Libya. He based this 
conviction on the fact that the people's committees and popular congresses were theoretically 
responsible not only for the creation of legislation, but its implementation at the grass-roots 
level. Moreover, people’s committee had a much larger total membership as a percentage of 
the national population than legislative bodies in other countries. 
 
In many ways, Gaddafi's political ideology is part of the radical strain of Western democratic 
thought primarily associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As scholar David Held (1987: 44) 





general will. Both hold that sovereignty is inalienable, indivisible, and infallible. Both believe 
in equality and direct popular rule. Thus, Gaddafi concludes that, "the outdated definition of 
democracy-democracy is the supervision of the government by the people-becomes obsolete. 
It will be replaced by the true definition: democracy is the supervision of the people by the 
people"(The Green Book: 1974:8). 
 
1.2.3.3. The Green Book, Part II 
 
Gaddafi commences The Green Book, Part II: The Economic basis of the third 
universal theory (The Solution of the Economic Problem: "Socialism"), published in 
early 1978, with a brief examination of the relationship between workers (producers) and 
employers (owners). He recognised that the lot of the worker had improved dramatically 
since the Industrial Revolution, with the introduction of fixed working hours, overtime pay, 
different kinds of leave, profit sharing, participation in management, job security, and the 
right to strike. Drastic changes had also occurred in ownership, including the transference of 
private ownership to the state.  
 
Despite these significant changes, The Green Book (1978) notes that the basic relationship 
between the producer, who is a wage earner, and the owner, who pays the wages, is still one 
of slavery. Even where the state owns the enterprise and the income derived from it reverts to 
the community, the plight of the wage earner, who contributes to the productive process for 
someone else's benefit, remains the same. Gaddafi's solution to the problem is to abolish the 
wage system. Rather than contributing to the productive process for the owner's benefit, or 
profit, the actual producer should be a partner in the process, sharing equally in what is 
produced or in the income derived from it.  
 
Gaddafi believed that a person cannot be free "if somebody else controls what he needs" to 
lead a comfortable life. Thus, each person must fully possess a house, a vehicle, and an 
income. Individuals cannot be wage earners because someone else would then control their 
income. They cannot have an extra house to rent, for in renting property they would be 
controlling a primary need of someone else. According to The Green Book (1978: 17) "[t]he 
legitimate purpose of the individual's economic activity is solely to satisfy his [material] 





money will eventually disappear as basic human needs are met. The only provision for 
differentiation in wealth is social reward, in which the society allocates an individual a 
certain share of its wealth equivalent to the value of some special service rendered. 
 
The 1969 constitutional proclamation recognised both public ownership ("the basis of the 
development of society") and private ownership (as long as it was non-exploitive). The 
application of Gaddafi's new views on ownership began a few months after the publication of 
Part II of The Green Book. In May 1978, a law was passed giving each citizen the right to 
own one house or a piece of land on which to build a house. Ownership of more than one 
house was prohibited, as was the collection of rent. On September 1 1978, the ninth 
anniversary of the September revolution, Gaddafi called on workers to "free the wage earners 
from slavery" and to become partners in the productive process by taking over "the public 
and private means of production". The firms that took over were controlled by the new 
people's committees. Another aspect of the drive against exploitation was Gaddafi's ban on 
commercial retail activities in Libya. The Libyan leader advised retailers to enter productive 
occupations in agriculture or construction. However, Metz (1979) notes that the immediate 
practical result of these changes was economic chaos and a significant decrease in 
production. Gaddafi also rejected the private ownership of land. Drawing a distinction 
between ownership and use, he argued that land is the collective property of all the people. 
Every person and his/her heirs have the right to use the land to satisfy their basic needs. The 
land belongs to those who till it. Hiring farm hands is forbidden because it would be 
exploitive. 
 
1.2.3.4. The Green Book, Part III 
 
In The Green Book, Part III: The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory , 
published in 1980, Gaddafi reiterates and elaborates his view on nationalism and briefly 
discusses a few other subjects. Gaddafi argues that whereas Marx maintained that the class 
struggle is the crucial variable accounting for change, nationalism is "the real constant 
dynamic force of history" (The Green Book, 1980:20). Gaddafi draws a sharp distinction 
between a state and a nation or nation-state. A state "embraces several nationalisms," and 





self-determination. A nation-state consists of a group of people with a prolonged, shared 
history, a common heritage, and "a sense of belonging to a common destiny". Ideally, "Each 
nation should have one religion", Gaddafi writes, to avoid the potential for conflict. He 
believed that national unity is threatened by the resurgence of ethnic or sectarian identities. 
Gaddafi points to the Lebanese civil war as an example of the triumph of sectarianism over 
nationalism (The Green Book, 1980). 
 
Part III of The Green Book also contains a discussion of such topics as the role of women, 
minorities, and education. Gaddafi declares that there is no difference in human rights 
between men and women: “it is an undisputed fact that both man and woman are human 
beings” (The Green Book, 1980: 26).  
As such, The Green Book (1980: 25) explains:  
There must be a natural necessity for the existence of man and woman, 
rather than man only or woman only. It follows that neither of them is 
exactly like the other, and the fact that a natural difference exists between 
men and women is proved by the created existence of men and women. 
This necessarily means that there is a role for each one of them 
corresponding to the difference between them. Accordingly, there must be 
different prevailing conditions for each one in order that they perform their 
naturally different roles. According to gynaecologists, women menstruate 
every month or so, while men, being male, do not menstruate or suffer 
during the monthly period. A woman, being a female, is naturally subject 
to monthly bleeding. When a woman does not menstruate, she is pregnant. 
If she is pregnant, she becomes, due to pregnancy, less active for about a 
year, which means that all her natural activities are seriously reduced until 
she delivers her baby. When she delivers her baby or has a miscarriage, 
she suffers puerperium, a condition attendant on delivery or miscarriage. 
 
 The Green Book (1980: 22) continues to argue that man does not get pregnant, he is not 
liable to the conditions which women, being female, suffer. Afterwards a woman may breast-
feed the baby she bore. Breast-feeding continues for about two years. Breastfeeding means 
that a woman is so inseparable from her baby that her activity is seriously reduced. She 
becomes directly responsible for another person whom she assists in his or her biological 
functions; without this assistance that person would die. Furthermore, a woman, who is 
created beautiful and gentle, should not be forced by economic necessity or by a misguided 






With regard to minorities, Gaddafi distinguishes between two types. The first belongs to a 
nation that provides it with a social framework, but also threatens to encroach on its social 
rights; the second has no nation, forms its own social framework, and is destined eventually 
to constitute a nation by virtue of a sense of solidarity. At this juncture, Gaddafi declared that 
“Black people will prevail in the world, [adding that] the latest age of slavery has been the 
enslavement of Blacks by White people. The memory of this age will persist in the thinking 
of Black people until they have vindicated themselves” (The Green Book, 1980: 29). Gaddafi 
condemns formal education as an act of dictatorship that destroys freedom because it 
deprives people of their free choice, creativity, and brilliance. He proposes that "all methods 
of education prevailing in the world should be destroyed" and replaced with a system where 
"knowledge about everything is available to each person in the manner that suits them" (The 
Green Book, 1980: 30). 
 
1.2.3.5. Gaddafi’s initiative for African unity: an antithesis to Western (neo) 
imperialism and exploitation 
 
The axiom that a united Africa will usher in not only a peaceful and conflict-free continent, 
but also decent human development, political maturity and economic growth is the factor 
driving Africa Unite initiatives (Nowrojee, 2003: 16). However, this desire is not 
accompanied by the necessary tools required to transform the continent. This is because plans 
to chart the route to a united Africa imply disobeying the imperial economic and political 
orders established in Africa by the neo-colonial masters (Black, 2004: 16). When Gaddafi 
took power in 1969, he compelled the US and British troops—the troops that supported the 
Israelis against the Arabs during the Arab-Israeli war—to leave Libya. In 1970, British troops 
were forced to evacuate their remaining bases in Libya, and the US had to abandon Wheelus 
Field, a US air force base located near Tripoli (The Washington Post: 2012 and Global 
Security.Org: Internet). Furthermore, Libya’s oil industries were nationalised together with 
all Italian assets in the country and political relations and economic activities were initiated 
between Libya, Egypt and Sudan in the same year. 
 
Jean-Paul Pougala (2011) argues that Gaddafi championed the initiative to mobilise African 
countries to form a single United States of Africa which he hoped would strengthen Africa’s 





colonial borders had been the enduring source of human-created conflict and insecurity in the 
region. He argued that the major political and economic weaknesses in Africa which were a 
source of strength for the Western colonialists stemmed from the divisions and disunity 
among Africans. He noted that Western governments understood that a united Africa would 
be independent from both political and economic support from the West. Thus, the West 
carefully plotted “to destabilise and destroy the African Union which was veering 
dangerously (for the West) towards a United States of Africa under the guiding hand of 
Gaddafi” (Pougala, 2011: 3). 
 
Pougala further argues that it was Gaddafi who offered Africa its first revolution during his 
term as Libyan leader and AU chairman. Africa was paying an annual lease of US$500 
million to Europe for the use of European satellites like Intelsat.  To put an end to this 
situation, Africa asked the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the US, and Europe 
to lend it US$400 million to finance a telecommunication project. These institutions 
promised to do so, but 14 years later, the loan had not been forthcoming. According to 
Pougala (2011: 2), the situation was remedied when Gaddafi donated US$300 million 
towards Africa’s own telecommunication satellite.  
 
Because the media plays such a huge role in shaping a world view, Gaddafi was determined 
to install an African satellite, built and manufactured on African soil, in Algeria, which is set 
to be completed in 2020. This satellite aims to compete with the best in the world at ten times 
less the cost. According to Pougala (2011: 2), this indeed poses a challenge to the Western 
communities who rely on the media to define and interpret Africa for Africans and the world. 
Gaddafi’s US$300 million symbolic gesture will undoubtedly change lives within the African 
continent and will cost the West, not only depriving it of US$500 million per year but also 
the billions of dollars in debt and interest the initial loan would have generated for years to 
come, thereby helping maintain a system to plunder Africa. 
 
The adverse impact of Gaddafi’s donation explains why the US President, Mr Barack Obama, 
saw fit to freeze US$30 billion belonging to the Libyan Central Bank which had been 
earmarked as the Libyan contribution to the three key projects that would add the finishing 
touches to the African federation (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011:  2). Pougala (2011) 






…the African Investment Bank in Sytre, Libya, the establishment in 
2011 [of] the African Monetary Fund to be based in Cameroun 
Yaoundé with a US$42 billion capital fund and the Abuja-based 
African Central Bank in Nigeria which when it starts printing 
African money, will ring a death knell for the CFA franc through 
which Paris has been able to maintain its hold on some African 
countries for the last five decades, will meet their end.  
 
These factors explain not only why the 2011 uprising in Libya was predominantly French-
led, but also why the conflict enjoyed the combined support of Europe and US in the form of 
UNSC and NATO in sustaining the conflict until Gaddafi was eventually killed. Authors such 
as Cordesman and Vira (2011) and Pougala (2011) observe that the UN-backed NATO 
intervention, which arose directly from UNSC Resolution 1973, is brainless when measured 
against the responsibility to protect canon that had guided the intervention. According to 
Pougala (2011), the claim by British, French US leaders that Gaddafi was a dictator and their 
unleashing of their combined military might to oust him—ostensibly to—and introduce 
democracy—were effectively choreographed. The US government justified the reasons for 
freezing Libya’s US$30 billion earmarked for Africa’s development thus: 
 
… The U.S. President has frozen $30 billion worth of Libyan assets 
– the largest asset freeze under any U.S.-based sanctions regime. … 
By freezing these assets, the President seeks to deprive Gaddafi and 
his government of the ability to siphon funds for personal gain, 
prevents further bloodshed in Libya, and secures state assets for the 
benefit of Libyans when a future – basically US instituted -- 
government is implemented. The Executive order further freezes all 
of the Gaddafi family’s property interests that are located in the 
United States, as well as those of senior Libyan government officials 
and other participants in the human rights abuses there. Gaddafi and 
members of his family have also been added to the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control’s (OFAC),a Specially Designated Nationals List 
(SDN). 
 
According to Sumeet Chugani (2011), the freezing of the account was intended not only to 
frustrate the regime, cause it to lose national sympathy, and turn the Libyan citizenry against 
the state, but also to cripple the government and its plan for Africa’s development and allow 
for the imposition of a US-fashioned regime. Chugani’s (2011) views corroborate Pougala’s 
(2011) implied claim that the seizure was carefully calculated to orchestrate continuing 
economic dependency on the imperial states at the centre as well as to ensure the stunted 





Secretary (2011) that maintains that the seizure was aimed at disarming the Gaddafi regime 
from mobilising his terrorist groups to attack the Libyan civilian populace and neighbouring 
states. It is also to specifically demobilise the regime from hiring mercenaries on its citizens. 
 
In addition, in a statement released to Foreign Policy.com, the Ugandan president Mr Yoweri 
Museveni charged that Gaddafi was the cause and source of his death. Mueveni, (2011)  
outlined Gaddafi’s meddling with the internal affairs of individual African states such as 
backing Idi Amin to kill Christians in Uganda, recommending the division of Nigeria into 
various autonomous states, his forceful push for the United States of Africa, and proclaiming 
himself king of kings. Museveni (2011:1) notes that Gaddafi jumped into the “domestic 
affairs of Uganda and shown support to Idi Amin who was persecuting citizens because Amin 
was a ‘Muslim’ and Uganda was a ‘Muslim country,’ where Muslims were being ‘oppressed’ 
by Christians”. He added that Amin killed a lot of people extrajudicially, and Gaddafi was 
identified with these mistakes. Further Museveni underscores that during the Gaddafi’s tenure 
as the AU chairman, he was notorious for resurrecting topics or discussions that had been 
covered by previous meetings in which he would "overrule" a decision taken by all other 
African heads of state. He adds that though, Gaddafi had been repeatedly defeated, his 
insistence on resurrecting finished topics made him the enemy of many leaders in the 
continent.  
 
1.2.4. Libya: post-Gaddafi: The emergence of the National Transitional 
Council  
The National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC), also known as the Libyan Transitional 
National Council (TNC), the Interim National Council (INC), or the Libyan National Council 
(LNC), is the de facto parliament of Libya, established by anti-Gaddafi forces—NATO, 
UNSC, UN-backed mercenaries and Libyan rebels—during the Libyan civil war, to end the 
government of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. On February 25 2011 Al-Jazeera Television 
reported that talks had taken place between "personalities from eastern and western Libya" to 
form an interim government for the post-Gaddafi era. On 26 February, Al-Jazeera reported 
that former justice minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil was leading the process to form an interim 
body, to be based in Benghazi. Mr Jalil stated that "the problem of Libya is the directives of 





in Libya; he also insisted on the unity of Libya through the destruction of The Green Book 
and all that it stands for— a pan-Arabic, pan-Islamic and anti-Westernisation outlook. 
 
Thabo Mbeki (2011) argues that the false Western knowledge of morality and values ended 
the Gaddafi regime; he adds that Mr Jalil was propelled into representing the interests of the 
West in his efforts to end the Gaddafi regime. Thus, Mbeki (2011) insists that the creation 
and growth of the NTC is a function of UN and NATO alignment aimed at protecting 
Western interests in Libya. Al-Jazeera Television confirmed Mbeki’s claim when it added 
that the efforts to form an alternative government have been partly set up, sponsored and 
supported by the US through the Libyan ambassador in that country, Ali Suleiman Aujali and 
the Libyan deputy ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Omar Al Dabashi who were the first 
Libyan officials to endorse the alternative government proposal for Libya (Al-Jazeera 
Television, November 2011, 5PM). 
 
1.3. Problem statement 
 
The UN has made several attempts over a number of decades to instill and consolidate peace 
and improve the level of security across the globe through resolutions and direct military 
interventions. Although there have been some improvements in the UN intervention 
strategies since the 1960s, the UNSC needs to uphold the values of the Charter such as the 
sovereignty of state and equality of member states at all times in order to strengthen its efforts 
to enhance peace and ensure security throughout the world. According to the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Report (2011), countries such as Angola, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, Sudan and [Libya] have experienced the impact of 
UNSC resolutions, which caused nearly 50% of the human suffering taking place in Africa. 
According to the report, more people die in the areas where the UNSC has intervened than 
from the wrangle between the nation and the Council. For example, the Report found that in 
Cote d’Ivoire, human insecurity and economic hardship was three to five times higher than in 
the rest of Africa during the 2010 and 2011 Ivorian conflict. In this regard, it is relevant to 
appraise UNSC Resolution 1973 in Libya with a view to understanding the role of this 








The 2011 Libyan conflict and its human security costs were exacerbated by the intervention 
of the UNSC and NATO. 
 
1.5. Research problem and objectives: Key questions asked 
 
Using the 2011 Libya crisis as the focal point, the aim of this study is to define the dynamics 
of the crisis, highlighting its causes and effects on peace and human security in Africa. In this 
regard the study will focus on the following objectives:  
 Determine the remote and immediate causes of 2011 Libyan crisis; 
 Ascertain the state and human security implications of the crisis for Libya and the 
rest of Africa; and 
 Articulate what lessons can be learnt from the Libyan crisis and other such cases in 
terms of how to deal with African political problems. 
 
1.6. Research questions  
 
The following questions will therefore be answered: 
 What are the remote and immediate causes of the 2011 Libyan crisis?  
 What are the state and human security implications of the crisis for Libya and the rest 
of Africa?  
 What lessons can be learnt from the Libyan crisis in terms of how to deal with 
African political problems? 
 
1.7. Research methodology and technique 
 
This study combines qualitative and historical research approaches to unpack the challenges 





undertakes a desktop review of the relevant literature and scholarly works focusing on the 
UN, conflict intervention resolution in Africa, politics in Libya and human development 
issues in Africa. Secondary sources of data include governmental documents and reports, 
books, peer-reviewed journal articles, online journal articles, newspapers and published and 
un-published theses. Issues of interest identified in the study such as the UNSC resolutions on 
Africa and the conundrum of state and human insecurity they pose in countries such as Libya 
are examined through a textual analysis of information from the outlined secondary sources. 
This study also undertakes a textual analysis of materials that document UN intervention in 
political conflicts in selected resource-rich African states. It compares these with reports on 
the UN’s non-interventions in resource-poor states such as Rwanda to situate the reality of 
the UN’s double standards, especially when it comes to Africa. 
 
1.8. Principal theories upon which the research project is constructed 
 
Considering not only the roles of the UNSC and NATO but also the variegated nature of 
conflicts across Africa and elsewhere since the 1960s—especially the 2011 Libyan crisis—
the researcher consulted a wide range of theories with a view to identifying the most suitable 
tool to adopt in unpacking the issues pertaining to UNSC Resolution 1973 in Libya. 
 
Realism, a long-established and popular Political Science and International Relations 
theoretical tool for explaining matters of war, security and peace was one of the obvious 
theories consulted. The controlling idea of the theory is that “human beings have [an] innate 
desire for power” and that might is right (Duncan et al., 2002: 18). Because states are the 
sovereign and principal actors in the anarchic international system, they exist in a condition 
of constant competition with or antagonism towards one another.  According to Katzenstein 
(1996:16), since no other actors within the international system are capable of regulating the 
activities and interactions of sovereign states, they coexist in a self-help  environment, where 
relations with other states are negotiated between them bilaterally or through multilateral 
arrangements, which are often controlled by the most dominant state actors.   
 
In this light, Mahalingam (2003:735) posits that differential levels of power are key 
determining features of the relations between states.  Given the anarchic international 





pursue their national security by maneuvering to acquire power and resources in the form of a 
range of political, economic and military attributes and capabilities.  Realists believe that 
states distrust one another and, as a result, eschew any long-term cooperation or alliances. 
This theory has some relevance in explaining an international environment in which some 
states such as the United Kingdom, France and the US can assume the right to impose 
themselves on Libya under the umbrella of the UNSC and NATO with the implied arrogance 
that the weak will suffer what they have to suffer. It also makes inroads into interpreting how 
Western governments have tended to dominate African states at will. 
 
The Securitisation/Human Security framework was also consulted. This theory holds that 
security is a speech act; that simply by uttering ‘security’ something is being done. If 
something is labeled a security issue, it becomes one (Floyd, 2007: 3). Hence, when a 
securitising actor states that a particular referent object (people)’s existence is threatened it 
claims a right to adopt extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the referent object 
(people) (Floyd, 2007: 3). This means that the security concept no longer has any given 
meaning but can be anything a securitising actor says it is. Understood in this way security is 
a social construction, with the meaning of security dependent on what is done with it. This 
theory is useful in explaining how the UNSC deployed the security argument to justify its use 
of Resolution 1973 to intervene in the national politics of Libya. The theory also reinforces 
the realist stance that the intervening states will use R2P and human rights ideas 
instrumentally to justify their intervention within a global system, where such interventions 
are increasingly frowned upon by states that are trying to move away from the realist 
paradigm. The weakness of this theory is its outlook on the securitising actor, as it presents 
the actor as irrational. 
 
The Political Economy of Warfare Model Theory is a theory of war between an insider and 
outsider (Libya and the NATO allies respectively). As Glaeser (2006: 1) who is a proponent 
of the model notes: “Warfare is enormously destructive, and yet countries regularly initiate 
armed conflict against one another”. This theory explains the hidden economic and political 
interests of NATO members who opted to invade Libya to effect regime change in spite of 
the option of negotiated settlement, which when properly explored might have resulted in a 
peaceful resolution of the differences between the warring parties. The strength of this theory 
is that it efficiently captures the role of the Libyan government as the insider protecting her 





resources of Libya. The weakness of the theory lies in its emphasis on resources as the only 
factor that compelled the UNSC to militarily intervene in Libya. Hence, it fails to account for 
the killing of Gaddafi to promote regime change and eliminate his political formula of pan-
Arabic and pan-Islamic identity and an anti-Westernisation outlook. 
 
Having carefully considered these theoretical approaches, this study will rely on the 
Securitisation and the Political Economy of Warfare theories to realize its objectives. While 
all the theories studied have potential, these two theories come closest in fulfilling the task of 
this study.  In reaching this conclusion, this study considered a number of factors. First, it is 
doubtful that the Libyan government actually had any real intention of perpetrating genocide 
against its people; ostensibly, this was what provoked the security claim. Second, although 
NATO denied economic and political interests in initiating the war they have been engaged in 
major trading activities in Libya since the overthrow of Gaddafi. Since the objective of this 
study is to examine state and human in/security and the UNSC’s use of resolutions and 
interventions to pursue specific interests, Securitisation and Political Economy have been 
chosen because of their ability to sufficiently explain UN-backed NATO intervention 
developed around the concept of human rights and R2P doctrines, and the organisation’s 
attendant economic activities in Libya.  
 
1.9. Limitations of the study 
 
The main limitations of this study pertain to time constraints and the scarcity of relevant data. 
Furthermore, considering that the Libyan conflict which forms the main focus of this study 
occurred in 2011, it was very difficult to access materials on the subject of the 1973 UNSC 







Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The activities and conduct of the United Nations (UN) in conflict resolution and direct 
intervention in conflict have been widely documented and recorded in academic studies on 
the subject as well as in UN documents and reports. The greater part of the UN literature 
addresses the strengths and ability of the organisation to promote peace and security in the 
world. This chapter focuses on the evolution of the UN and an evaluation of its work. It 
critically assesses the literature with a view to ascertaining the state and human insecurity 
implications of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in the selected 
African countries of Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, and Rwanda. The literature on the UNSC 
resolutions in each of the countries is reviewed with a view to making a case for validating 
the proposition of this study.  
 
2.2. The evolution of the United Nations and the establishment of the 
Security Council 
 
The League of Nations was set up in 1919, following World War I (WWI). Its main objective 
was to maintain world peace. However, not every country joined the League. The United 
States (US), for example, was never a member. Others that had joined later quit, and the 
League often failed to take the necessary action in conflict situations (United Nations, 2009: 
4). Although it was not particularly successful, the League ignited a dream for a universal 
organisation. The upshot was the UN. The UN was born on October 24, 1945 as a response to 
the League’s deficiencies. In order to realise its set objectives, the UN established five organs 
that steer its activities supported by the United Nations Charter, Chapter III, Article 7. These 
organs are the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, 
International Court of Justice, and Secretariat (United Nations Charter, 1945: 4). They work 
jointly to maintain international order. The UNSC’s powers as outlined in the Charter include 
“the establishments of peacekeeping operations, the international sanctions, and the 






The UNSC consists of the veto-holding and dominant five permanent members—China, 
France, Russia, the UK and the USA — as well as 10 non-permanent members with two-year 
terms (United Nations Charter, 1945: 6). According to Goodrich and Simons (1995) and 
United Nations (2009: 1) the principle rationale for establishing a global organisation to 
uphold international peace and security is to endow it with the means by which disputes 
between nations can be peacefully settled. The authors posit that the objective of establishing 
international organisations such as the League of Nations and the UN is to have permanent 
machinery in place that helps disputants to amicably resolve issues that may disturb or breach 
global peace and security.  
 
In line with the above, article 1 of chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter provides that “the 
purposes of the United Nations are: to maintain international peace and security … by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law” (UN 
Charter, 1945:3). While this purpose and principle serve as guide for UNSC activities, article 
7 of chapter III of the Charter establishes the Security Council and article 12 reinforces the 
establishment and proclaims that “the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation 
with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests” (UN Charter, 
1945: 5). This partly explains some of the enduring challenges relating to the Permanent Five 
(P5)-led UNSC’s duties in various parts of the world, especially Africa. 
 
Many of the major issues that continue to bedevil the UNSC’s administrative and political 
methods and operations lie in the adoption of resolutions and the authorisation of military 
intervention in nations. Since the “emergence of the UNSC, its resolutions have led to gross 
violations of state sovereignty on the one hand, and persistent human insecurities on the 
other” (Elden, 2006: 36).A comparative analysis of UNSC resolutions in selected African 
states in which Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been deployed to justify intervention also 
raises concerns as to in whose interests the UNSC interventions are undertaken. 
 
2.3. Efforts of the UN Security Council to address African conflicts 
 
In the post-Cold-War period, the United Nations Charter vested primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international security and peace in the Security Council. The UNSC has 





played a role in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and the removal of the 
Portuguese from DRC territory (United Nations, 1945:33). However, Goodrich and Simons 
(1955:603) and Dannreuther (2007: 14) maintain that the Council has largely been ineffective 
in dealing with African questions involving important interests of the major powers. They 
add that this has been the case in resource-rich African states.     
 
Virgil Hawkins (2003:67) (who corroborated with Goodrich and Simons), adds that some of 
the United Nations Security Council’s political monkey business included:  
persistent bias response to African conflicts; the failure of the permanent 
members of the Security Council to curb their economic and political 
interests, the inability to impartially adopt resolutions and mediate in 
matters that affect resource-rich African states, and the double standard 
in the use of Chapter VII of the Charter.  
 
These imbalances in the Council have led to political disharmony in African states such as in 
Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Libya, and Rwanda. For example, the Council’s actions and 
inaction in DRC and Rwanda led to the assassination of African leaders such as Patrice 
Lumumba of DRC and Libya’s Gaddafi, as well as the infamous Rwandan genocide. These 
not only point to the level of inconsistency in the UNSC’s resolutions on Africa but also to 
the Council’s determination to ensure that Africa’s development remains stunted. Hawkins 
(2003:69) observes that while the intent of the UNSC may be to instill peace among 
disputants, a cursory scrutiny of the Council’s resolutions in Africa since the 1960s reveals 
that the major conflicts in Africa were largely either ignored or stoked by the UNSC’s 
resolutions. This observation raises doubts about the sincerity and commitment of the 
Council to resolve conflict in Africa.  
 
Michelle Small (2006) disagrees with the claim that the UNSC has been part of Africa’s 
economic and political insecurity and conflict.  She insists that Africans are the source of 
their problems and that if African problems reside in the UNSC, the African members of the 
Council are accountable. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006), using Zimbabwe as an example, agrees 
with Small’s argument. He maintains that Zimbabwe plunged into an unprecedented crisis 
that clouded its developmental trajectory. He insists that “the crisis happened in tandem with 
the metamorphosis of African nationalism into afro-radicalism and nativism predicated on 





This, and similar situations in Africa—enabled by African leaders—have stirred up 
controversy and conflict in most of the African states experiencing crisis where the UNSC 
has either failed to intervene or had intervened meaningfully.  
 
Conflicts in various parts of Africa either discredit or lend credence to the contention that the 
UNSC resolutions on Africa are acts of double standards. Hawkins (2003), Isike, Uzodike 
and Gilbert (2008) and Mills (2010) note that the five permanent members of the UNSC are 
all nuclear powers. They therefore constitute an exclusive nuclear club that predominantly 
addresses the strategic interests and political motives of the permanent five (P5). For 
example, the UNSC protected the oil-rich Kuwaitis in 1991 but neglected the resource-poor 
Rwandans three years later and waged one of the largest peace keeping operations in the 
world in Rwanda’s neighbor, DRC in 1999. 
 
Cordesman and Vira (2011) also assert that even the authorisation of the NATO military 
assault on vulnerable Libyan citizens not only guaranteed the killing of the Libyan leader but 
also decimated the civilian population. They maintain that the recognition of the TNC - a 
rebel group - by the UNSC also illustrated the extent to which double standards rule the 
supposedly democratic leaning Council. They argue that the UNSC Resolution1973 inspired 
insecurity, not only in Libya but in the whole continent’s security regime. It is against this 
backdrop that this study contends that the UNSC Resolution1973 indeed deviated from the 
purpose and principles propagated by the UN Charter of 1945. The UNSC’s Resolution1973 
overturned the Charter and exposed Libya and the continent to both human insecurity and an 
assault on its territorial integrity.  
 
2.4. United Nations Security Council Resolutions in Africa: An Overview 
 
Since the wave of independence in Africa in the early 1960s, the UNSC has adopted various 
resolutions aimed at global relations, peace, security and order. The Council’s resolutions 
varied from “admissions, complaints, missions, imposition of resolutions, interventions, illicit 
arms flow, sanctions and tribunals” (Security Council Special Research Report, 2008: 3). 
According to the Report, between 1960 and 2011, the UNSC adopted 2,547 resolutions, of 
which 1,844 related to Asia, North America, South America, Australia/Oceania and Europe, 





presence, there are numerous instances of UNSC resolutions that are devoid of any intention 
to attain real peace (See tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
Table: 1. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Disparities from 1960-1969 
UNSCR in 1960s 
 
Total Resolutions on 
Africa and the world 
 
Resolutions on the 
rest of the world 
Resolutions on 
Africa alone 
1960 28 Resolutions 133-160 06 Resolution 22 Resolutions 
1961 10 Resolutions 161-170 03 Resolutions 07 Resolutions 
1962 07 Resolutions 171-177 03 Resolutions 04 Resolutions 
1963 08Resolutions 178-185 03 Resolutions 05 Resolutions 
1964 14 Resolutions 186-199 09 Resolutions  05 Resolutions 
1965 20 Resolutions 200-219 15Resolutions 05 Resolutions 
1966 13 Resolutions 220-232 08 Resolutions 05 Resolutions 
1967 12 Resolutions 233-244 10 Resolutions 02 Resolutions 
1968 18 Resolutions 245-262 12 Resolutions 06 Resolutions 
1969 13 Resolutions 263-275 08 Resolutions 05 Resolutions 
Total in a decade:  143Resolutions 133–275 77 (133–275) 66 (133–275) 
 
Table: 2. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Disparities from 1970-1979 
UNSCR in 1970s 
 
Total Resolutions on 
Africa and the world 
 
Resolutions on the rest 




1970 18  Resolution 276-291 08 Resolution 08 resolutions 
1971 19Resolutions 292-307 11Resolutions 05 resolutions 
1972 17 Resolutions 308-324 07 Resolutions 10 resolutions 
1973 20 Resolutions 325-344 14 Resolutions 06 resolutions 
1974 22 Resolutions 325-344 18 Resolutions 04 resolutions 
1975 18 Resolutions367-384 08 Resolutions 10 resolutions 
1976 18Resolutions 385-402 06 Resolutions 12 resolutions 
1977 20 Resolutions 403-422 06 Resolutions 14 resolutions 
1978 21Resolutions 423-443 12 Resolutions 09 resolutions 
1979 18 Resolutions 444-461 12 Resolutions 06 resolutions 
Total in a decade 
 







Table: 4. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Disparities from 1990-1999 
UNSCR in 1990s 
 
Total Resolution on Africa 
and the World 
 
Resolution on 





 1990 37 Resolutions647-683 37 Resolutions  0Iraq-
Kuwaitdominat 
1991 42 Resolutions684-725 39 Resolutions  03 resolutions 
1992 74 Resolutions726-799 58Resolutions  16 resolutions 
1993 93 Resolutions800-892 65Resolutions  28 resolutions 
1994 77 Resolutions893-969 47 Resolutions  30 resolutions 
1995 66 Resolutions 970-1036 48 Resolutions  18 resolutions 
1996 67 Resolutions1037-1092 46 Resolutions  21 resolutions 
1997 54 Resolutions 1093-1146 38 Resolutions  16 resolutions 
1998 73 Resolutions1147-1219 40 Resolutions  33 resolutions 
1999 65 Resolutions 1220-1284 38 Resolutions  27 resolutions 
Total in a decade 
 
648 (647 – 1284) 
 
455 (647 – 1284) 192 (647 – 1284) 
 
 
Table: 3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Disparities from 1980-1989 
UNSCR in 1980s 
 
Resolutions on Africa 
and the world 
Resolution on the 
rest of the World 
 
Resolutions on Africa 
 
1980 23Resolutions462-484 18Resolutions 05resolutions 
1981 15Resolutions485-499 15Resolutions 00 resolutions 
1982 29Resolutions500-528 24Resolutions 05 resolutions 
1983 17Resolutions529-545 13 Resolutions 04 resolutions 
1984 14Resolutions560-580 09 Resolutions 05 resolutions 
1985 21Resolutions546-559 11 Resolutions 10 resolutions 
1986 13Resolutions581-593 11 Resolutions 02 resolutions 
1987 13Resolutions594-606 10 Resolutions 03 resolutions 
1988 20Resolutions607-626 15Resolutions  05 resolutions 
1989 20Resolutions627-646 15 Resolutions  05 resolutions 





Table: 5. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Disparities from 2000-2011 
UNSCR  
2000-2011 
Total Resolutions on 
Africa and the world 
 
 
Resolutions on the 
rest of the World  
Resolutions on 
Africa alone 
 2000 50 Resolutions1285-1334 27 Resolutions  23 resolutions 
2001 52 Resolutions1335-1386 33 Resolutions  19 resolutions 
2002 68 Resolutions1387-1454 43 Resolutions  25 resolutions 
2003 67 Resolutions1455-1521 35 Resolutions  32 resolutions 
2004 59 Resolutions1522-1580 30 Resolutions  29 resolutions 
2005 71 Resolutions1581-1651 33 Resolutions  38 resolutions 
2006 87 Resolutions1652-1738 45 Resolutions  42 resolutions 
2007 56 Resolutions1739-1794 26 Resolutions  30 resolutions 
2008 55 Resolutions1795-1859 32 Resolutions  33 resolutions 
2009 48 Resolutions1860-1907 26 Resolutions  22 resolutions 
2010 59 Resolutions1908-1966 30 Resolutions  29 resolutions 
2011 66 Resolutions  1967 –2032 25 Resolution 41 Resolutions 
Total in a decade 
 
682 (1285 2032) 
 
 
360 (1285 2032) 322 (1285 
2032) 
 
This analysis of UNSC resolutions since 1960 shows that Africa was the target of 
approximately 70% of the Council’s overall resolutions between 1960 and 2011; however, a 
perfunctory examination of the Council’s work in selected African states (Angola, Cote 
d’Ivoire, DRC and Rwanda) during this period reveals that the Council’s involvement is 
equal to the extent of the conflict it has precipitated and sustained on the continent (Africa 
Statistical Year Book, 2010: 10).  
 
The development and growth of conflicts in the DRC, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, and Libya – 
resource-rich African states with records of human insecurity crises as well as the UN record 
of non-interference in the genocide in Rwanda - a resource-poor African state - lend credence 
to the argument that the UNSC exhibits double standards. This has been more a source of 
pain and suffering for the continent than it has been a source of peace and development. The 
UNSC unequal commitment in resource-rich and resources-poor African nations helps 
explain the Council’s role in the 2011 Libyan conflict discussed in chapter three. For 
example, Virgil Hawkins’ measurement of the Council’s activities in Africa in the 1990s 





responsible for approximately 90% of the total number of war deaths in the 1990s; the study 
also shows that nine of the ten bloodiest conflicts in the 1990s were African Conflicts” 
(Hawkins, 2003:66). 
 
In light of the above, Hawkins (2003) and Clark (2003) further contend that Council’s 
approach to African conflicts compared with non-Africans - for example, India, Pakistan and 
Iraq - suggests disregard. He notes that in some instances it was doubtful whether a threat to 
peace ever existed, while high-profile conflicts were completely ignored. While the aim of 
this overview is to illustrate the Council’s overall involvement in the resolution of conflicts, it 
is pertinent to add that the conflicts that started and accelerated, especially in resource-rich 
and resource-poor African states, are economically-driven to protect Western interests with 
UN backing. This study will tackle the political and economic factors behind the UNSC’s 
parallel behaviour in administering peace using five selected African states: Angola, Cote 
d’Ivoire, DRC, Libya and Rwanda.  
 
2.5. Angola: a brief introduction 
 
Angola has witnessed one of the most protracted conflicts on the continent. The country was 
Africa’s second largest oil producer in 2010, producing about 1.6 million barrel of oil per day 
(African Economic Outlook, 2012). Moreover, Angola “has the 4th largest diamond reserves 
in the world, produces 15 percent of world’s diamonds with more than 70 percent of these 
diamonds of gem quality” (Amuwo, 2009: 254; Cortright and Lopez, 2000: 151). It occupies 
an area of approximately 1,246,700 sq. km. Angola obtained political independence from 
Portugal in 1975 after more than 500 years of Portuguese colonial oppression and slavery 
(Botchway, 2011: 4). 
 
Angola’s independence was followed by its division, apparently sponsored by the two 
ideologically opposed permanent members of the UNSC—the US and the former Soviet 
Union (Russia)—which set the country up as a battleground for a proxy war. “The US was in 
terms of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) responsible for 
the survival and activities of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) (UNITA) and National Front for the 





Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) (MPLA) 
which engraved enmity and processed human insecurities in the state” (About.com African 
history, 2011).  
 
The civil war grew apace, intensified and was bolstered by the UNSC’s involvement and lack 
of AU’s involvement in Angola (BBC News, November 6, 2012). According to a BBC news 
report, “the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the left-wing MPLA and the US and apartheid 
South Africa backed UNITA in a conflict that recorded over 500,000 deaths in its sixteen 
year reign”. Within five years, Angola became one of the most successful economies in sub-
Saharan Africa. It enjoyed a period of sustained peace through record international oil prices 
and robust growth in both the oil and non-oil sectors. This economic opening helped the state 
“fight against the dominant hegemony of China, Russia and the US that were accused of the 
disruption of [the] daily pattern of peaceful living in the post-war Angola” (Campos and 
Vines, 2007:1; Kuznar,  and Lutz,  2007). 
 
Although China, Russia and the US are P5 members of the Council, they created the Angolan 
conflict in order to secure oil deals aimed at advancing the economic interests of Russia and 
the US. The economic race for oil and gas in Angola prevented both Russia and the US from 
acting objectively within the UNSC and from honouring the Council’s avowed mandate to 
resolve conflict in that country. A study conducted by the World Policy Institute in 2005 
reveals that in the wake of September 11 in keeping with its interest in securing access to oil 
and other key natural resources, the United States has been rapidly expanding U.S. military 
involvement in Africa. While most recent increases in U.S. arms sales, aid, and military 
training in Africa have been justified as part of what the administration refers to as the 
‘Global War on Terrorism’ (GWOT), oil has been a major factor in the administration’s 
strategic calculations from the outset.  
 
Human Rights Watch (2005) also maintains that the US recklessly abandoned the 
“International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and exported military hardware worth of 
$4 billion into Angola during the war thereby not only stoking the conflict but also 
sabotaging peace process in Angola”. Despite faltering international support for the rebel 
group (UNITA) in response to the Jonas Savimbi’s increasingly erratic behavior, the 
indiscriminate use of landmines, and civilian hostage-taking, the US continued to aid the 





munitions included highly sophisticated small arms and light weapons like Stinger aircraft 
missiles. Yet, the US State Department’s Human Rights Report acknowledged that Angola’s 
"human rights record remained poor, with effect to the perpetuation of human insecurity 
regime in the state and citizens” (Wadel, 2009: 120). 
 
2.5.1. UNSC Resolutions in Angola from 1960 to 2011 
 
A singular development within the security regime during the post-Cold War era is the use of 
military force to protect human beings. It is against this backdrop that the UNSC recognised 
the sovereignty of states, human security and the rights of the citizens of all nations. The 
UNSC intervened in Angola with a view to preserving humanity from violations during the 
conflict. The overall “UN process of preserving peace and order among member states 
includes the adoption of the UN Security Council resolutions and the direct military 
intervention” (Weiss et al., 2001:167).  
 
In 1961 the UNSC became concerned about apartheid South Africa’s assault on the territorial 
integrity of Angola, and adopted Resolution 163 (1961) to protect Angola from the human 
insecurity that the apartheid state was stoking in the country. Fifteen years later, with the US 
continuing to trade arms in Angola, as well as abundant evidence of active war, the Council 
adopted Resolution 387(1976) on “the Angola-South Africa situation” (S/RES/387 1976). A 
cursory glance at these resolutions reveals that the UNSC sought to: 
[end] aggression against the People's Republic of Angola; 
scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the People's Republic of Angola; desist from the 
utilization of the international Territory of Namibia to mount 
provocative or aggressive acts against the People's Republic of 
Angola or any other neighbouring African State; meet the just claims 
of the People's Republic of Angola for a full compensation of the 
damage and destruction inflicted on its State and for the restoration of 
the equipment and materials which its invading forces seized. 
 
Clearly, Resolution 387 is one of many UNSC’s contradictory claims to resolve African 
conflict. While protection of the territorial sovereignty of Angola is a pre-requisite to ensure 
that Angola enjoys both human and state security, Fierke (2007: 145) is doubtful that the 
UNSC intended achieving peace. The author argues that unwarranted incursions into Angolan 





South Africa and the US government. In his view, the US’s provision of weapons to the 
South African government accounts for threats to Angolans’ human security. This view is 
corroborated by the findings of the World Policy Institute (2005) which insisted that 
munitions were responsible for the decimation of human lives and the promotion of human 
insecurity in conflict zones in Africa. Andrew Boyd (1971: 2) who offered a new 
interpretation of the UNSC resolution strategy claims that apart from the Council’s lack of 
interest in matters that are not beneficial to the P5, a major deficiency within the Council lay 
in the fact that people are the victims of these resolutions. 
 
UNSC Resolution 428 (1978) in Angola corroborates Boyd’s view. This “grieves the tragic 
loss of human lives including those of Namibian refugees in Angola caused by South African 
invasion of Angolan territory” (UNSCR, 428 1978). Although, this resolution was adopted in 
1978, Robert Fearn (2003: 38) holds that, during this period, the US-enabled UNITA 
needlessly killed more than 300,000Angolan civilians. Thus imposing sanctions on the 
weapon supplying countries, although very necessary to halt the conflict, was entirely ignored 
and US got off scot-free. Ten years after Resolution 428, Resolution 626 (1988) was adopted. 
This finally helped Angolans affected by violent conflict. The Resolution required that Cuba 
conclude a bilateral agreement with Angola and set up the United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission (UNAVM); however, nothing was said about the US military hardware 
that had decimated the population. 
 
While the UNSC sought to instill peace in Angola by focusing on the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops, Angola’s colonial master, Portugal, US-UNITA relations and the Russia-MPLA 
alliance remained the constant variables that triggered new conflicts and drove the ongoing 
conflict. In defence of their ideology and economic gain, the US and Russia -two permanent 
members of the Security Council - set out to achieve a divided Angola. In its bid to secure 
economic advantage, the UNSC issued another Resolution in 1991. When the Angolan 
government informed the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) that the Government of 
Angola (GoA) and UNITA had concluded a peace accord in 1991, the state still suffered the 
effects of the US trade in weapons and the UNSC’s neglect and abdication of its 
responsibility to halt this arms traffic. Instead, the UNSC “stresse[d] the importance of all 
states to refrain from taking any action that will undermine the agreement” (S/RES 





Since the US–UNITA alliance in Angola, the UNSC has failed in its efforts to end the human 
insecurity which the armed conflict caused. Demonstrating the Council’s failure to apply the 
resolution, in 1998, the UNSC demanded that Mr Jonas Savimbi (a US-supported rebel 
leader) “responds to the appeals of the United Nations and guarantee the security and access 
necessary for… those involved in the crash of the United Nations flight 806 in territory 
controlled by UNITA” (UNSCR 1219,1998). 
 
Even when the UNSC tried to assert itself, the strong alliance and refuge that UNITA found 
with powerful UN members such as the US, a permanent member of the Council, undermined 
the collective effort of the UNSC, thereby making it impossible for it to deal with UNITA in 
Angola. In 2002, the UNSC reiterated the 13 resolutions it had adopted on the conflict in 
Angola between 1993 and 2002 and declared thus:  
Reaffirming its resolutions 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993 and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions, in  particular resolutions 1127 
(1997) of 28 August 1997, 1173 (1998) of 12 June 1998, 1237 
(1999) of 7 May 1999, 1295 (2000) of 18 April 2000, 1336 (2001) 
of 23 January 2001, 1348 (2001) of 19 April 2001, 1374 (2001) of 
19 October 2001, 1404 (2002) of 18 April 2002, 1412 (2002) of 17 
May 2002, 1432 (2002) of 15 August 2002, 1433 (2002) of 15 
August 2002 and 1439 (2002) of 18 October 2002, … expresses 
once against concern regarding the humanitarian effects of the 
present situation ‘the use of arms’ on the civilian population of 
Angola (UNSCR, 1439: 2002). 
 
While the UN recognised the humanitarian effects of the conflict in Angola, it was silent on 
the role of the US in fuelling the conflict by supplying arms to protect its desired economic 
interests in Cabinda province of the state which was under the control of the MPLA in that 
country particularly between 2002 and 2010(the period of the oil boom in Angola). No 
further UNSC resolutions were adopted on Angola after 2002, leading to the conclusion that 
although the oil field was under the control of MPLA, Angola was abandoned by the UNSC 
because the crisis presented economic benefits for a powerful permanent Council member 
such as the US. 
 
However, Alina Mihaela Vasile (2007: 35) refutes the conclusion that Angola was abandoned 
by the UNSC; instead, she blames the belligerent parties and the AU for the conflict. Vasile 
(2007) holds that the conflict in Angola is premised on three salient factors: lack of will from 





cease-fire violations; lack of leadership from the AU; and the deflation of the UN organised 
missions by the warring parties. She stressed that “although the UN established several 
missions in Angola during the conflict, the peace seemed to be far away until the death of 
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi” (Vasile, 2007: 33). She blamed the OAU/AU for lack of 
leadership in the continent, stating that none of the five meetings held to end the Angolan 
conflict was organised by the AU. She maintains that the Alvor Talk in January 1975 was 
organised by the Portuguese government. The Meeting in Zaire of 1989 was organised by 
Zairean president Mobuto Sese Seko. The Peace Accords for Angola (Bicesse Accords) of 
May 1991 was organised by the Portuguese government in Lisbon. Lusaka Protocol, which 
was new improvements from the Bicesse, was hosted on November 20 1994 in Lusaka, 
Zambia while the Luena Memorandum was set up by the two parties and signed in Angola in 
2002. She claims that the AU, not the UN, was the guilty party in Angola.  
 
2.6. Republic of Cote d’Ivoire: a brief Introduction  
 
According to the Guide, (2009:13) Cote d’Ivoire, a country with an area of 322, 460 sq. km is 
situated on the southern rim of West Africa and shares borders with five other nations. To the 
west:  
It is bounded by Liberia and Guinea. Much of its border with Liberia is 
formed by the course of the Cavally River.  On its northern edge, it is 
bounded by Mali, its largest neighbor, and Burkina Faso. Its entire 
eastern border is shared with Ghana. Finally, on its southern edge, it 
possesses an extensive coastline (515 km or 320 mi) on the Gulf of 
Guinea. For more than three decades after its independence from France 
in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire—formerly known as the Ivory Coast—was 
recognized as a model of religious and ethnic harmony. 
 
According to the Guide (2009), Côte d’Ivoire lacked a natural resource base until a small 
quantity of oil was discovered. As a result, its economy is dominated by small-holder 
agriculture. The Republic of Cote d’Ivoire (RCI) is the world’s largest supplier of cocoa 
beans, the source ingredient for chocolate, producing 1.3 million tons and 46% of the cocoa 
produced in the world (Guide, 2009: 5). Its leading customers are Britain, France and the US, 
the world leading manufacturers of chocolate such as “the British-owned Cadbury, 
American-owned Hershey’s and Nestle. These three countries are also permanent members of 





RCI’s market economy, based on export agricultural products, is cited by Kirwin (2006) as 
the reason for the state’s impressive growth. As such, economic stagnation in the late 1980s 
contributed to ethno-regional divisions and civil war. In 2002, “fractious relations between 
so-called étrangèrs, typically of Burkina Faso and Malian heritage, and those of “pure-
blooded” Ivoirite led to open conflict” (Kirwin, 2006: 1). The escalating conflict “split the 
country between the predominantly Muslim north and the historically Christian south. After 
protracted international mediation efforts which involved the United Nations, the two sides 
finally reached a peace agreement in early 2007” (Guide, 2009: 5). 
 
2.6.1. UNSC Resolutions on Cote d’Ivoire from 1960 to 2011 
 
While the north and south of the RCI had agreed on a peace deal in 2007, conflict continued. 
Since the admission of Cote d’Ivoire into the United Nations body through resolution 150 
(1960) on August 23, 1960 the country has been the subject of several other resolutions 
relating to conflict and peace issues.  
 
Kirwin (2006: 1) notes that the 2002 conflict attracted the attention of the UN. By 2003, the 
UNSC through its president and Secretary General had started mediating in the conflict in 
Cote d’Ivoire. While the UNSC P5 led the mediation, three of these members, France, Britain 
and the US, have economic interests in the RCI. According to Kirwin (2006), France owns 
approximately half of the banks in the RCI. The world renowned British-owned company, 
Cadbury, and the US-owned Hersey would suffer if the RCI reduced its cocoa production. 
Thus, it could be argued that the French, British and the US sought to safeguard their 
business interests and not necessarily to halt the conflict in the interest of Ivorians. This is 
underscored by these three countries’ insistence that regime change was the only acceptable 
option in the RCI. In light of this, it is imperative to note that some UN-led peace processes 
are driven by greed. This is an important factor to note as it opposes the tenets of UN SC 
objectives for intervention which is solely to bring about peace, human and state securities. 
 
In line with the principle global peace, Britain, France and the US, in their individual capacity 
and as permanent members of the UNSC, believed that the 2002 conflict threatened peace not 





UNSC to ensure the adoption of resolutions to engender confidence in the region and 
promote human security alongside territorial integrity. The UNSC thus: 
 
Adopted Resolution 1464 (2003) and supports the statement by the 
UNSC’s President which demonstrated the UNSC’s strong commitment 
to sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte 
d’Ivoire. It further decided to establish, United Nations Mission in Côte 
d’Ivoire (MINUCI), with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by 
the Ivorian parties of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and including a 
military component. 
 
While it might appear that France, Britain and the US did not have any ulterior motives in 
this particular conflict, the Africa Year Book (2010:162) holds that, the conflict partly 
resulted from the sharp fall in cocoa production that started in 2002. Production fell from one 
thousand four hundred and nine (1,409) tons of cocoa beans in 2008 to one thousand two 
hundred and thirty (1,230) tons in 2009.The Year Book (2010) argues that this affected the 
profits of the British and American chocolate producing companies.  
 
Thus, intervention to restore order in Cote d’Ivoire was aggressively and vigorously pursued 
with a view to keeping Cadbury and Hershey’s alive and to also entrench the French imperial 
presence in Cote d’Ivoire. In order to ensure the Security Council’s ability to tilt the conflict 
in its favour, France, set up a military group to participate in the Ivorian conflict. Resolution 
1479 (2003) promoted a liaison between the Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire 
(FANCI) and the forces nouvelles, in order to build confidence and trust between “the armed 
groups, in cooperation with the French and ‘Economic Community of West African States’ 
(ECOWAS) forces, in particular concerning helicopters and combat aircraft” (UNSCR 1479, 
2003).  
 
Although the intention of Resolution 1479 (2003) was to liaise with Ivoirians to ensure 
human security and territorial integrity, the principle and purpose of the UN Charter reveals 
that French involvement in the domestic politics of Côte d’Ivoire is a violation of UN Charter 
Chapter 1, Article 7 (Charter, 1947: 3). UNSC Resolutions 1464(2003), 1479(2003) and 1498 
(2003) authorised the French forces to engage in combat. These same Resolutions were 
further used to bargain for the unrelenting implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis 
agreement. This agreement was concluded in France’s capital, Paris, in 2003. In the same 





Côte d’Ivoire, (MINUCI) shall be extended until 4 February 2004” (UNSCR 1514(2003) to 
help monitor the implementation of the agreement.  
 
However, in 2004, the Council deplored the resumption of hostilities in Cote d’Ivoire and the 
repeated violations of the cease-fire agreement of 3 May, 2003; it reiterated its full support 
for the action undertaken by United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the 
French forces in accordance with their mandate under resolution 1528 (2004) and for the 
statement of its President of 6 November 2004 (S/PRST/2004/42). Resolution 1572(2004) 
emphasised that there can be no military solution to the crisis and that the full implementation 
of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements remained the only way to resolve it. 
 
In 2005, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1584(2005), which authorised the French forces 
supporting UNOCI to provide appropriate security assistance to UNOCI in carrying out its 
tasks in the Cote d’Ivoire (UNSCR 1584, 2005). This resolution not only enabled the French 
government to assert its influence in Cote d’Ivoire, but also helped France to divide the 
country in two, take one side, and launch attacks on the forces opposing the Government of 
France (GOF) (UNSCR, 2005: 1584). Since this authorisation, Ivorian civilian victims of 
selective French attacks have repeatedly called on the UN to withdraw the French forces from 
Cote d’Ivoire, accusing France of targeted killings.  
 
At the same time, the Government of Cote d’Ivoire accused France of exploiting the 
country’s natural diamonds, and the illegal trafficking and proliferation of arms. France 
retaliated by claiming that Ivoirian diamonds are ‘blood diamonds’ thereby denying the state 
access to global markets (Cook, 2011: 18). 
 
The UN response to this situation is found in Resolution 1643(2005). On 15 December 2005, 
the UNSC declared:  
 
Taking note of the final communiqué of the Kimberley Process Plenary 
Meeting … and of the resolution adopted by Kimberley Process 
participants … to prevent the introduction of diamonds from Côte 
d’Ivoire …, and recognizing the linkage between the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources such as diamonds,… and trafficking of arms and the 
recruitment and use of mercenaries Decides to renew … paragraphs 7 to 






The provisions of paragraphs 7 to 12 effectively prevent the state from taking action against 
the invasion of its territory and the decimation of its population, allowing France to control 
Cote d’Ivoire and its natural resources and trade. For example, paragraph 7 of Resolution 
1572(2004) states that:  
All States shall, for a period of thirteen months from the date of adoption 
of this resolution, take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or 
indirect supply, sale or transfer to Côte d’Ivoire, from their territories or 
by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms or any 
related material, in particular military aircraft and equipment, whether or 
not originating in their territories, as well as the provision of any 
assistance, advice or training related to military activities. 
 
Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1572(2004) stated that “the measures imposed by paragraph 7 
shall not apply to: (a) supplies and technical assistance intended solely for the support of or 
use by UNOCI and the French forces who support them, (b) supplies of non-lethal military 
equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance 
and training” (UNSCR, 1572(2004). It is however, important to note that the Council’s last 
Resolutions on the RCI in 2003, Resolution 1572(2004), and all other Resolutions from 2005 
to 2011centred on the French forces and the sovereign integrity of the state of Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
According to Abayomi Azikiwe (2011), the French government was responsible during the 
conflict for human insecurity and the loss of life in the Cote d’Ivoire. He explains that France 
coaxed the Economic Community of West African States into rejecting the Gbagbo regime. 
According to Azikiwe (2011), France is also a part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Cote 
d’Ivoire and has about one thousand six hundred and fifty (1,650) troops which repeatedly 
assault citizens and undermine the international principle of self-determination in Cote 
d’Ivoire. He asserts that Laurent Gbagbo’s rejection of the results of the presidential election 
fuelled France’s determination to topple him from power at all costs, which led to France and 
her allies’ insistence that opposition leader Alassane Ouattara, occupy the presidency. 
Despite strong opposition from Ivoirians to the France-led UN call for regime change in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Azikiwe (2011) notes that the UN’s so-called peacekeeping forces conducted a 
series of air strikes against Ivoirian military units and areas still loyal to President Gbagbo. 
He also states that French peace-keepers attacked the presidential palace in a raid that left 







Azikiwe’s view was contested by Richard Lee (2011: 1) who blamed the continent’s heads of 
states under the umbrella of the AU for poor conflict resolution strategies. Using Libya as an 
example, Lee (2011), notes that the AU was conspicuously silent when popular uprisings 
kicked out autocratic leaders in Tunisia and Egypt. He further states that the AU was equally 
clueless in dealing with the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire and in Libya, where rulers responded 
violently against people who were rebelling against them. The major African Union (AU) 
mission to Libya for example, was a massive failure. Intended to resolve the crisis, the AU 
delegation was comprised of African leaders, including South African President Jacob Zuma, 
who had all been allies of Gaddafi in the past and were therefore too compromised to come 
up with a fair deal. 
 
Lee (2011:1) argues that for a long-time, there have been allegations that Zuma’s campaign 
to dislodge former African National Congress (ANC) leader, Thabo Mbeki, was partly 
financed by Gaddafi. The other members of the delegation – President Mohamed Ould Abdel 
Aziz of Mauritania, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, President 
Amadou Toumani Toure of Mali and the Chairperson of the AU itself, Jean Ping of Gabon – 
have all benefited from Gaddafi’s largesse in the past. He maintains that the cordial 
relationships explain why the AU mission appeased Gaddafi, offering him a peace plan that 
would have kept him in power and that was rightly rejected by the Libyan opposition. In the 
absence of leadership from Africans, the United Nations and the traditional big powers 
stepped in to try to resolve the Libyan crisis. While it is debatable whether Gaddafi partly 
sponsored the removal of Mr Thabo Mbeki or not, the fact that the Jacob Zuma-led AU, 
negotiated for an inclusive government which will retain Gaddafi in power after 50 years of 
leadership in Libya vindicate Lee. 
 
In spite of Lee’s observations, a Human Rights Watch Report (2012: 12) claims that “over 
one thousand defenceless and unarmed persons were killed by the UN-French-backed 
Ouattara forces”. While the study and the report which was made available by the Caritas Aid 
Agency (CAA), accuses the UN and France of being responsible for the pogrom, the UN 
report insists that forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo were attacking the UN staff and pro-Outtara 
supporters. However, the UN staff was composed of the French forces that had continuously 
attacked government forces and demanded that Laurent Gbagbo vacate the presidency. There 





sustained and vicious campaign that dethroned and subsequently led to the capture of Laurent 
Gbagbo, after which he was transferred to the UN-mandated ICC for prosecution.  
 
2.7. Democratic Republic of Congo: a brief introduction  
 
The Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, (2012) stated that, established as a 
Belgian colony in 1908, the then-Republic of the Congo—Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC)—gained its independence in 1960. The DRC has a population of about 71,712,867 
and a total area of 2,344,858 sq. km, slightly less than one-fourth the size of the US. 
Economists and political analysts note that it is home to a vast array of natural resources and 
mineral wealth. Its untapped deposits of raw minerals are estimated to be worth in excess of 
US$ 24 trillion (Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, 2012)  The DRC has a 
2,511 km border with Angola (of which 225 km is the boundary of Angola's Cabinda 
Province), 233 km with Burundi, 1,577 km with Central African Republic, 2,410 km with 
Republic of the Congo,217 km with Rwanda,628 km with South Sudan,459 km with 
Tanzania,765 km with Uganda and 1,930 km border with Zambia 1,930.  Natural resources 
and mineral wealth in the DRC include cobalt, copper, niobium, tantalum, petroleum, 
industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, uranium, coal, hydropower 
and timber. 
 
While these resources are sufficient to guarantee both the human and state security of the 
DRC, the country has witnessed gruesome wars in the post-Cold War period. Although 
imperial exploitation of the natural resources is a contributory factor to the insistent conflict 
in DRC, the assassination of Congolese nationalists: Mr Patrice Lumumba, Mr Maurice 
Mpolo and Joseph Okito, believed to have been perpetrated by the US and Belgian 
governments were the genesis of the DRC endless war. According to Bailey (1994: 23) “the 
Belgium occupation of DRC, the UNSC Resolutions ‘143(1960); 145(1960); 146(1960); 
152(1960); 157(1960) and especially 161(1961)’ wracked the Democratic Republic of Congo 
to disorder”. 
 
This is chiefly due to the UNSC’s reckless failure to heed the call to bring the assassins of the 
Congolese nationalist leaders to book.  Instead the Council in its resolution 161(1961) 





experiencing conflict. Surprisingly, Resolution 161, did not require that the US and Belgium 
explain their roles in the brutal murder of the nationalists. This exacerbated the conflict 
situation in the Congo. According to Cortright and Lopez (2000: 120) Resolution 161 of 1961 
was not sufficient to encourage the search for the culprits and no burden was laid on either 
the US or Belgium at all to ensure compliance. 
 
Veteran Ugandan scholar, Professor Dan Wadada Nabudere (2004:3), famously described the 
DRC civil war as “Africa’s First World War”. Baregu (2002:33) contends that the war was all 
“about high international politics as opposed to low domestic politics (democratisation, 
human rights, ethnicity, etc.)”. He adds that it was first and foremost, an imperialist war and 
like all imperialist wars in modern history, it was about the distribution of wealth and power. 
Both Amuwo (2009) and Baregu (2002) note that the US is the main beneficiary of the 
conflict in the Congo based on the fact that the US was not held to account for the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba and that the US sold military hardware that created the 
war-torn DRC. They add that the US was the biggest winner in the DRC tragedy in that its 
armaments industry was a foremost supplier to all the countries and warring factions/militias 
involved in the war. Baregu (2002:3) observes that behind the pro-democracy pro-growth 
rhetoric, the less publicised role of the US in Africa has been its steady supply of arms, 
ammunitions and military training – all stoking the fires of armed conflicts in the Congo and 
on the continent. In the process, the security of people, states and societies are constantly 
undermined and endangered.  
 
Yet, neither the AU nor the African members of the UNSC can put an end to these conflicts 
since they lack leadership. This explains why (sub-Saharan) Africa has been in the UNSC’s 
non-permanent seats since 1962 but has not been able to influence the Council either to take 
decisions or compel the adoption of any resolution probing the role of US in the DRC 
conflicts since the early 1960s. According to statistics made available by The Green Papers 
Worldwide (2013), Table 6 below provides the list of African states that have served in the 






































(1 year only) 
1947 Australia Belgium Poland Brazil Colombia Syria 
1948 Canada Belgium Ukraine Argentina Colombia Syria 
1949 Canada Norway Ukraine Argentina Cuba Egypt 








Greece Chile Brazil Turkey 
1953 Pakistan Denmark Greece Chile Colombia Lebanon 
1954 New Zealand Denmark Turkey Brazil Colombia Lebanon 
1955 New Zealand Belgium Turkey Brazil Peru Iran 
1956 Australia Belgium 
Yugoslavia 
(resigned) 
Cuba Peru Iran 
1957 Australia Sweden the Philippines Cuba Colombia Iraq 
1958 Canada Sweden Japan Panama Colombia Iraq 
1959 Canada Italy Japan Panama Argentina Tunisia 
1960 Ceylon Italy 
Poland 
(resigned) 




Turkey Ecuador Chile 
the United 
Arab Republic 






1963 Ghana Norway the Philippines Venezuela Brazil Morocco 
1964 the Ivory Coast Norway 
Czechoslovakia 
(resigned) 
Bolivia Brazil Morocco 
1965 the Ivory Coast 
the 
Netherlands 











5 from AFRICA & ASIA 
2 from LATIN 
AMERICA 









3 from AFRICA ---> 
(1 from the Arab 
World) 
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1967 Mali Ethiopia Nigeria Japan India Brazil 
Argentin
a 
Bulgaria Denmark Canada 
1968 Senegal Ethiopia Algeria Pakistan India Brazil 
Paragua
y 
Hungary Denmark Canada 























Poland Italy Belgium 
1972 Guinea Somalia Sudan India Japan 
Argentin
a 
Panama Yugoslavia Italy Belgium 







Iraq Indonesia Peru 
Costa 
Rica 







Iraq Japan Guyana 
Costa 
Rica 
Byelorussia Italy Sweden 
1976 Benin Tanzania Libya Pakistan Japan Guyana Panama Romania Italy Sweden 









































1982 Togo Uganda Zaïre Jordan Japan Panama Guyana Poland Spain Ireland 











Zimbabwe Egypt India Pakistan 
Nicaragu
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Bulgaria Denmark Australia 














1988 Senegal Zambia Algeria Nepal Japan 
Argentin
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1989 Senegal Ethiopia Algeria Nepal Malaysia 
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Kenya Gabon Bahrain Japan 
Costa 
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Angola Guinea Syria Pakistan Chile Mexico Bulgaria Spain 
German
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Pakistan Chile Brazil Romania Spain 
German
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Brazil Romania Denmark Greece 
2006 Congo Tanzania Ghana Qatar Japan 
Argentin
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Libya Vietnam Indonesia Panama 
Costa 
Rica 




Uganda Libya Vietnam Japan Mexico 
Costa 
Rica 
Croatia Austria Turkey 






















Azerbaijan Germany Portugal 












Adapted from: (Richard E. Berg-Andersson (2011) The Green Papers Worldwide: The 





2.7.1. UNSC Resolutions in the DRC from1960 to 2011 
 
On 7 July 1960 the UN adopted resolution 142(1960) through which the DRC was admitted 
to the global body. One week later, on 14 July 1960, the Council adopted Resolution 
143(1960) in which it responded to Congo’s complaints of the invasion of its territory by 
Belgium and the attendant adverse human and state security threats which those invasions 
had caused for the Congolese population. The council called upon the “government of 
Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of Congo and authorise[d] 
the Secretary General (not NATO) to take necessary steps” (S/RES/143(1960). Such 
necessary steps did not, however, end Belgium’s pogrom or the US’s supply of armaments in 
the Congo.  
 
Resolution 145 of 1960 noted appreciation for the work of Secretary General and called upon 
the government of Belgium to speedily implement Council Resolution 143(1960) on the 
withdrawal of troops. However, rather than mentioning the US by name, the Council 
requested “all states” to refrain from any action which might impede the restoration of law 
and order or undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of 
Congo (S/RES/145(1960). Resolution 146(1960) also commanded the Belgium government 
to withdraw its troops. The fact that a further Resolution had to be passed means that 
Resolution 145 had been ignored by Belgium.      
 
During the 1960s, while the UNSC passed repeated Resolutions, the Congolese pointed out 
that the US was a catalyst in the conflict by arming militia and rebel groups. In 1961, the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 161 to express “deep concern at the grave repercussions of the 
crime and the danger of widespread civil war and bloodshed in Congo and the threat to 
international peace” (S/RES/161(1961). The widespread civil war that the UNSC sought to 
abate necessarily followed the brutal murder of the DRC nationalists and the continued 
domination and subordination of the DRC population by means of illegal Belgian occupation 
and US-supplied arms.  
 
Resolution 161 (1961) called for parliament to be convened; this destroyed social harmony in 
DRC due to the divisions created among the parliamentary representatives. According to 
Bailey (1994), Resolution 161(1961) sowed the seeds of animosity among the population and 





invasion of the state through the divide and rule tactics of countries such as Belgium and the 
US.  
 
As at 1964, the conflict in the DRC continued to be fuelled by Belgium and the permanent 
Council member, the US, in provisioning mercenaries and arms. In 1964 the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 199, 
reaffirming the sovereignty and Territorial integrity of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo... requests all states to refrain or 
desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo; appeals 
for cease-fire in Congo in accordance with the resolution of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) dated 10 September, 1964; 
considers in accordance with the same resolution that the 
mercenaries should as a matter of urgency be withdrawn from the 
Congo. 
 
Resolution 199 (1964) recognised the presence of military hardware in the DRC and the role 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in brokering peace, but did not discuss the US’s 
supply of arms and ammunition that facilitated the perpetuation of the conflict in the Congo. 
According to Mentan (2007: 89): 
U.S. enabled the cycles of violence and economic problems plaguing the 
continent of Africa throughout the Cold War (1950-1989), the U.S. 
delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to Africa. Many of the top 
U.S. arms clients – Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire (DRC)... have 
turned out to be the top basket cases of the 1990s in terms of violence, 
instability, and economic collapse. 
 
The presence of munitions and hired mercenaries ensured that the state could not break free 
from the colonial bondage; this exploited the country’s resources and undermined the will of 
the native population to become an active human community, free from imperial domination 
and able to determine their destiny and chart their path to peace. 
 
Although the Council did not adopt any resolution requesting Belgium and the US) to hand 
over the culprits to the International Criminal Court (ICC), by 1967, Portugal had started an 
offensive invasion from its Angola-controlled borders. The need to root out foreign occupants 
in the DRC did not receive the Council’s endorsement. Instead, the UNSC issued Resolutions 
226 (1966) and 239 (1967) to “condemn the support and assistance which those mercenaries 





as supply of arms” (United Nations Document, 1967: 14).  No country was named. 
Information available on the UNSC resolution logbook suggest that by 1967, when the 
Council adopted Resolution 239(1967) she was aware that the US was stoking the conflict by 
unauthorised means, but the US was not mentioned in the resolution.  It is apparent, however, 
that the resolutions which were intended to abate the decimation of the DRC population only 
served to exacerbate the already bad situation, and increased the resolve of the foreign 
sources to continue on the path of offensive violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC, 
thereby perpetuating human insecurity in the entire region. 
 
It is also important to note that the AU was not able to influence the thrust of these 
resolutions because of the disunity among the African representatives in the UNSC. 
According to Kitsepile Nyathi (2012), the DRC conflict would have ended if the AU had 
genuinely intervened to halt it. For instance, he states that the conflict is persistent because 
SADC members such South Africa and Zimbabwe are benefitting from the spoils of the 
conflict through the mines. Thus, neither the adoption of resolutions nor the UN’s lack of 
commitment to the Country (as may be expressly claimed) is responsible for the conflict. It is 
about the AU’s brotherhood and regional politics through which the DRC owes $1 billion 
debt to Zimbabwe which was incurred through lost military hardware during the intervention. 
 
While the wealth of evidence on the conflict in the DRC pointed to the UNSC, US and other 
external actors, some scholars such as James Karuhanga (2012: 1) insist that the conflict in 
the DRC has survived to date because the AU has been ineffective there. For example, he 
contends that: 
The International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), a 
regional initiative that brings together 11 countries is leading the way 
to the resolution of the DRC conflict instead of the AU. 
According to an ICGLR statement, the council stressed the 
importance of the establishment and speedy deployment of the 
envisaged Neutral International Force. “The Council stressed the need 
for sustained efforts to eradicate the presence of negative forces in 
eastern DRC, to effectively restore state authority, and promote 
lasting peace, security and stability in the region, including the 
effective implementation of the Goma Agreement of 23 March 2009 
between the Government of the DRC and the National Congress for 
the Defence of the People (CNDP). The 2009 agreement is central in 
the conflict between the Congolese government and a group of 
soldiers who mutinied in May, and subsequently formed a movement 





CNDP fighters, and had been integrated into the ranks and file of the 
DRC forces, accuse the government of not living to its part of the 
bargain regarding the implementation of the 2009 agreement. 
 
According to Cortright and Lopez (2000: 120), it is imperative that UNSC Resolutions should 
be sufficiently burdensome to encourage the search for a negotiated settlement or immediate 
compliance. Resolutions 226 (1966) and 239 (1967) were insufficient to put an end to the 
combined efforts of the US, Belgian and Portuguese governments to kill the voices that 
sought answers for the death of their nationalists crusaders. It is against this backdrop that the 
UNSC issued Resolution 241(1967). The Resolution categorically stated that:  
the Security Council is concerned by the serious situation created in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo following the armed attacks committed 
in that country by foreign forces of mercenaries; and that Portugal 
allowed those mercenaries to use territory of Angola under its 
administration as a base for their armed attacks against the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. 
 
While it had become evident that the Portuguese had launched attacks on the Congolese and 
continued defying the UN resolutions, the Council blamed “mercenaries from the Portuguese 
controlled borders”. Similarly, the US sustained the attacks through the importation of deadly 
military weapons contrary to UN Resolutions 226(1966), 239(1967) and 241(1967) 
respectively. 
 
The US, a permanent member of the Security Council which participated in the adoption of 
those resolutions, had pecuniary interests in selling munitions to the DRC. This created a 
cauldron of political tension and sustained the dangerous violence that remained 
unchallenged during 50 of UNSC resolutions. The Council abandoned the application of the 
relevant provisions of the UN Charter relating to violators of the sanctity of the UNSCR. 
 
The Council’s objective, to rescue DRC civilians from foreign mercenaries and deadly 
weapons, was ignored by the US with impunity as the importation of arms continued from 
1960 to 2012. Thirty years after UNSCR 241(1967), the conflict which the Council had 
sought to halt persisted due to the involvement of P5 members such as the US. Between1968 
and 1998, eight-hundred and forty (840) resolutions issued by the UNSC were ‘carefully 






Furthermore, while the defiant US and Portugal exacerbated the Congo crisis by renewing the 
supply of arms and the invasion of the territory, which the UNSC warned member states to 
desist from, the credibility of the Council was undermined by its toleration of the violations 
of permanent members such as the US.   
 
UNSC Resolution 1291 (1999) reaffirmed the sovereignty of the DRC over its natural 
resources. It noted the illegal exploitation of the country’s assets and the potential 
consequences and emphasised the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission 
(MONUC) in the country. However, despite the MONUC being deployed, the conflict in the 
Congo persisted.  
 
While the above resolutions sought to affirm the territorial integrity of the DRC and uphold 
decent human security conditions, anti-interventionist authors such as Vann (2002) argued 
that they destroyed political and economic development and the human growth of the 
Congolese. The author holds that a more appropriate action would have been for the UNSC to 
adopt a resolution to apply sanctions on the US and Portugal who had defied the Council’s 
resolutions since 1960. Thus, the researcher is of the view that the 61 UNSC Resolutions 
relating to the DRC from1961 to 2011 were ineffectual in securing peace in the DRC.  
Hawkins (2003) and Vann (2000) argue that the situation in the DRC is one of many 
worrying instances in Africa where the interests of the Security Council’s permanent 
members have not only prevented it from acting, but also enabled the killing of many 
civilians under the guise of maintaining peace and security. This is possible, though the 
African members of the Security Council are not veto wielding members, they are ineffective 
and play decorative role in the UNSC chamber, and this explains why they have not been 
able to act politically within the organ to make either their presence or position known. For 
example, Djibouti, Nigeria and Rwanda were non-permanent members of the UNSC when 
the 1994 genocide occurred in Rwanda.  
 
The wheedling ability of the P5 could also mean that weak African country that singles itself 
out against the will of the powerful UNSC permanent members will eventually suffer the 
damage in international politics. This explains why the Guardian Newspaper states that the 





moment in the coordinated international efforts to assist African state [Mali] out of conflict. 
The newspaper argues that the unity African leaders demonstrated in Mali, ensured that Mali 
can re-establish her unity and territorial integrity, dismantle terrorist and criminal networks in 
the north, and restore full constitutional order through free, fair and transparent election 
(Guardian Newspaper, Wednesday, 26 December, 2012). 
 
Hawkins (2003: 66) is of the opinion that, “the war in DRC- probably the bloodiest war in the 
1990s raged over an area of Western Europe, drawing in the direct military involvement of as 
many eight other African countries and resulted in well over one million deaths in its first 
year”. He notes that this massive conflict was in greater part handled by the Council through 
presidential statements. In his view, a presidential statement is woefully inadequate to restore 
peace. Council’s lack of willingness to confront the US about its arms trade, and Belgium and 
Portuguese for their military attacks on the Congolese helped to maintain the spiral of conflict 
that engulfed the Congo. The assassination of Lumumba, a visionary leader who was 
determined to administer the natural resources of the state for the benefits of the citizens, 
helped to entrenched Western imperial leadership in the Congo and perpetuated the cycle of 
corruption, victimisation, political deprivation and the economic marginalisation of the 
Congolese population. 
 
According to Weissman (2002) the UNSC failed to take appropriate action to restore peace in 
the mineral-rich DRC. He argues that the “Council was unable to end the violence due to its 
commitment to the America’s economic gains from the violence” (Weissman, 2000). He 
insists that an appropriate resolution of the murder of the Congolese leaders requires that the 
US and Belgium hand over the culprits. In similar vein, Bailey (1994:4) argues that the 
UNSCR protects the interests of permanent Council members and neither represents the 
interests of those directly affected by the conflict nor the will of the general population. 
 
Bailey (1994) adds that a biased UNSC worsens crisis situations in the Third World (TW) by 
not “making immediate formal determination under the relevant Article in the Charter ‘to 
detect’ threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression, thus making it impossible for the 
Council to take appropriate binding decisions” (Bailey, 1994: 4). 
 
In the 50 years of Council’s involvement in the Congo, one thousand eight hundred and 





(699) resolutions have been adopted on African States and seventy-seven (77) on the DRC 
(S/RES, 1961-2011). It is particularly important to underline that the biggest cause of violent 
wars during this period is the availability of military hardware. The US, the world leading 
manufacturer of military weapons and a permanent member of the Security Council, exported 
military hardware worth more US $2billion to the Congo; this facilitated the conflict in that 
country (World Policy Institute, 2012).  
  
2.8. Republic of Rwanda: a brief introduction  
 
According to the African Statistical Yearbook (2010:311) Rwanda has a population of 
approximately 10 million. She obtained her independence from Belgium in 1962. Rwanda 
has an area of 26,338 sq km. It borders Burundi, DRC, Tanzania, and Uganda. According to a 
2011 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, Rwanda has abundant natural resources of 
gold, cassiterite (tin ore) wolframite (tungsten ore) methane, hydropower and arable land. 
However, none of these natural resources is available in any quantity that will ensure 
Rwanda’s presence in the global market or make the state an influential role player in world 
politics.  
 
The CIA report (2011), notes that Rwanda is a poor rural country. About 90% of its 
population is engaged in (mainly subsistence) agriculture and there is some mineral and agro-
processing. Rwanda continues to receive aid funding and was classified in 2005 and 2006 by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank respectively as a heavily indebted poor 
community (HIPC) (Canuto and Moghadam, 2010).  
 
Rwanda experienced devastating genocide in 1994. According to CIA (2011), in 1959, three 
years before independence from Belgium, the majority ethnic group, the Hutus, overthrew the 
ruling Tutsi king. Over the next several years, thousands of Tutsis were killed and some 
150,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were driven into exile in neighbouring 
countries. The children of these exiles later formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patrotic Front 
(RPF), and launched a civil war in 1990.  
 
The war, along with several political and economic upheavals, exacerbated ethnic tensions, 





Rwandans killed up to a million of their fellow citizens, including approximately three-
quarters of the Tutsi population (Canuto and Moghadam, 2010). The genocide ended later 
that same year when the predominantly Tutsi RPF, operating out of Uganda and northern 
Rwanda, defeated the national army and Hutu militias, and established an RPF-led 
government of national unity. 
 
2.8.1. United Nations Security Council Resolutions in Rwanda from 1960 to 
2011 
 
Rwanda was admitted to the United Nations on 26 July 1962 through Security Council 
Resolution 172(1962) (S/RES/172(1967). However, Rwanda was not recorded on the 
Security Council resolution sheet until 1993. Following three decades during which the 
UNSC adopted no Resolutions on Rwanda, its former colonial master, Belgium played one 
ethnic against the other, leading to the 1994 genocide. 
 
According to a Security Council document, four resolutions were adopted on Rwanda 
namely: “812(1993); 846(1993); 872(1993); and 891(1993)” respectively (S/RES/891(1993). 
Resolutions 812(1993), 846(1993), and 891(1993) specifically identified instances of conflict 
that would lead to human insecurity and 872(1993) established the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The pogrom that the UNSC sought to avert in Rwanda 
occurred in 1994. The UN stood by and witnessed the massacre of women, children, youth 
and the aged. 
 
According to Magnarella (2002: 7), the international community, especially Belgium, France, 
the US and the UN intentionally failed to prevent the slaughter. Magnarella argues that the 
four hundred (400) UN troops in Rwanda at the time of genocide could not have saved lives 
because they had neither sufficient manpower nor a proactive UN mandate. While the UN 
had become aware of the situation in Rwanda in 1993, it dilly dallied until the genocide had 
occurred in 1994, Magnarella is convinced that the lack of intervention is due to the UN 
tactics of selective resolution and selective response in African conflicts and wars. 
 
Magnarella’s views notwithstanding, Vasile (2007: 53) opines that the Rwandan genocide 





national and continental leadership. Vasile traced the genocide to the racist Hamitic thesis 
propagated by colonial administrators who regarded the Tutsi as Hamites—an intellectually 
superior and aristocratic (Caucasian) race. She is adamant that the actual genocide was a 
product of the Tutsi who adopted a supremacist view and further reinforced their belief that 
they were born to lord it over the Hutus.  The political crisis that broke out in Rwanda in 
October 1990 that actually led to the genocide in 1994, occurred when the rebels of Tutsi-
dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)—the military wing of Rwandan Patriotic Front—
invaded the country from their Ugandan base. She claims that the United Nations did not 
instigate the invasion. 
 
However, scholars such as Mills (2010:4) and Hawkins (2003:66) concur with Magnarella 
and argue that the UN failed to intervene in Rwanda because no visible political or economic 
gains would accrue to the P5 from intervening in the resource-poor country. Thus, 
engagement in Rwanda, even to save human lives, was seen as a waste of resources. This 
view is further elucidated by Mills (2010:4) who asserts that the Council that flailed around 
so ineffectually during the 1994 Rwandan genocide was, in 2008, managing the biggest 
peace-keeping-operation in the world in the neighbouring ‘resource-rich’ DRC. 
 
While the UNSC issued three resolutions in 1994: 928, 929and 965 referring to the 
deplorable human situation in Rwanda, none sought to directly intervene militarily to prevent 
the genocide or maintain peace. While Resolution 928(1994) sought to “extend the mandate 
of the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda”, Resolution 929(1994) concerned itself with 
the “establishment of a temporary multinational operation for humanitarian purposes in 
Rwanda until the deployment of the expanded UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda”. The 
Council’s last resolution in 1994 on the Rwandan genocide—Resolution 965was geared 
towards “the extension and expansion of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda” (S/RES/965(1994)). 
While it has been consistently argued in this study that the UNSC has stoked the conflict, it is 
important to mention that the African Union and other relevant sub-regional organisations 
such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and East African 
Community to which Rwanda is a neighbour and member, did not interface with the UN on 
the matter of genocide in Rwanda. Also, neither of the two organisations (nor any other 





to one African Union document (2000), the OAU/AU failed to instill peace in Rwanda 
because the Organisation lacked the sensitive information and required knowledge about the 
conflict (African Union Official Document…, 2012). The document underscores poor 
governance in the region while also affirming the fact that African leaders in the UNSC are 
dysfunctional. For emphasis (see Table 6), although Rwanda was a non-permanent member 
of the UNSC in 1994 but did not take the lead to bring the Security Council to its rescue. 
 
After the 1994 genocide, the Council adopted eight resolutions in 1995: Resolutions 977, 
978, 989, 997, 1005, 1011, 1028 and 1029 were adopted with a view to arresting and 
incarcerating those ‘offenders’ not killed during the genocide. The remnants of the 
population, as well as the dead, were victims of UNSC Resolution 872(1993) which declared 
that the UN would command peace in Rwanda. However, UNSC 977(1995) established a 
tribunal for the trial of Rwandans and “made the decision to designate Arusha as the seat of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda” (S/RES/977(1995)). 
 
While Resolution 977(1995) established the Tribunal, Resolution 978(1995) had the specific 
objective of arresting and detaining persons responsible for the genocide. Resolution 
1011(1995) sought to lift the restrictions imposed by paragraph 13 of Resolution 918 (1994) 
on the sale or supply of arms and material to the Government of Rwanda and Resolution 
1029(1995) concerned itself with the extension and adjustment of the mandate of the UN 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda to assist the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan 
refugees (S/RES/1029(1995)). 
 
While these resolutions issued by the Council from 1993 to 1995 seemed to defend human 
rights and care for the welfare of the Rwanda citizens, Greg Mills (2010) is of the opinion 
that the genocide was possible in Rwanda because the Security Council had allowed it to 
happen. Therefore, its response was at best reactive rather than proactive. Despite the 
apparent generosity shown towards refugees by the Council on paper, such generosity would 
not have been necessary if the Council had worked to avert the 1994 genocide that it foresaw 
in 1993. 
 
While Resolutions 1050(1996) and 1053(1996) decried human insecurity in Rwanda, 
subsequent Council resolutions from 1998 to 2011 revolved around the “International 





Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in 




The UNSC Resolutions: 1200(1998); 1241(1999), 1259(1999); 1329(2000); 1347(2001); 
1411(2002), 1431(2002), 1449(2002); 1477(2003), 1482(2003), 1505(2003), 1512(2003); 
1534(2004); 1684(2006), 1705(2006), 1717(2006); 1774(2007); 1824(2008), 1855(2008); 
1878(2009), 1901(2009); 1932(2010), 1955(2010), 1966(2010); 1995(2011), 2006(2011), 
2013(2011) and 2029(2011) were adopted after 11 years of the Council’s involvement in the 
country. The essential purpose of these resolutions is to set up the tribunal and prosecute 
Rwandan suspects. 
 
While the tribunal has engaged in a frantic search for Rwandans responsible for the genocide, 
scholars such as Bruce Jentleson (2001) and Virgil Hawkins (2003) argue that the Rwanda 
genocide occurred because it was in the best interests of the superior powers. For example, 
Jentleson’s work on Preventive Statecraft: A realist Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era 
maintains that “major wars would have been prevented if the conflicts were not in the best 
interest of superior powers” (Jentleson, 2001: 250). He is convinced that prevention of 
conflict is possible. Thus, in his view, conflicts such as the Rwanda genocide occurred 
because of the UNSC’s decision to abandon intervention due to the nature of the interests and 
the costs involved in the conflict. The UNSC should therefore account for its culpability in 
the 1994 Rwandan. 
 
It is against this backdrop that it becomes imperative to diligently record the role of the 
Security Council while mediating in resource-poor and resource-rich African conflicts. 
Countries such as Rwanda have experienced crises of ethnic or racial divide activated by the 
colonial masters (Ryan, 1990: 22). This was manifested in the UN-pardoned genocide in 
Rwanda. When states are experiencing important societal transformation, they should not be 
punished for actions that the external actor— the UNSC—has taken or failed to take. The 
core issue in countries that are experiencing societal transformation after conflict is the 





assaults on its territorial integrity. It is also expected that the state will provide an “effective 
justice system, including efficient and legitimate policing, rapid and accessible legal recourse, 
and appropriate protection and compensation for people injured by crime” (ICHRP, 2003:6). 
However, in the case of Rwanda, part of the appropriate compensation to the people affected 
would be to institute a commission of enquiry and bring the Security Council (the global 




This chapter has examined UNSC resolutions and military interventions in the African states 
of Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC and Rwanda. It also appraised, not in detail the roles of the 
AU in resolving African problems. This chapter revealed that the P5 of the UNSC do not 
intervene in a country unless such intervention offers them economic and political benefits. It 
found that selective adoptions of resolutions cause conflicts in the affected countries. 
Compared with the rest of the world, the bulk of the UNSC resolutions on Africa enabled the 
UNSC P5 to stoke conflicts on the continent. Furthermore, the chapter underlines that lack of 
unity and cooperation among African leaders, is an enduring source of conflict in the 
continent. The regional organisations such as the AU has a potential of resolving major 
conflicts in Africa as was demonstrated in its effort to intervene in the 2011 Libyan conflict 
but lack of confidence in its capabilities and unity among its leadership has left African 
conflict in the hands of external interveners. Similarly, the ECOWAS and SADC method of 
expressing dislike to a conflict situation within the continent is inconsistent. These bodies 
will become some significant role players in dealing peace in Africa at such time when they 
are internally equipped to execute the relevant articles and chapters of the AU Constitutive 







The roles of the AU, NATO and the UNSC in the Libyan crisis 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the various roles played by the securitising actors in the 2011 Libyan 
conflict. It discusses the roles of the AU, NATO, and the UN with a view to determining how 
their interests in the conflict dovetailed into a state and human insecurity regime in Libya and 
the effects these organisations have on Africa’s development and growth. In doing so, the 
contributions made by these organisations to sustaining the conflict are determined. The 
UNSC Resolutions on Libya since 1960 with specific discourse on Resolutions 1970 and 
1973will also be discussed. The outcome of the factors discussed will then be assessed with a 
view to ascertaining the adverse impact of all the securitising actors and the UNSC 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya. 
 
3.2. The role of the AU in the Libyan crisis 
 
Civil war and violent conflicts have caused tremendous anguish for civilian populations in 
Africa and the rest of the world (Adebayo: 2009).  Simms and Trim (2011) maintain that a 
singular development of the post-Cold War era is the use of military force to protect human 
beings. From “Rwanda to Kosovo, Sierra Leone to East Timor, and more recently Côte 
d'Ivoire to Libya, soldiers have rescued some civilians in some of the world's most notorious 
war zones. Could more be saved? (Simms and Trim (2011: 4). Exploring the roles of the 
international organisations involved in the Libyan conflict will go some way towards 
answering this question. 
 
According to Ronald Chipaike (2012:46), the Libya crisis has left so many questions about 
the ability of the African Union to resolve conflicts on the continent without outside help. He 
claims that the fact that the three AU members in the UNSC voted for Resolution 1973 for 
the establishment of a no-fly zone and the consequent bombardment of Libya by NATO 
implies that the AU does not trust its own capacity to deal with conflicts of the magnitude in 
Libya. Chipaike (2012) noted that China had not exercised its veto out of its respect for the 





to Western pressure and, in doing that, it was unwittingly giving NATO the responsibility to 
deal with an African conflict. The effectiveness of African solutions for African problems can 
certainly be questioned in the case of Libya. However, while the Libyan problem had grown 
to proportions where civilians were no longer safe, it was not NATO that was supposed to 
intervene in Libya; rather, it was the African Union. As Kalu (2009) pointed out, ‘Article 4 
(h) of the AU act gives the AU the right to intervene forcibly in one of its member states with 
regards to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. This explains why it is safe to 
question AU’s lack of visible action, otherwise, why would the AU go through the longer 
path via the UN when they could intervene directly in Libya? 
 
3.3. The conundrum of failed missions in Libya 
 
Regional and global organisations such as the AU, NATO and the UN were crafted through 
various treaties to help guarantee human security. Conflicts—whether human made or the 
result of natural disasters—have continued to challenge the core objectives of these 
institutions and their roles in conflict/disaster-affected areas of the world. Cordesman and 
Vira (2011) argue that the 2011 Libyan conflict is one of many that interrogate the 
commitment of some of these institutions. The founding principle of the UNSC to serve as 
the guardian of global peace and security was tested in Libya. The UN may have failed to 
respond effectively in terms of Resolution 1973 and the NATO intervention stratagem. 
NATO’s bombing campaign did not enjoy the support of anti-interventionist states. Similarly, 
the AU’s weakness and lack of leadership was also visible throughout the 2011 conflict in 
Libya. The pro-democracy and pro-sovereignty apologists such as Blackwell (2003) and 
Benette (2011) contend that the AU’s weaknesses, which include indecisiveness, were 
evidenced by the opposing views held by the Nigerian and South African governments on 
Libya. Benette (2011) adds that if the AU had been truly united and had abided by the 
principles of the AU constitutive Act, it would have protected Libyans from the UN-backed 
NATO bombing campaign. The Act provided for rules of intervention but South Africa and 
Nigeria interpreted it differently and caused the AU to abandon its application. 
 
Chipaike (2012) also observes that one of the principal problems with the continental body is 
its members’ insistence on the respect of the territorial sovereignty of constituent countries. 





Article 4 (h) of the AU document, the AU was busy defending values of sovereignty, 
independence and brotherhood. This weakened the organisation and created room for the 
more decisive groups like NATO to assume responsibility. In fact the AU could have lost the 
respect of the NTC as a result both of its indecisiveness in taking action against Gaddafi and 
interference for political compromise that would have included members of both the Gaddafi 
regime and the NTC rebels.  
 
Following from Chipaike’s view, Libya may be a clear indication that the AU’s insistence on 
inclusive governments as a conflict management or resolution strategy has outlived its 
usefulness. It indicates a poverty of alternatives to solve the ever-increasing conflicts in 
Africa. The eventual ouster of Laurent Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire by Ouattara’s military forces 
repudiates the effectiveness of governments of national unity as transition mechanisms. 
Likewise, the continual feuding between parties in both the inclusive governments of 
Zimbabwe and Kenya point to a bleak future in terms of power transition. Violence may 
break out again. The AU’s position on the crisis in Libya was also made weak by the fact that 
the General Assembly had already voted to give the NTC a seat, which forced some AU 
members who wanted the establishment of a Zimbabwe or Kenya style inclusive government, 
to accept what the UN wanted in Libya. However implicit in the AU’s call for an inclusive 
government in Libya is the idea that Gaddafi had to be included in any political arrangement 
set up to bring lasting peace in the country—  position that could have adverse repercussions 
for relations between the NTC leadership in Libya and the African Union. 
 
3.4. The African Union in Libya: the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
 
The AU was established in 2002 as the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
which was established in 1963. Its objectives include: enhancing unity and strengthening co-
operation and coordination as well as equipping the African continent with a legal and 
institutional framework to enable Africa to take its rightful place in the community of nations 
(http://www.africa-union.org). In response to the ineffectiveness of the OAU’s conflict 
prevention, resolution and transformation mechanisms, the AU created a new security regime 






The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) were established in terms of the 
framework set out in the African Union Constitutive Act (AUCA). Articles 3 (f) and (h) aim 
to promote peace and security and to promote and protect human rights (Kalu, 2009). 
Furthermore, Article 4 commits the AU to creating a common security and defence policy; to 
pursue the peaceful resolution of conflict among member states; and to prohibit the use of 
force or threats of use of force among member states (Yobo, 2009: 19). In its effort to 
guarantee human security and reliable peace, the AU developed the African Union’s 
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the African Standby Force (ASF). 
 
Unfortunately, the notes that the spirit of the Constitutive Act failed to materialise during the 
voting session that led to the adoption of the UNSC’s Resolution 1973. Gabon, Nigeria and 
South Africa, who were non-permanent members of the UNSC, voted in favour of this 
resolution. This in part was the result of a lack of leadership problems facing Africa. The 
culpability of the AU, however, lies not in indecisive leadership, but rather in the application 
and monitoring of the said resolution. After the adoption of Resolution 1973 and the ensuing 
NATO bombing campaign, there was an expectation that the AU would re-organise itself, 
map out peace plan and communicate this to the UN and NATO. However, this was stymied 
by the deep divisions that have been Africa’s abiding problem. According to AllAfrica 
(2011), South Africa and Nigeria were leading opposing factions of African states. This 
weakened the ability of the AU to act decisively in Libya, thereby providing room for the 
external interveners (Western governments’) offensive attack and the attendant human 
deaths. Such divisions not only enable Western governments to point to Africa’s political 
failure, but also allow them to be responsible for protecting African security interests. This 
explains why African governments and representatives have refused to be responsible and 
unable or unwilling to act on behalf of the African continent to collectively resolve African 
human and state security problems.  
 
According to Cilliers (2005:1) cited by Yobo (2009: 20) CEWS is the link between the AU 
and various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as research institutes 
and civil society organisations.  According to these authors, the CEWS is “rooted in new 





and generally aim to serve human security and interests and not necessarily national and 
states interests” (Yobo, 2009: 20). 
 
3.4.1. The African Union Mission in Libya 
 
According to Benette (2011) one of the vaunted accomplishments of the past decade on the 
African continent has been improved AU security and peace initiatives. However, the 54-
nation body appears to have stumbled in Libya. From the start of the 2011 Libyan conflict, 
the AU opposed international intervention, insisting on inclusive dialogue between Libya’s 
opposition and the ruling regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The 265
th
 session of the 
AUPSC in Addis Ababa on March 10, 2011 stated the AU’s position on the Libyan situation. 
The AUPSC recalled its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (CCLXI) adopted at its 261st 
meeting, held on 23 February 2011 and declared thus:  
AU expresses deep concern at the prevailing situation in Libya, which 
poses a serious threat to peace and security in that country and in the 
region … with resulting humanitarian situation  and Expresses AU’s 
solidarity with Libya, underscores the legitimacy of the aspirations of the 
Libyan people for democracy, political reform, justice, peace and 
security, as well as for socio‐economic development, and the need to 
ensure that these aspirations are fulfilled in a peaceful and democratic 
manner; in this context, Council takes note of the stated commitment of 
the Libyan authorities to embark upon the path of reforms. 
 
However, given the nature of the conflict in Libya and the scale of the interests of some 
members of the P5, especially in terms of the UK, France and US’s growing determination to 
kill the Libyan leader—Colonel Muammar Gaddafi—the AU undertook a series of 
consultations aimed at proffering political solution by supporting negotiation efforts 
facilitated by five nations of the multilateral body (the Presidents of South Africa, Congo-
Brazzaville, Mali and Mauritania, and the Ugandan foreign minister) to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement in Libya. Despite the AU’s strong and unequivocal condemnation of the 
indiscriminate use of force and lethal weapons, and the reaffirmation of its strong 
commitment to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as the rejection of 
any foreign military intervention such as that of NATO in whatever form, the AU finally 
succumbed to the UN-backed NATO and rebel pressures. The AU claims it voted for no-fly 
zone; but when it was interpreted to include ensuring peace even at the cost of human deaths 







It is the submission of this paper that NATO’s involvement in Libya marked the first attempt 
by the West to militarise the new scramble for African resources in the present age. It is also 
argued that if African leaders continue with their mostly dictatorial tendencies, resource 
hungry western countries will use the internal grievances brewed by non-democratic rule as a 
ruse to intervene militarily to uphold and protect human rights and liberties (Murshed, and 
Tadjoeddin, 2007: 11). According to Chipaike (2012: 47), the moment African people rise 
against their government, out of their own will or because of external machinations, there is 
likelihood that Western governments will use force to quell the protests as happened in 
Libya. African governments should therefore endeavour to be democratic, transparent and 
accountable to their people. The nexus between economic and political freedom is very 
strong, hence the need to avail both economic and political opportunities. Gaddafi’s mistake 
was that he concentrated much on the economic and social aspects and left out the political in 
an attempt to create a socialist utopia. 
 
While Chipaike (2012) argues that the AU failed in Libya, Benette (2011: 3) passed the bulk 
of the blame on NATO. She maintains that “the rebels emboldened by NATO air support did 
not allow the AU to practice its bolstered “no indifference” policy. She holds that the Libyan 
rebels should have accepted the AU plan, arguing that it would have forced the AU to take 
more responsibility for Gaddafi’s actions”. The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011) 
corroborates Benette’s view, holding that the suffocation of the AU in its peace efforts in 
Libya is a function of the UN-backed NATO. The ICG maintained that, “a joint political 
initiative by the Arab League and the African Union – the former viewed more favourably by 
the opposition, the latter preferred by the regime – is one possibility to lead to peaceful 
negotiation and transformation of the 2011 Libyan pogrom” (ICG, 2011: ii). While this was 
indeed an option, the Group notes that the AU was not allowed to implement its strategy for 
Libya. It adds that sustaining the military campaign by UN-backed NATO required a 
negation of the AU’s negotiation deal; this encouraged a major foreign military offensive in 
Libya and an escalation in the number of deaths in the country. 
 
While the ICG trusts that AU would have brokered a peace deal if allowed to do so in Libya, 
Adebajo (2011: 13) observes that the AU’s inability to act in conflict-affected African states 





AU was not only marginalised, but was indeed deeply divided over Libya. This incapacitated 
the organisation; as casualties and destruction mounted in Libya, the country’s divisions 
deepened, and the risk of infiltration by jihad militants increased. Furthermore, the economic 
and humanitarian conditions in Libya worsened, and the economic as well as political and 
security burden were forced on Libya’s neighbours due to the AU’s inefficiencies (Benette, 
2011). 
 
3.5. The contributions of NATO to the 2011 Libyan pogrom/conundrum 
 
Apart from the AU’s inability/failure to act as swiftly as possible to forestall the calamity 
imposed on Libya by the UN-backed NATO and its client National Transitional Council 
(NTC), a number of Western Countries such as France, Britain, and the United States stifled 
the peace process in Libya. NATO denied that its goal was to kill Colonel Gaddafi, and 
insisted that its air strikes were directed towards inflicting enough damage to persuade 
Gaddafi and his advisors to surrender power with a view to protecting the civilian population 
and promoting democracy in Libya. In a contending view, Tulsa Liberty (2011) argues: 
 
NATO mission in Libya was neither for the interests of Libyan 
civilian population nor for democracy and human rights. Liberty 
argued that the US government fully backed the Saudi monarchy and 
the Mubarak dictatorship but both regimes do not subscribe to the 
tenets of democracy, and also violate the core creed of human rights 
and values. As such, he insists that the NATO invasion of Libya was 
for the protection of the Western and US-owned oil giant Conoco-
Philips and Exxon-Mobil. He declared that protecting civilians and 
promoting democracy is of zero interest and concern to the Conoco-
Philips and Exxon-Mobil oil giants in Libya.        
 
He further claims that NATO’s objective was to stifle a negotiated settlement in Libya. This 
was with a view to ensuring the collapse of the loyalist military machine and the 
assassination of Gaddafi and his inner circle. According to Cordesman and Vira (2011: 5), “it 
is uncertain how NATO can hope to destroy the Libyan command and control apparatus 
without targeting the people at its centre”. 
 
Cordesman and Vira (2011) add that NATO forces were engaged in a war of attrition in ways 
that were designed to lead to regime change in Libya. Regime change is a significant 





of a no-fly zone, as well as all necessary measures to protect civilians. Instead, Britain, 
France, the US and senior European and NATO officials demanded that Colonel Gaddafi step 
down, with US president Barrack Obama observing that Colonel Gaddafi’s departure from 
office “is good for United States… and that it is the right thing to do” (Cordesman and Vira, 
2011: 5). 
 
NATO’s presence in Libya also truncated AU’s conflict resolution and transformation 
strategies, and helped divide the country against itself. According to Jacobson (2012), NATO 
neither sought peace nor demonstrated a collective political will to attain peace through 
dialogue in Libya. Jentleson’s (2001) findings show that peace is obtainable without the use 
of military hardware; however, this was undermined in Libya by the NATO forces. 
According to Jentleson (2001) enforcement of a rule can be achieved by peaceful means, 
including the simultaneous protection of social groups and the individual, without resorting to 
the use of military force. 
 
Mertus (1999: 6) also presents a critique of the NATO bombing campaign in Libya. In her 
view, NATO’s primary raison d'être was to indulge in wars and not necessarily manage 
conflicts and maintain peace. She contends that NATO’s conflict resolution and/or 
transformation mechanisms and techniques are not suitable and cannot be effective in 
resolving conflicts in Africa; rather, they cause more harm than good. Yobo (2009) 
corroborates this view when she argues that a conflict resolution framework must fit into the 
given conflict context in order to be relevant. She argues that external intervenors, including 
NATO do not effectively analyse the power structure and the role of the state, the arms 
dealers and the victims of violence. According to Yobo (2009:26) in the African context, 
internal African structures and the negative role the Western media plays in explaining the 
causes of conflict in Africa are themselves a source of conflict on the continent. The 
Compliance Campaign (2012) maintained that the Western media helped legitimise the 









3.6. The United Nations in Libya 
 
The birth of the UN in San Francisco in 1945 was partly intended to employ international 
machinery for the promotion and maintenance of global peace and security. It is in pursuant 
of this goal that the UN Charter (1945) declared the organisation’s key objectives thus: 
 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, 
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can 
be maintained, and to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom, to practice tolerance and 
live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and 
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and 
security, and to ensure, by the  acceptance of principles and the 
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save 
in the common interest, and to employ international machinery 
for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of 
all peoples. 
 
When NATO was established, one of the primary principles driving the organisation was: 
 
To provide the Organisation with access to the latest 
theoretical and technical knowledge that the intern can apply 
through practical work assignments, as well as with additional 
staff resources. To provide interns with an opportunity to 
learn from the NATO community and get a better 
understanding and a more balanced view of the Organisation, 
to contribute to creating a more diverse workforce and to 
expand understanding of NATO in Alliance countries 
(www.nato.org).  
 
All of these objectives were geared towards preventing a repeat of the experiences of WWI 
and WWII. However, the current rates of human deaths resulting from military interventions 







3.6.1. United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Libya from 1960 to 
2011 
 
The DRC government suspected the Belgian and US governments of assassinating Patrice 
Lumumba and approached the Security Council for action. The Council did not issue any 
resolution requesting Belgium and US to hand over the culprits but issued Resolution 
161(1961) “regretting the assassination, and ordering the convening of the parliament” 
(S/RES/161(1961). Such double standards in the adoption and application of the UNSC 
resolutions and actions are evident in the US and UK’s actions against Libya. The US and 
Britain claimed to have “evidence implicating two Libyan nationals in the destruction of Pan-
American flight 103 over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988 and the French Union des 
Transport Aeriens (UTA) flight 772 over Niger on September 19, 1989 and the Council in 
January 1992 issued Resolution 731(1992) requesting Libya’s full cooperation with the 
Council and effective response in handing over the culprits” (Bailey, 1994:110).  
 
According to Bailey (1994), Libya denied that any of its nationals were involved in the two 
incidents, and had on March 3 1992 instituted proceedings in the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) against Britain and US, alleging that the two states had failed to settle their 
disputes with Libya through the mechanisms of the Montreal Convention for suppressing 
unlawful acts against civil aviation and asking the Court to indicate provisional measures. 
The Council met on March 31, 1992 and voted 10 against 5, with China on the losing side, 
under Chapter VII of the Charter issued Resolution 748(1992). This, imposed sanctions on 
the entire Libyan aviation industry and included a: “ban on all flights to and from Libya by 
requiring that states refuse landing, takeoff, and over-flight rights for Libyan-bound aircraft 
and close Libyan Arab Airlines offices. It prohibited the supply of aircraft parts, maintenance, 
engineering, and airworthiness certification for Libyan aircraft if Libya had not complied 
with the Council’s previous resolution by 15 April” (Bailey, 1994:111). 
 
On 14 April 1992, one day before the Council’s deadline to Libya, the Court announced its 
decision “that it was not required to indicate provisional measures, insisting that according to 
Article 103 of the Charter, obligations under UN Charter prevail over obligations under 
international agreements” (Bailey, 1994:111).  The Court found that the rights claimed by 
Libya under the Montreal Convention could not be the basis for provisional measures. This 





the hands of its assailants – Britain and the US in the Security Council. On 11 November 
1993 the Council convened and adopted Resolution 883(1993). This confirmed the sanctions 
and extended them to include “a freeze of Libyan assets” (Bailey, 1994: 111; 
S/RES/883(1993). While Libya denied the attacks, it had agreed to turn over the UTA 
suspects to a French Court and the Lockerbie suspects to an international tribunal or the Arab 
League but the US and Britain insisted that the Lockerbie trials had to be held in a US or 
British court.  
 
According to the Libyan government, the British and US-championed sanctions had human, 
economic, food, health, community, political and state security impacts. The 1997 Libyan 
report to the UN, listed a loss over “$2 billion in aviation and counted the inability to fly the 
sick abroad and the attendant death of patients due to lack of the deserved specialist treatment 
which Libyan hospital may not provide for the sick as the chief human insecurity paradigm 
that the Security Council has caused the Libyan population” (Bailey, 1994:113). However, 
the sanctions continued to be upheld by the P5 members of the UN and culminated in UNSC 
Resolution 1973(2011). 
 
3.6.2. UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on the conflict in Libya: The role 
of the Council 
 
The principal reasoning guiding UNSC Resolution 1970 was the responsibility of the Libyan 
government to protect its own people and borders. When the pro-democracy demonstrations 
started in Tunisia, spread to Egypt and successfully dethroned the leadership of these states, 
France, Britain and the US started developing modalities on how to extend the campaign to 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s led-Libya. A demonstration which was haphazardly organised 
started in January in Libya with the demonstrators not having a common purpose. 
 
While some called themselves pro-democracy demonstrators, others held that the 
demonstration was for the release of Fethi Tabel, a Libyan human rights activist.  Eventually, 
with the support of French-hired mercenaries and French-groomed Libyan rebels, the 
demonstration reached its height on 15 February 2011. In a live broadcast, the Libyan leader 
advised them to ignore Western insinuations and incitement, holding that the demonstrators 





the agents of the West in any form in Libya and may die a martyr” (www.aljazeera.com, 
15/08/2011).  
 
On February 26 2011, France, Britain and US forced the Security Council to a round table 
and adopted a resolution on the situation in Libya. From this date, the UNSC inserted itself in 
the Libyan domestic conflict and adopted Resolution 1970(2011) which “ordered the travel 
and assets freeze and arms embargo … on Libya to forestall genocide” (The Tribune, May 9, 
2012). Two weeks later, on March 17, 2011 the Council met at the UN headquarters, and, by 
a vote of 10 in favour to none against, with five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India 
and the Russian Federation), adopted Resolution 1973(2011) on Libya. Resolution 1973 
(2011) was the quickest Council resolution involving the use of military hardware in an only 
weeks’ old uprising in the Council’s Organ’s history (The Guardian News, August 8, 2012). 
The resolution declared thus: 
Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 
1970 (2011), expressing grave concern at... civilian casualties, 
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the 
Libyan population ... further condemning acts of violence ... considering 
that the widespread and systematic ... crimes against humanity, 
expressed its readiness to ... support  humanitarian assistance in the 
Libya... expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians 
and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of 
humanitarian assistance … decides to establish a ban on all flights in the 
airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians, 
… the ban shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian. 
While the overarching intention of Resolution 1973(2011) was to ensure the “protection of 
civilians, no fly zone, enforcement of arms embargo, ban on flights, establishment of 
designations, and panel of experts to help civilian population in Libya” (S/RES/1973(2011), 
the Council eventually concerned itself with regime change in Libya. To achieve this 
objective, it invoked Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VII mandated the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (a military organisation where China does not have a veto power) to 
pursue the British, France and US mission of regime change by all necessary measures. The 
scramble to control Libya’s resources was on. 
 
On 16 September 2011 the Council adopted Resolution 2009(2011) to re-enforce Resolution 
1973(2011) in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.  Resolution 2009(2011) establishes the UN 





(S/RES/2009(2011). It also retracted some of the declarations in Resolution 1970(2011) and 
further decided that “the measure imposed by paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall 
also not apply to the supply, sale or transfer to Libya of: (a) arms and related material of all 
types, including technical assistance, training, financial and other assistance, intended solely 
for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities and notified to the 
Committee in advance and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within 
five working days of such a notification; (b) small arms, light weapons and related material, 
temporarily exported to Libya for the sole use of United Nations personnel, representatives of 
the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, notified to 
the Committee in advance and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within 
five working days of such a notification” (S/RES/2009(2011)). 
 
While Resolution 2009(2011) has allowed Britain, France and the US to export and sell arms  
to the rebel group known as the National Transitional Council (NTC),it also declared “that 
the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) and Zueitina Oil Company shall no longer be 
subject to the asset freeze” (S/RES/2009(2011).  
 
Resolution 2009(2011) saw the eventual demise of the Libyan government and its leader, 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi through the combined effort of NATO mercenaries and the NTC 
on October 20, 2011. Seven days after the assassination of the Libyan leader, despite the 
TNC’s fervent prayer for the UNSC to stay in Libya a little longer on October 27, 2011 the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 2016 (2011). It asserted: “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Council welcomes the positive developments in Libya (the 
collapse of Libyan regime and murder of Libyan Leader- Colonel Muammar Gaddafi) which 
will improve the prospects for a democratic, peaceful and prosperous future, … Decides also 
that the provisions of paragraphs 6 to 12 of Resolution 1973 (2011) ‘no fly zone’ shall be 
terminated from 23.59 Libyan local time on 31 October 2011” (S/RES/2016(2011). 
 
Still celebrating the death of Libyan leader, the Council reconvened and issued Resolution 
2017(2011).  This resolution “recalls its previous resolutions 1373 (2001), 1526 (2004), 1540 
(2004), 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 1977 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2009 (2011) and 2016 (2011), 
and the statements of its Presidents S/PRST/2005/7 and S/PRST/2010/6; Reaffirming its 
strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity 





security; Calls upon the Libyan authorities to take all necessary steps to prevent the 
proliferation of all arms and related material of all types” (S/RES/2017(2011). It is however, 
important to note the arms in Libya were provisioned by the Council in Resolution 
2009(2011). 
 
Resolution 2022 (2011)-- the UN Security Council’s  concluded: “Stressing the importance of 
the UN’s, including UNSMIL’s, continued support to the transitional government of Libya in 
addressing immediate priorities as set out in paragraph 12 of Resolution 2009 (2011), 
[d]ecides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya established 
by paragraph 12 of Resolution 2009 (2011) until 16 March 2012, and looks forward to the 
report of the Secretary-General, including recommendations on the next phase of UNSMIL’s 
support to Libya” (S/RES/2022(2011). According to scholars such as Hawkins (2003), Isike, 
Uzodike and Gilbert (2008), and Amuwo (2009), Council resolutions are usually the 
reflection of the will of powerful states such as the US, Britain and France in conflict areas as 
opposed to the interests of affected citizens. 
 
3.7. The impacts of the intervention on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Republic  
 
Libya gained independence from her colonial master, Italy, on December 24, 1951. 
According to Liberty (2011), in 2008, “Libya has the largest oil reserve in Africa and is the 
ninth largest in the world with 41.5 billion barrels proven reserves”. Its population amounted 
to “about six million people” (Hahn 1981:1).  
 
Following a study conducted by the United Nations Security Council (2012: 42) on the 
impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region, the report declares: 
While the impact of the crisis reverberated across the world, such 
neighbouring countries as Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, the 
Niger and Tunisia bore the brunt of the challenges that emerged as a result 
of the crisis. In a relatively short period of time, the Governments of these 
countries, especially those in the Sahel region, had to contend with the 
influx of hundreds of thousands of traumatized and impoverished returnees 
as well as the inflow of unspecified and unquantifiable numbers of arms 
and ammunition from the Libyan arsenal. Although the volume and the 





influx clearly has the potential to further exacerbate an already precarious 
and tenuous situation. In addition, these countries are directly threatened by 
an impending food security and nutrition crisis that could further 
exacerbate and negatively affect the political, social and economic situation 
in the region. 
 
While this report suggests that the demographic constitution of Libya changed following the 
intervention in the 2011 Libyan conflict, Global Issues (2011: 1) finds that: the Libyan oil 
sector declined by 2.3%; disunity and division increased by 6.4%; external control rose by 
11.2%; the Libyan population decreased by 0.6%; and proliferation of arms increased by 
12.4%.It is clear that the 2011 Libyan conflict had an adverse impact on the country. The 
sense of oneness and nationhood was disrupted by the divisions engendered by the conflict. 
Apart from the loss of life and the decrease in national population due to mass exits and the 
use of lethal weapons and munitions, the proliferation of arms also made Libya a very 
dangerous state compared with conditions before the conflict (Global Issues, 2012).    
 
Furthermore, the intervention also made Libya a less important player in African regional 
politics. Christopher M. Blanchard (2012: 15) argues that the principal element that makes 
Libya a strategic and successful state is its role in African politics and the national unity on 
which its foundations were laid. Disunity and division in post-conflict Libya has clearly 
undermined the security status of the state. State and human insecurity are the direct result of 
the intervention in Libya. 
 
The United Nations uses the Human Development Index (HDI) to measure both human 
growth and development of member states. This also includes economic, political and social 
well-being of the citizenry of the state under review. The United Nations Development 
Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report of 02 November 2011, which assessed 
185 UN member states, ranked Libya sixty-fourth in terms of its Human Development Index. 
Libya is two places ahead of the Russian Federation. This suggests that Libya is better than 
Russia in both human growth and development. But the question remains why Russia was not 
targeted to establish a better way to improve the political and social well-being of its people. 
While France occupied 20
th
 place with an HDI of 0.884 and the United Kingdom occupied 
28
th
 place with an HDI of 0.846, Libya’s HDI is 0.760. At the bottom of the log is DRC, with 
an HDI of 0.286.Since Human development is not only linked to education and welfare but 





needing development are treated equally. While France occupies 7
th
 place in HDI in terms of 
Europe, Britain did not make the top ten in Europe. Given that Libya is second after 
Seychelles on the African continent, the principle guiding is poor by the way of western 
interpretations of development (List of Countries by Human Development Index, 2012).  
 
In the wake of February 2011, France, Britain and the US, under the umbrella of the UNSC 
and NATO, invaded Libya. They pursued the dethronement of the Libyan government 
through Resolution 1973 (2011). This effectively led to the killing of Libyan Leader Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi and his sons and the recognition of the rebel leadership in Libya by these 
countries, as well as the loss of thousands of human lives at the hands of NATO. 
 
The arguments presented to the UNSC relating to the action, or lack of action, on the part of 
both the Council and the AU illustrate that the consequence is the conundrum of state and 
human insecurity in Libya. The main concern in Libya is the degree of insecurity the Council 
and NATO created in their bid to instill security. Ole Waver (2004) holds that securitization 
theory argues that security is a (illocutionary) speech act; solely by uttering ‘security’, 
something is being done. “It is by labeling something a security issue that it becomes one” 
(Waver, 2004: 13). 
 
Similarly, Campbell cited by Yobo (2009:27) maintains that although the state remains the 
fundamental purveyor of security, the focus has shifted from the security of the state to that 
of the people— human security. Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert (2008:25) and Yobo (2009:27) 
argue human security involves the validation of all citizens; war against poverty, disease and 
famine; the termination of all threats to human existence such as: community, economic, 
environmental, food, wealth, personal and political securities; demilitarisation of the human 
environment; and ending crimes against humanity such as genocide.  In analogous vein, 
Edwards (2009: 764) insists that human security means protecting “vital freedoms”. 
According to Edwards (2009) it suggests protecting people from critical and pervasive threats 
and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that 
give people the building blocks of survival, dignity, and livelihood. Human security in his 
view connects different types of freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear, and 






It is however, important to note that the presence of the militarised NATO in Libya during 
the 2011 Libyan conflict underscored the great danger posed to human existence in that state 
and caused civilian population to flee and become refugees. According to Edwards (2009: 
774) and Cordesman and Vira (2011: 61) seven hundred and ten thousand four hundred and 
eight (710,408) persons departed Libya as IDPs and about two thousand five hundred (2,500) 
citizens made up the refugee population during the UN-backed-NATO-led pogrom. Whether 
the refugees are viewed as victims of security deficits or as potential threats to national or 
international trans-border security, territorial assault and security are the defining elements in 
the refugee protection landscape and territorial integrity challenge. Indeed, some of the major 
aspects of human existence that the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya undermined, in 
Campbell’s (2002: 8) view, are: Economic security, food security, health security, personal 
security, community security, political security, and ‘territorial security’.   
 
Economic security: or financial security is the condition of having stable income or other 
resources to support a standard of living now and in the foreseeable future. It includes: 
probable continued solvency predictability of the future cash flow of a person, individual 
need for a basic source of income either from productive and remunerative work or from a 
publicly financed safety institution or other economic entity such as a country employment 
security or job security (Economic Security…, 2012). 
Food security: Food availability: sufficient quantities of food available on a consistent basis. 
Food access: having sufficient resources to obtain appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. 
Food use: appropriate use based on knowledge of basic nutrition and care, as well as adequate 
water and sanitation (http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/). 
Health security: protection from diseases and unhealthy ways of living. 
 
Personal Security: to protect people… from physical violence either from state or external 
forces as well as from groups within states. 
 
Environmental security: protecting people from short- and long-term ravages of nature and 
man-made threats to nature. 
 
Community security: protecting people from the loss of traditional relationships and values 






Political security: political security is concerned with whether people live in a society that 
respects their basic human rights. 
  
In light of the above, the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya which was primarily 
responsible for creating refugees and generating IDPs in Libya critically threatened human 
security and the lives of Libyans, who were dislodged from their normal daily activities. 
According to REUTERS (2011), during the NATO incursion in Libya, more than 50,000 
people were killed; between 200 and 500 were IDPs based on independent reports from the 
UNCHR and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) respectively and 11,000 
people became refugees and asylum-seekers from a country that had the highest HDI on the 
continent after Seychelles in 2011 (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485f36.html).  
 
Since the end of World War II, the international political system has been structured around 
three central tenets. According to Elden (2009:11) these are the notion of the equal 
sovereignty of states, internal competence for domestic jurisdiction, and territorial 
preservation of existing boundaries. The United Nations Charter underlines these tenets in its 
first Chapter when it notes that all members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. 
Other Articles of the founding Charter, as well as Security Council and General Assembly 
resolutions have continually stressed these central founding principles. Elden (2009) observes 
that these tenets are interrelated in that the notion of territorial integrity means both territorial 
preservation and territorial sovereignty and political independence which require both 
exclusive internal and equal external sovereignty. NATO did not respect this norm in Libya. 
  
Michael Walzer argues that state sovereignty and territorial integrity generally provide 
measures of protection within national borders (Elden, 2006: 13).Indeed, if an invasion has 
been threatened or has actually begun, it may be necessary to defend the border as it 
represents the security of the people. In view of the above, Elden (2006) maintains that wars 
of aggression, to avert the violation of human rights, cases of enslavement or massacres may 
be fought in defence of the state and its population. In this sense therefore, sovereignty and 
the territorial integrity of the state is the manner in which exclusive jurisdiction is exercised 






The concept of state sovereignty was a popular one at the time of independence of former 
colonies. It should be noted, however, that as the post-colonial period progressed, and the 
doctrine and principles of democracy made their way into democratic states, the military 
incursion pendulum began to swing back. States began to monitor and effectively control the 
territory under their occupation and leadership. Thus, the national interest and the military 
force that dominated the Cold War discourse are no longer considered well suited to the 
transnational character of many of the new challenges of post-Cold War independent states 
(Edwards, 2011: 763). It is of particular importance to highlight that the 2011 UN-backed 
NATO intervention in Libya undermined the principles that guide the conduct of territorial 
ownership and the occupation of states; the AU indirectly supported this through its 
indecisive actions. 
 
The UN-backed, NATO-led intervention in Libya brings into focus uneasiness about 
“crossing the sovereignty line and getting into other people’s business” (Crocker et al., 2007: 
231). According to Crocker et al. (2007), outsiders (such as NATO in Libya) are not 
necessarily best equipped to intervene; they have no self-evident mandate to intervene 
without advancing their own national interests to the detriment of the state they profess to set 
free. In his accounts of preventive statecraft, Jentleson (2004) maintains that notwithstanding 
claims of neutrality or non-involvement, there is no ‘non-position’ for international actors 
(such as NATO in Libya). Jentleson (2004) adds that while international actors may profess 
neutrality, be it limiting their involvement to humanitarian rescue, protecting civilians and the 
territory or simply staying out, one way or the other, these actions affect the state’s territorial 
integrity.  
  
The works of Jenleson (2004) and Crocker et al. (2007) suggests that interference in the 
domestic affairs of a sovereign state by international actors could undermine the territorial 
integrity of the affected state. Other scholars disagree. According to Fielder (2011), the realist 
paradigm presupposes that the Libyan government should have engaged in self-help or 
conducted its own affairs as an independent and sovereign state during the crisis. In terms of 
this view, the government of Libya was only re-asserting its authority against internal 
security threats. In terms of the realist paradigm, no other state has the right to interfere with 
Libya’s internal affairs. Thus, any act to stop an established and a globally recognised state 






While the realist paradigm holds that intervention in sovereign states undermines the 
leadership of a state, the constructivist and liberal paradigms firmly hold that the state system 
has transcended simple anarchy to establish a system where accepted norms of behaviour 
diffuse through state and international organisations. According to Fielder (2011), a state’s 
decision to be part of the global community implies its agreement to sacrifice some of its 
sovereignty in order to gain shared benefits such as security and trade. While this 
constructionist view is a reality that obtains in the current international system, Liberty 
(2011) is opposed to the constructionist paradigm. 
 
According to Liberty (2011), NATO’s intervention in Libya ridiculed the principle of 
territorial control and ownership, especially since it was conducted in order to benefit states 
such as Britain, France and the US. In his view, Libya was merely resisting the new 
colonialism. Liberty (2011) argues that colonisers such as Britain and France and the leading 
neo-imperial leader, the US assigned noble labels such as protecting civilian to their national 
political and economic interests that undermined the sovereign rights of the affected state and 
its population. Liberty argues strongly that NATO’s role in Libya during the 2011 uprising 
strips claims to be protecting civilian propaganda of any credibility. Liberty notes that 
Britain, France and the US relied on the uniformity of the corporate-owned media coverage 
about their humanitarian motives and the protection of the civilian population to disguise 
their crass and cynical plans to politically and economically marginalise  Libyans in the 
international system. 
 
3.8. Conclusion  
 
Having appraised the roles of the AU, NATO and the UNSC in the 2011 Libyan conflict, this 
chapter concluded that the UNSC, through the hurriedly enforced no-fly zone over Libya, 
precipitated both state and human insecurity in Libya. It also emphasised that the AU’s 
inability to effectively intervene was a direct result of the lack of unity on the continent. The 
unity of African nations is one of the principle ways to deal with African political problems. 
A united Africa would be a force to be reckoned with, but a divided one is an enduring source 







The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) clause and the challenges of state and 
human insecurity 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Taking into account that both the remote and immediate causes of the 2011 Libyan conflict 
are linked to the UNSC resolutions and interventions discussed in chapter three, this chapter 
focuses on the R2P doctrine, as this doctrine has implications for the crisis in Libya. This 
chapter also highlights that the prospect of global peace in the post-Cold War world is 
difficult to attain. The lessons learnt in chapters one, two, three and four are clearly outlined 
and it is demonstrated that R2P is not a sufficient instrument to instill peace.   
 
4.2. The concept of Responsibility to Protect 
 
The term ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) has been defined by Kiszti (2012), Garrigues, 
(2007) Scanlon et al., (2007), Luck (2008) and Burke (2009) as the obligation to protect 
citizens from mass violence and suffering, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to provide a framework for humanitarian intervention in restricted 
circumstances, rather than to create an alternative framework for human rights protection. 
The five main documents in which the R2P has been articulated are the High Level Panel’s 
“Report on Threats, Challenges and Change”; the Secretary-General’s Report “In Larger 
Freedom”; the Outcome Document of the World Summit of 2005; UN Security Council 
Resolution 1674; and the UN Secretary-General’s Report on “Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect” (Office of the President of General Assembly, 2009).  
 
While all these documents seek to ensure that the international community plays a collective 
part in the protection of civilian populations in conflict-affected areas around the world, none 
of them can be considered a source of binding international law in terms of Article 38 of the 
Statue of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which lists the classic sources of 
international law. Thus, theR2P has become part of the enduring acrimony between the 





confronting the international community is the degree to which that community is responsible 
for the protection of civilians during humanitarian crises. 
 
According to the UN Human Rights Council report of 2006 cited in Kiszti (2006: 8) and 
Burke (2009) the goal of the R2P concept was to establish some consensus on when 
intervention should be permitted, under whose organisation and authority, and the manner in 
which that intervention should occur. Thus, the R2P doctrine maintains that state sovereignty 
implies a primary and fundamental responsibility to protect all citizens from any heinous 
crimes.  
 
According to Scanlon et al., (2007:6) the principle of R2P places three responsibilities on the 
shoulders of the international community: “the responsibility to prevent; the responsibility to 
react; and the responsibility to rebuild”. This is a new way of conceptualising state 
sovereignty in order to move to a culture of national and international accountability; 
however, there has been much criticism of the functionality of the R2P. One such criticism is 
that it often appears ambiguous; the circumstance under which intervention can and cannot be 
used is often unclear. This, in turn makes it possible for the R2P to be dovetailed into human 
security conditions in some states, where the principle was employed to arrest human 
insecurity; the 2011 Libyan crisis is a case in point. 
 
In Replacing the Responsibility to Protect: the Equitable Theory of Humanitarian 
Intervention, Ciaran Burke (2009:34) expresses doubts about the possibility of any successful 
application of the R2P. In his view, the concept is flawed, because R2P is “superficially 
attractive”. He holds that two obvious causal factors for intervention have been omitted from 
just cause, namely, the “Overthrow of democratically-elected regimes and Massive abuses of 
Human rights”. He asserts that the R2P concept will continue to victimize the groups that it 
seeks to redeem because “many of the R2P’s ideas were misconceived, and its threshold 
criteria are faulty at best” (Burke, 2009: 35).  
 
Burke (2009) adds that the R2P clouds the debate on humanitarian intervention and sets 
criteria which might easily be used for other, altruistic reasons.  For example, there are many 
circumstances in which external military intervention, regardless of exigent circumstances, 
will not be a viable option; if China were to use aggressive military force against some form 





condemn the action, but there would be no real military options in terms of a response.  For 
that matter, there would be no major military option if any one of a number of major powers 
committed R2P-delineated crimes (Western, 2011)  
 
According to Burke (2009) another criticism of the R2P is the fact that the principle is rooted 
in “legal nothingness”. Neither state practice, nor major treaties have included affirmative 
references to the concept, and while the UNSC Resolution 1674(2006) reaffirmed the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD) regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, this did not entail legal incorporation of the 
R2P, nor does it serve as any sort of future guideline for Security Council activities. 
 
Burke (2009) and Alm (2011) argue that the lack of legal foundations for the R2P helps the 
crusaders for the concept to advance dubious claims and serves the interests of the 
interveners. He contends that while the idea of ‘good international citizenship’, which implies 
the responsibility to intervene anywhere in the world when serious crises emerge, due to the 
interdependence of the world community may counterbalance fears of opportunistic 
interventions, it is fanciful at best. Martti Koskenniemi notes sarcastically that, “it is never 
Algeria that will intervene in France or Finland in Chechnya” (Burke, 2009: 139). 
Furthermore, the UN permanent five does not exercise their veto unless a matter is of prime 
interest to them. It is almost always powerful states that intervene in weaker states. In this 
regard, Burke observes that even though the interveners claim the intervention is “not 
necessarily for Realpolitik but the moral duty to protect”, in essence, it represents treachery 
(Burke, 2009: 139). 
 
Burke adds that the prism of R2P favours the Liberal, quasi-utopian notion of a world of 
interdependent states, each of which has an interest in every conflict, every time they occur, 
due to the universal desire for a stable world environment. He notes that this vision is roundly 
refuted by Realists, who point to the fact that unless states’ vital interests are at stake, they 
will not intervene if intervention risks soldiers’ lives or incurs serious costs. Thus, a happy 
coincidence where the promotion of national security also defends human rights becomes the 
preferred alternative. The strength of this position is that it recognises the reality of state 
interests and power; its weakness is that it makes humanitarianism dependent on shifting 





formulae for permissible intervention do not posit primacy of humanitarian motives as a sine 
qua non of intervention” (Wheeler, 2000: 33). The UNSC Resolution 1973 and NATO’s 
military intervention in Libya lend credence to this claim. 
 
4.3. The Doctrine of responsibility to protect and its application in Libya 
 
The overarching purpose of the Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2005 was to endorse that each 
individual sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it emphasised that the 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this 
responsibility through United Nations agencies. This clarified the import of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which had occupied centre stage 
in political debates on states’ unwillingness or inability to defend their civilian populace. 
Furthermore, the international community, through the UN has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters 
VI and VIII of the Charter, primarily to help protect affected populations from human 
insecurity. However, in the 2011 Libyan conflict, the UN-backed NATO did not use peaceful 
means, but launched an aggressive military assault on both the military and the civilian 
population in the country.  
  
Well-intentioned as the provisions of Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter might be 
regarding the protection of vulnerable populations in crisis situations, the track record of UN 
actions and inaction in Rwanda, Cambodia, Srebrenica, and especially in the 2011 Libyan 
crisis have clouded its objectives in protecting civilians. The failure of the UN to respond to 
the horrific genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and in Cambodia two decades earlier as well as to 
the mass murders in Srebrenica in 1995, the latter two under the watchful eyes of UNSC, 
raised disturbing questions both about the political will and the capacity of the UN, and the 
economic interests of the Security Council’s P5 regarding interventions. 
 
On 22 February, one week after the uprising in Libya, the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect (GCRP) requested the “Security Council to take steps including 





sanctions against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi” (Notaras and Popovski, 2011: 3). 
According to Notaras and Popovski (2011) the call for UNSC intervention was necessary 
because the Libyan government was undermining Pillar Three of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document. Pillar Three activates international intervention when states are 
manifestly failing or unwilling to protect their citizens. 
 
It is pertinent to note that in the Preamble to Resolution 1973, the following determination 
was added: “Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan 
population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to 
take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians in Libya”. This note suggests that 
the Libyan government had the capacity to protect its civilian population but did not do so. 
Interestingly, this text refers to both the recent norm of R2P, and to the Protection of 
Civilians (PoCs) — the latter being an old principle of Just War theory found in religious 
traditions, but which was universalised as a norm in international humanitarian law through 
the “1949 Fourth Geneva Convention” (Patrnogic, 2006: 68) 
 
While the UN Security Council intervened in Libya under the R2P, scholars such as 
Mehrunisa Qayyum (2011) and David Rieff (2011: 1) are skeptical of the UN’s role in Libya. 
They assert that it might be argued that Gaddafi’s statement to go house-to-house to deal with 
the state offenders in a broadcast might have provided entry point for the Western states into 
the Libyan conflict, the UN-backed-NATO-led intervention in Libya was never intended to 
execute the R2P, but rather represented the affirmation of the powerful states’ freedom to 
invade weaker states at will. They observe that the UNSC and NATO penetrated Libya 
following the claim that citizens of Libya were under threat of genocide or grievous harm 
after Gaddafi’s Benghazi broadcast that called the rebellious residents ‘rats’. Rieff (2011: 1) 
and Jon Western, (2012: 1)  add that the UNSC and NATO intervention in Libya “obscured 
the fact that NATO’s interpretation of R2P in effect puts the old wine of Kosovo-style 
humanitarian military intervention in a new U.N.-sanctioned bottle”  
 
These authors maintain that Britain, France and US intervened in Libya to secure regime 
change, not to protect civilian population as they professed. For example, they note that 
London, Paris and Washington had no trouble ignoring their professed values and turning a 
blind eye to Gaddafi’s ‘crimes’ when it suited them to do so. They then decided that their 





sense, regime change became the West’s policy, and the civilian-protection mandate of the 
R2P was its cover. 
 
It has been claimed that the doctrine of R2P decimated more human lives than it protected in 
Libya (Qayyum, 2011: 2).  Libya is another example of selective international concern for 
civilian populations. The swift and unprecedented UN decision-making and robust NATO 
military action in oil-rich Libya highlights the disparities in international responses to threats 
to international security and peace. For example, “over 5,000 Syrians have been killed while 
thousands more remain in political detention since March 15, 2011” (Qayyum, 2011) when 
the uprising first emerged in the south-western city of Daraa. However, neither the UN nor 
NATO, used the R2P to intervene in Syria at the time and there appeared to be no prospect of 
future intervention. Eventually, China and Russia vetoed proposed military intervention in 
Syrian conflict in July 2012. This raises the question as to why military intervention was 
pursued in Libya. 
 
It can thus be concluded that a doctrine of intervention that both claims the moral high 
ground and universality, but where the interveners are always from the global North and the 
targets always from the global South neither invokes the R2P nor the protection of civilians. 
Rather, it is real politik. In this sense, the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya remains 
geopolitical business as usual. Rieff (2011) observes that while Paris, London, and 
Washington were congratulating one another for a job well done in Libya, in the UNSC, 
China and Russia were vetoing the imposition of far milder, nonmilitary sanctions against 
Syria. In his view, no R2P-based call or Libya-type interventions will be sanctioned by the 
UN in the foreseeable future because of the suffering caused to Libyans by UN and NATO 
actions. 
 
4.4. NATO and the responsibility to protect in Libya 
 
Those behind the 2011 Libyan conflict viewed NATO as part of the group of professional 
mercenaries, hired by Britain, France and the US to kill Gaddafi under the pretence of the 
R2P the civilian population. The Libyan people’s euphoria and NATO’s relief at the 
successful military campaign that removed Gaddafi and his eventual death clearly tempered 





civilians. The jury indeed is still out on whether international military action in Libya will 
promote consolidation or softening of the R2P norm. Resolution 1973 authorised military 
action to prevent civilian slaughter but did not authorise intervention in a civil war (any state 
has the right to use force to suppress armed uprisings), effect regime change, or target 
Gaddafi. To the extent that he was so targeted, NATO exceeded UN authority in breach of 
the Charter code.  
 
By its very nature, including unpredictability, unintended consequences and the risk to 
innocent civilians caught in the crossfire, warfare is inherently brutal. This raises the 
question: under what circumstances is the use of force necessary, justified and required to 
provide effective international humanitarian protection to at-risk populations without the 
consent of their own government? In the absence of genuine R2P, the intervention is more 
likely to be ad hoc, unilateral, self-interested and deeply divisive.  
 
Evans, G. and Sahnoun, M (2001) and Ramesh Thakur (2008) noted that the unilateralism 
and self-interestedness of NATO was a key difference between Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 
2003. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 might be seen as a clear case of self-
interestedness. The UN’s failures in Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s reflected its 
structural, political and operational deficiencies that led to its inability to save people from a 
life of hell on earth. Thakur (2008) posits that R2P responds to the idealised UN as the 
symbol of an imagined and constructed community of strangers. While the implied UNSC 
claim that “we are our brothers’ and sisters’ keepers” is noble one, in Libya, the UNSC 
served as the killer of its brothers and sisters. 
 
In the Balkans, it took NATO almost a full decade to intervene with air power. In Libya, it 
took one month to mobilise a broad coalition, secure a UN mandate, establish and enforce no-
fly and no-drive zones and to stop Libya’s advancing army from securing the security of the 
state. Adopted on 17 March 2011 by a 10-0-5 vote (with China, Russia, Brazil, Germany and 
India abstaining), Security Council Resolution 1973 was carefully crafted both to authorise 
and widen the scope of intervention. The African representatives in the UNSC also voted in 
support of the no-fly and no-rive zones. This suggests that not only did the African members 
not understand the implications of supporting such measures, but that, as noted in chapter 






According to Veuthey, (2006) and Rieff (2011: 2), the“R2P is a doctrine born of good 
intentions, but one of its great drawbacks is that it turns war into a form of police work writ 
large, guided by fables of moral innocence and righteousness”. War, even when it is waged 
for a just cause and with scrupulous respect for international humanitarian law, always 
involves a descent into barbarism (think of the way Gaddafi died). This is why even when the 
R2P is applied well, it carries moral risks. When it is distorted, as it was by NATO in Libya, 
the R2P is not a necessary reform to the international system, but a threat to its legitimacy 
Schraeder, (1994) and Martin and Edwards (1995: 15). When R2P supporters advocated the 
doctrine in the UN in the middle of the past decade, they emphasised its nonmilitary aspects 
and insisted that the use of force would be a rare, last resort. Yet in Libya, military force 
almost immediately followed the ultimatums issued to Gaddafi; to all intents and purposes, 
the R2P was NATO-ized. As a result, except in the NATO-led states, R2P has lost what little 
ethical credibility it ever commanded. 
 
4.5. The AU and the Responsibility to Protect in Libya  
 
The AU’s objectives of preventing conflict from occurring and protecting civilians when it 
occurs, attainable as they might be, have been fraught with the security challenges that have 
confronted leadership in Africa since independence. After fair attempts in Togo, Sao Tome 
and Principe, it became difficult for the AU to gain full control of other conflicts in affected 
African states, from the Rwandan genocide, to Sudan-Darfur, to DRC, to Cote d’Ivoire, and 
especially the 2011 Libyan crisis. Thus, international organisations such as the UN and 
NATO have taken centre stage in these conflicts. This is despite the AU’s introduction of the 
Constitutive Act which discusses the organisation’s intervention plan and provides the AU 
with the legal backing to intervene in a conflict-ridden member state in order to curtail threats 
such as “war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (Kalu, 2009: 17). 
 
The AU aims to: achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and peoples; 
to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its 
peoples; to promote peace, security and stability on the continent; and to promote democratic 
principles and institution, popular participation and good governance. These are the 





cohesion, solidarity and integration of the peoples of Africa. Sadly, this creed was entirely 
absent in Libya and Gaddafi died as a result of the failure to invoke and implement it.  
 
When 43 African heads of state met in Durban in July 2002, the transition from the OAU to 
AU was motivated by the need to make changes to the fundamental hubris in the pan-African 
peace and security schema (Yobo, 2009: 81). This has a deep-seated respect both for the 
parameters of sovereignty and for the need for intervention in order to protect human lives. 
Elements of the R2P were used to strengthen the AU’s emerging peace and security regime. 
This is evident in the Constitutive Act of 2002, even before the R2P was globally accepted as 
an international norm for intervention in the 2005 World Summit Document. According to 
Kalu (2009:18), for example, “Article (4)h of the Constitutive Acts provides right to 
intervene, impose sanctions, and override sovereignty of the affected member state and 
follow up in terms of conflict prevention, issues of genocide, crime against humanity, human 
rights among others”. Yobo (2009) adds that the necessary intervention should be conducted 
within the guiding rules and regulations of mediation and especially in accordance with the 
“African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other relevant human rights 
instruments” and (Yobo, 2009: 81). This is in order to guarantee human rights during 
intervention in any conflict.   
 
With regards to the lessons drawn from AU’s response to conflict situations as in Darfur 
2003, it has entrusted its peace-keeping capabilities to the Peace and Security Council (PSC). 
According to Yobo (2009), the PSC is composed of an African Standby Force, a body of 
multidisciplinary military and civilian contingents for rapid response and deployment. In 
keeping with the principle of the Charter, part of the duties of the PSC is to ensure the signing 
of peace/ceasefire agreements and provide care to those who are in the midst of humanitarian 
crises as a result of conflict. She adds that, “the prevention-reaction-rebuilding field of 
protection” as articulated by the Responsibility to Protect Act, the emerging frameworks and 
the founding documents therefore underscore the importance of conflict prevention and 
sustainable post-conflict reconstruction through development and transformation as a means 







4.5.1. African Union’s capacity to respond to the Libyan crisis 
 
Michael Doyle’s (2006) assertion that “peace, law and order cannot be enforced on any 
resistant population” is pertinent in examining conflict-affected areas in Africa and beyond. 
Human-induced conflicts such as the 2011 Libyan conflict which some expert observers such 
as International Crisis Group (2011)blamed on the Western-led UN Security Council and 
NATO, are, on the one hand, a reflection of the AU’s inability to assert itself and, on the 
other hand, a demonstration of the lack of unity on the continent.  The AU through the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative and the PSC, developed its 
capacity by means of a “comprehensive continental plan and diplomatic strategy to marshal 
resources from both within and outside the continent” to provide African solution to African 
problems (Yobo, 2009: 94). This includes taking appropriate, collective decisions as a unit to 
intervene and take the lead in resolving African conflicts. 
 
A few weeks after the uprising in Libya, the AU condemned the conflict in the strongest of 
terms and unanimously maintained that it would be resolved through the AU’s conflict 
response mechanisms. The AU  “reaffirm[ed] its strong commitment to the respect of the 
unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreign military 
intervention, whatever its form” (AUPSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV)). While this declaration 
presented the AU as an organisation that sought to instill peace in Libya, it did not take long 
for the organisation to crack. This first became apparent when NATO ignored the AU’s calls 
for non-foreign military intervention and invaded Libya with the UNSC’s support. NATO 
departed only after the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was killed. 
 
The targeted killing of Gaddafi by the Western-led NATO and UNSC elements not only 
questioned the efficiency and the capacity of the AU to defend African leaders who found 
themselves in conflict with powerful Western states; it also leads to the question:  asks, what 
does the AU’s R2P doctrine entails in the current continental and international conflict 
resolution and transformation system? The selective application of intervention and the shift 
from civilian protection to regime change practiced by NATO and the UNSC in Libya also 
calls into question whether or not the AU enjoys decisive leadership and whether theR2P can 
become anything more than a tool for regime change or ad hoc responses to violence against 
civilians.  The doctrine’s major promise when it was unanimously adopted at the World 





atrocities and that it would contribute to the broader transformation of global society. 
However, its application in Libya did not abide by this promise. 
 
Before the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, the chain of command holding the AU together 
seemed to have broken. The member states became divided over Libya and could neither 
enforce the R2P principle nor military intervention as provided by the AUCA. According to 
African Economic Outlook (2012: 24) the two most powerful states in Africa, the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa were clearly divided on critical issues 
in Libya; as was in the case in Cote d’Ivoire other member states took sides with either 
Nigeria or South Africa. This crack in Africa’s unity and the AU’s lack of military capacity 
diminished the continent’s capacity to protect civilians and may have allowed for the death of 
Gaddafi. The disunity regarding Libya was once again reflected when Nigeria and 34 other 
African countries recognised the leadership of the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the 
legitimate Libyan government. South Africa, Zimbabwe and Uganda did not recognise the 
TNC regime until they were bullied into doing so by the US, Britain and France and the 
majority of the African states.  
 
4.6. Who has the responsibility to protect the Libyan Population?  
 
The international community has a contentious history when it comes to preventing and 
halting mass atrocities. According to Aidan Hehir (2011) throughout the 20th and early 21st 
centuries, states largely failed to act according to their responsibilities as signatories of the 
1948 Genocide Convention, ‘standing by’ time after time while civilians were targeted by 
their leaders, despite their declarations that such crimes must “never again” be allowed to 
happen. It was only in 2001, under the shadow of shameful inaction during the Rwandan 
genocide and in the light of the perceived success of the 1999 Kosovo intervention, that the 
international community was finally able to produce a comprehensive framework of policy 
tools designed to guide states towards preventing mass atrocities. The R2P is a moral tool 
intended to halt atrocities as they occur and rebuild and reconstruct societies in the wake of 
such crimes.  
 
However, according to Aidan Hehir (2011), it is the national duty of the Libyan government 





not British, French and US citizens. In Hehir’s view, the R2P contains structural barriers to 
effective action; until these barriers are removed, the use of force to subdue an enemy state 
will continue. Hehir (2011) argues that the laws governing the use of force and the structure 
of the UN are the same in 2011 as they were in 1991. For all the hype surrounding the R2P it 
constitutes no more than a slogan which has served to embolden those who are convinced 
that eloquent appeals to behave responsibly influence world politics.  
 
Since the R2P was officially recognised at the World Summit a number of mass atrocities 
have occurred which undeniably warranted external intervention. Yet, in the face of “state-
sponsored slaughter in Sri Lanka, Darfur and the DRC, the Security Council chose not to 
sanction effective action” (Hehir, 2011). If R2P meant something and had real influence, why 
was this so? Pro-R2P scholars argue that the R2P constitutes more than military intervention 
and that such action is not always prudent. A more accurate explanation, however, is that the 
response of the international community remains dependent on the interests of the P5; in the 
absence of a duty to act, the R2P constitutes no more than a ‘discretionary entitlement’. 
Hence inconsistency and inertia are inevitable. 
 
O’Connell (2011) supports this viewpoint, noting that just hours after Gaddafi’s Benghazi 
threat, the UNSC responded with Resolution 1973 authorising military force to protect 
civilians; the bombing campaign began within hours of the UN vote. Only one month after 
the civil war began, in comparisons with Rwanda and Bosnia, and President’s Obama’s 
statement that the use of force would last only a few days, there were clear indications that 
neither the Security Council nor the states—Britain, France, and US—involved in the 
intervention were focused on the test based on the principle of necessity. The principle of 
necessity requires that even the use of force with a lawful basis in the UN Charter, such as 
Security Council authorisation, must nevertheless be a last resort and have the prospect of 
achieving more good than harm. The interveners failed at the outset to demonstrate either 
aspect of necessity. 
 
Serious analysis prior to the intervention would have revealed the likelihood of high 
casualties resulting from the intervention, as well as alternatives to it. O’Connell (2011) 
argues that, due to NATO’s intervention, a violent insurrection that might have been 
suppressed in a few days gained a new lease on life with fighting continuing for more than 





intervention in the civil war. Though it is generally accepted that one cannot kill a frog with a 
gun as response must be in line with the aggravation, Ramesh Thakur (2011:13) insists that 
any state has the right to use force to suppress armed uprisings within its borders. In light of 
the above the 2011 Libyan uprising would have been best managed if the NATO allies did 
not get involved, as was the case in Tunisia and Egypt. Thus, the mission that effected regime 
change and targeted and killed Gaddafi acted outside of the confines of the guiding principles 
of R2P and the principle of state sovereignty. This is why Thakur (2011) maintains that, to 
the extent that Gaddafi was targeted, NATO exceeded UN authority in breach of the Charter 
law. 
 
In The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Regime Change, Alex Bellamy (2011) 
concurs with Thakur. He observes that the use of attack helicopters by the UN mission in 
Cote d’Ivoire to oust Laurent Gbagbo from power in April 2011 and NATO’s decision to 
interpret UN Security Council Resolution 1973 as permission for the use of airpower to 
overthrow the Gaddafi regime and install the TNC provoked strong responses from several 
UN member states. Long-standing critics of the R2P, Nicaragua and Venezuela, for example, 
used particularly blunt language to criticise the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya as 
complicity in neo-imperialist interventionism dressed up in humanitarian garb. Bellamy 
(2011) notes that Nicaragua and Venezuela complained thus:  
 
Once again we have witnessed the shameful manipulation of the 
slogan protection of civilians for dishonourable political purposes, 
seeking unequivocally and blatantly to impose regime change, 
attacking the sovereignty of a State Member of the United Nations 
[Libya] and violating the Organization’s Charter. Once again, the 
logic of interventionism and hegemony has prevailed through a 
disastrous decision with incalculable potential consequences for tens 
of millions of individuals worldwide.  
 
Furthermore, Venezuela added that: 
 
It is regrettable that certain countries are seeking regime change in 
Libya, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Those 
actions contravene resolution 1973 (2011), which calls for respect 
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya. 
 
More worrying than these harsh criticisms from two of the half dozen or so opponents of the 
R2P, however, was the fact that three members of the emerging ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, 





an accommodation with the new principle – also spoke out strongly against the UN and 
NATO actions in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya. The Chinese Government—a permanent member 
of the Security Council—(Bellamy, 2011: 5) also argued that, “The responsibility to protect 
civilians lies first and foremost with the Government of the country concerned”. The 
international community and external organizations can provide constructive assistance, but 
they must observe the principles of objectivity and neutrality and fully respect the 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned. There 
must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war. 
 
4.7. The lack of unity in Africa: the death of Gaddafi in Libya 
 
Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi would not have been killed by the NATO forces if 
the African leaders were truly united. The establishment of the AU’s PSC and the 
development of the African Standby Force (ASF) recognised the political implications of 
Western powers mediating in the domestic affairs of African states. According to Nowrojee 
(2003), the AU’s efforts to create a conflict-response system recognise that Africa, like any 
other continent, is not conflict-free. African leaders are aware of the possibilities of both low 
and high-profile conflict on the continent and have created institutions to help to resolve 
them. However, the internal divisions between and among the member states have become a 
conflict-stoking element in Africa’s peace endeavour and have led to African leaders serving 
their own self-interests in their response to conflicts. 
 
More precisely, Gaddafi died as a result of disunity in Africa and a lack of leadership from 
the African representatives in the UNSC -- the non-permanent members of Council who 
voted for the UNSC Resolution 1973 in Libya—Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa. Clearly, 
being a part of the Resolution 1973 would have helped the AU to intervene meaningfully to 
de-escalate the conflict and resolve it through diplomatic means. But the diplomatic route was 
hardly used to diffuse the unrest in Libya. It may be argued that the African representatives’ 
vote for the Resolution 1973 was informed by factors such as Gaddafi’s disruptive and active 
interference in the domestic politics of African states such as his call for the separation of 
Nigeria into two parts (Vanguard Newspaper, October, 2011). Similarly, one of AU 





leaders, a direct reference to Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie, one of the last ruling monarchs on the 
continent. 
 
As was the case in the Cote d’Ivoire, the AU’s push for lasting peace with respect to regional 
conflicts are frequently unraveled by internal African bickering over strategic direction. 
Citing the Ivorian experience, the vice president for multilateral affairs at the International 
Crisis Group (2011) firmly holds that lack of cohesion is an obstacle to resolving major 
conflicts in Africa. 
 
Whether to retain Gaddafi in power or to transfer leadership to another Libyan is a matter that 
the African states could have diplomatically mediated and resolved without any loss of lives 
or the human security conditions so sadly witnessed in Libya. According to Yusuf Alli (2011) 
“President Goodluck Jonathan had maintained a parallel position with President Zuma over 
Gaddafi’s fate”. While Nigeria’s position on the TNC was supported by 34 African countries, 
South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe supported Gaddafi. This made it difficult for the 
continent to either set a common agenda or implement the provisions of the AU’s 
Constitutive Act in conflict situations. 
 
Indeed the division noticeably undermined Africa’s strength and capacity for intervention in 
Libya and had also lent support to NATO’s aggressive head-hunting of Gaddafi and the 
perpetuation of human insecurity in Libya. According to the United Nations Human 
Development Report of 1994: 
 
Human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, 
a job that was not cut, and ethnic tension that did not explode in 
violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a 
concern with weapons; it is a concern with human life and dignity. 
 
It is against this backdrop that Bain (2001: 7) and Gray (2007) argue that human security 
presupposes that security consists of something more than the narrow Cold War agenda that 
focused on problems of nuclear deterrence, military balances, zero-sum games, competing 
power blocs, and interstate diplomacy and war. The African Union was entangled in 
competing power blocs in Libya and as a result was presented with a dilemma in leading the 
peace process. While the AU held to its rhetoric of the AU peace plan and a political solution, 





frantic search for Gaddafi. A united statement by the AU against the bombing campaign 
would have compelled NATO to resort to alternative means such as negotiations between the 
government and the TNC to resolve the Libyan conflict. 
 
According to Cordesman and Vira (2011), during the NATO bombing campaign in Libya, 
both human and national securities were grossly violated. The moral foundation of human 
security which the AU embraces differs in several important ways from the doctrine of 
national security that has clearly dominated both the prevailing theoretical and practical 
understandings of security in contemporary global politics. Recognising that the principle 
difficulty of national security is that individual security does not necessarily follow from the 
security of the political community, the AU’s lack of unity contributed to the lack of both 
human and national security in Libya. Bain (2001: 8) makes the following distinction: 
“whereas national security postulates states as moral communities worth preserving in their 
own right, human security confers moral priority on the security of individual human beings”. 
 
While it is clear that the AU was unable to protect the civilian population from NATO’s 
bombing operation in Libya, the organization persisted in its claim that it had a political 
roadmap that would ensure the peaceful co-existence of all Libyan citizens until the death of 
Gaddafi put an end to the pogrom.  
  
4.8. Lessons for Africa 
 
The prospects for a mutual peaceful world environment helps bind states together and 
institutionalises cooperative political behaviour. Britain, France and the US’s dual 
membership of the UNSC and NATO was an important condition that facilitated NATO’s 
ability to attack with the blessing of the UNSC.  The durability of the political space occupied 
by the West and US has been manifested not only in these organisations’ continued existence 
but also in their concerted efforts to expand the scope of assignments targeting the national 
interests of dual members of the UNSC and NATO. Both the Council and NATO embarked 
on ambitious plans to secure a safe Libya, in their assumed responsibility to protect the 






As an independent sovereign state, Libya has the primary responsibility to protect its civilian 
population in the best interests of citizens and the state(S/RES/1970(2011)). Clearly the 
application of the R2P in Libya was motivated by the domestic interests of Britain, France 
and the US. Taking into consideration that Libya had the highest Human Development Index 
on the continent after the Seychelles during the 2011 conflict, intervention by France, Britain 
and the US, ranked 10th, 12th and 15th respectively on their continents, makes no sense. 
 
There is no doubt that, due to global interconnectedness and the multiple power blocs present 
in the Security Council, transformation will occur and the victimisation of states will 
certainly decrease. While Europe and North America might not wane, other power blocs such 
as Africa and the South America may rise. The veto power and the votes of the African and 
South American states will tilt the decision making process. If proposals by Britain, France 
and the US are not vetoed, usually to avert political scuffles between the three and China and 
Russia, a simple majority vote will ensure a UNSC outcome that Britain, France and the US 
did not propose. 
 
Skeptics have also voiced concern that military interventions may be used to promote the 
parochial goals of global or regional powers in situations where there is no real humanitarian 
crisis. Hawkins (2003), Sambanis and Doyle (2006) and Cordesman and Vira (2011)have 
dismissed the principle as too narrow, arguing that anything short of a comprehensive 
framework focusing on the human security agenda is ill-suited in African circumstances. The 
campaign around the issue of the “responsibility to protect” is also seen in some quarters as 
diverting attention from the more “sustainable” goal of human security. However, Scanlon et 
al. (2007) have argued that applying broader frameworks to the doctrine would only serve to 
dilute its central theme: generating effective, consensual responses in humanitarian crises. 
The R2P is thus a mobilisation tool for timely action in worst-case scenarios, not a panacea 
for issues of human security. The principle gives new expression to old ideas in such a way 
that the international community has less scope to justify ill-conceived action or inaction in 









4.9. Lesson from the activities of the AU, NATO and the UN in Libya  
 
The Council’s insistent pursuit of the protection of civilian population in Libya as its part of 
R2P expressly declared in Resolution 1973(2011) is understood differently by different 
scholars. Scholars such as Amuwo, (2009); and Isike, Okeke-Uzodike and Gilbert (2008:34) 
have lucidly argued that the national geo-strategic, economic and political interests of 
Western powers, France and Britain and the US in resource-rich African states are 
aggressively pursued at all cost. They add that the important moral and political values that 
the West claims drives its foreign policies (for example, democracy and human rights) are 
ignored whenever it appears they may be counter-productive.  
 
The use of NATO forces to conduct a series of targeted bombing of the Libyan citizens which 
it purportedly set to protect was a calculated British, French and US tactic to by-pass the use 
of the Security Council to sanction military action in Libya, which China and the Russian 
Federation may have vetoed. Furthermore, while the African leaders under the umbrella of 
the AU were still negotiating a political solution to the controllable Libyan uprising, the 
speed of Resolution 1973(2011) ensured that AU’s mission was thwarted in order to exploit 
Libya’s natural resources.  France and Britain in dire need of economic leverage to avoid 
experiencing Spain, Greece and Italy’s economic woes, were prepared to adopt all necessary 
measures to gain control over Libya’s resources, including killing the Libyan leader. 
 
According to Rieff (2011) the celebration of the death of the Colonel Gaddafi and the quick 
withdrawal of NATO forces from Libya by the UNSC members who are also NATO 
members also signals that the mission in Libya was to kill Gaddafi and change the regime.  
The marriage of convenience between the UNSC and NATO in Libya resulted in one (the 
UNSC) being the judge of the other (NATO’s) case. The territorial integrity and human 
insecurity that the Council set out to preserve in Libya culminated in one of the most 
gruesome killings on the continent of Africa since independence. Libya’s territory was 
overtaken by Britain, France and the US through the NATO bombing campaigns and the flow 
of arms into Libya which Resolution 2009(2011) provided indirect violation of international 
regulations for state sovereignty. The assault on Libya’s territorial integrity and the 
movement of both deadly weapons and people in and out of the country’s borders also 






4.10. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has illustrated that R2P clause was instrumentally used by the UNSC to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of Libya. It also examined the functionalities of the R2P and 
attributes the recorded human deaths in the countries discussed in the literature review to the 
operational interpretation of this concept. This chapter has highlighted that the R2P 
intervention was not necessary in Libya and that it violated the territorial integrity and 
undermined the sovereignty of Libya. It was further noted that the reason why the Libyan 
















Conclusion and recommendations 
5.1. Executive Summary 
 
Having studied the UNSC resolutions adopted in Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Libya and 
Rwanda, this study agrees with Paul Collier (Economic Causes of Civil conflict and their 
Implications for Policy) that, in civil wars where rebel organisations are financially viable, 
there is a systemic alliance with interested external donors and forces. The conflict in Angola, 
for example, was fuelled by the capitalist-led US and Communist-led USSR’s attempts to 
lure the oil-rich Angola to their side. Angolans died in a bid to defend either capitalism or 
communism. Throughout the civil war, two permanent members of the UNSC—Russia and 
the US—stoked the conflict by providing funds and munitions to the warring factions. It is 
therefore of concern that neither the US nor Russia were mentioned in any of the resolutions 
adopted to restore peace in Angola. UNSC Resolution 696 of 1991 which stressed the 
importance of all states refraining from taking any action that would undermine the 
agreement to end the war in Angola is one of many instances of mis-targeted UNSC 
resolutions to deflate attention from the real problem—the US’s proliferation of military 
hardware in  Angola for economic gain.  
 
Similarly, Resolutions: 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993 and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions, in  particular resolutions 1127 of 28 August 1997, 1173 of 12 June 1998, 1237 of 
7 May 1999, 1295 of 18 April 2000, 1336 of 23 January 2001, 1348 of 19 April 2001, 1374 
of 19 October 2001, 1404 of 18 April 2002, 1412 of 17 May 2002, 1432 of 15 August 2002, 
1433 of 15 August 2002 and 1439 of 18 October 2002 were solely concerned with the 
humanitarian effects of the use of arms in Angola, not the arms themselves. No call was made 
to identify the providers of the weaponry in Angola and no country has accounted for it to 
date. In order to root out the effect of weapons, the long term solution may be to deal with the 






5.2. Cote d’Ivoire: the behaviour of the United Nations Security Council  
 
The pattern of stoking conflicts through misdirected UNSC resolutions continued in Cote 
d’Ivoire. While Resolution 1464 (2003)for example, endorses respect for territory and 
sovereignty, Resolution1479 (2003) established liaison with French forces, and Resolutions 
1464(2003), 1479(2003) and 1498 (2003) authorised the deployment of the French forces in 
Cote d’Ivoire, Resolution 1514(2003) extended the lease of deployment, Resolution 1528 
(2004)fully supported the actions of the UNSC and French forces, Resolution 1572(2004) 
admitted that military attack was not a solution to the Ivorian conflict and Resolution 
1584(2005) encouraged France to provide appropriate security assistance.  
 
Since Resolution 1584(2005) and subsequent resolutions up to Resolution 1946 of 
2010regularly discussed the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire but did not end the conflict, this raises 
questions about the double-standard of stoking conflict by adopting more ineffectual 
resolutions. Ten years after the  UN made its presence felt in Cote d’Ivoire, the RCI remains 
deeply troubled and influenced by problems that can be traced to its colonial governor—
France,  and the UNSC’s ‘invisible presence’ in the state. The net effect of the societal 
tensions created by France and the UNSC in the RCI is such that scholars such as Uzodike 
(2004) argue that external intervention has resulted in the collective failure of the state to 
create and nurture the proper context for sustained development. 
 
The persistent failures of the state,  the interlocking nature and spillover of the UNSC 
resolutions from 2002, the armed conflict and its attendant multiple security threats and the 
mutual vulnerabilities created by the UNSC and French government in the RCI led to the 
state and human insecurity experienced during the 2010/2011 Ivorian conflict. It is important 
to note that although the relationship between resources, the economic agendas of the P5, 
civil wars and the UNSC may not be anything new in international politics, the UNSC 
resolutions during 2010/2011 conflict in the RCI undermined the argument that the UNSC is 
a neutral arbiter before, during and after interventions.  For example, Resolutions 1479 
(2003), 1464(2003), 1479(2003), 1498 (2003) and 1514(2003)… ordinarily authorised France 
to ride roughshod over the RCI. This explains why the develop mentalists perceive a negative 
correlation between the conflict and the UNSC’s resolutions and authorisation of military 
intervention that is not only associated with the pathologies of crime and terrorism but the 





5.3. Democratic Republic of Congo: lessons from UNSC operations 
 
Since the DRC’s independence, the UNSC has engaged in humanitarian interventions to 
resolve intra-state conflict and the inter-state economic wars in DRC. It has been noted that 
the DRC conflict is one the biggest since World War II (WWII). The continuation of the 
conflict is largely the result of the lack of political will on the part of the UNSC to end it, 
rather than a lack of knowledge of the conflict’s adverse impact on the nation and the region 
(Gebrewold, 2004: 7).It is for this reason that this study agrees with Virgil Hawkins 
(2003:64), who notes in Measuring UN Security Council action and Inaction in the 1990s: 
lessons for Africa that UNSC resolutions on major conflicts such as the DRC civil war 
merely served to help the Council pretend that it was making genuine efforts to end such 
conflicts.. 
 
According to the UNSC Resolution log table, presented in the chapter 2 of this study, in the 
decade from 2000 to 2010the UNSC adopted several resolutions pertaining to the conflict in 
the DRC. The conflict persisted, yet the UNSC is still present in the DRC, waging war 
against the population through one of the largest peace keeping operations in the world. The 
question that arises is why Libya was an ‘overnight’ intervention, unlike the DRC? This 
suggests that the lingering state and human insecurity in the DRC is economical beneficial to 
some Council members as with removing Gaddafi and ending the conflict in Libya. When 
compared with the speedy process in Libya the resolutions adopted on the DRC conflict since 
its inception reveal that the UNSC attaches different values to conflict situations based on the 
underlying economic outcome for the key members. It also illustrates that the inability of the 
AU to articulate and insist on an African position is due to leadership divisions and weakness 
among the African heads of state. The UNSC has used regular resolutions to foster the idea 
that it is committed to conflict resolution in the DRC while spending little money on military 
intervention. The DRC has substantial mineral resources and the UNSC’s failure to regard the 
conflict as a real threat to regional peace is not only in stark contrast with the organisation’s 
hurriedly imposed no-fly zone to avert the perceived threat to regional security in Libya but 







5.4. Rwanda: Lessons from the UNSC operations 
 
Discussions on the performance of the UNSC in Rwanda tend to focus on the periods before, 
during and after the 1994 genocide. The inaction of the UNSC during the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda shows that the Council intentionally allowed the deadly conflict to occur. It is 
generally agreed that the UNSC was unwilling to authorise the use of force or diplomacy to 
ensure peace in Rwanda. According to Hawkins (2003:69) for example, the UNSC’s 
un/willingness to deploy force to settle disputes is the result of the major powers’ interests in 
the conflict—Rwanda was abandoned by the UNSC due to its lack of economic resource. 
 
The Rwandan genocide was abandoned due to a lack of natural mineral deposits which the P5 
members could exploit after the intervention. The UNSC Resolutions and actions in 2003 and 
2004 were deliberate. The lengthy paragraphs in several resolutions on the 2011 Libyan 
conflict beginning with Resolution 1970 on the doctrines of altruism, piety and the virtues of 
R2P are at best flimsy. This is because a resolution ordering an end to the violence and the 
deployment of NATO would have been adopted and pursued in Rwanda. No article regarding 
intervention as provided by the UN Charter has changed since 2003. Ignoring economic gain 
and guarding peace and providing security in Rwanda would not only have prevented the 
genocide and the attendant incarcerations, but would also have avoided the animosity that 
existed in post-genocide Rwanda. 
 
5.5. The responsibility to protect in African conflicts: Lessons from Libya 
 
According to Bellamy (2011: 20) the relationship between the R2P and interference in 
domestic politics such as striving for regime change has long been an uncomfortable one. 
This is why one of the principle objections to the 2001 report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty concerned the widened potential for 
abuse that may accompany any relaxing of the general prohibition on force contained in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter. This view was most clearly expressed by Venezuela in the case of 
Libya; Venezuela argued that the R2P would merely serve the interests of the powerful by 
granting them more freedom to intervene in the affairs of the weak without necessarily 





2011 Libyan conflict agree that the UN-backed NATO activities in Libya would not have 
been necessary were they not geared towards assassinating Gaddafi. 
 
This explains why O’Connell (2011) asserts that the military intervention was a failure 
despite the outcome. While some regard the coalition intervention that began on 19 March 
2011 in Libya as a success, she labels the tens of thousands of deaths and injuries a ‘tragedy’. 
In her view, which this study shares, when such casualties occur owing to a military 
intervention that was not necessary, the intervention is a failure. The appraisal of the 
application of R2P in Libya in chapter Four of this study revealed that the UNSC was unable 
to establish any concrete reason why a military intervention should be imposed on Libya as 
the first resort; this says much about a global organisation that seeks to promote peace and 
lends credence to the claims of scholars who refer to the intervention as resource-driven 
and/or an imperialist intervention. 
 
While the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt succeeded in part because protestors claimed 
ownership of the uprisings and the regimes’ opponents understood the importance of non-
violence and self-reliance during confrontation with the state, the Libyan crisis was pre-
determined by the Western allies. It is the opinion of this researcher that the call for 
democracy in Libya was one of the most demeaning things the UN allowed to be done under 
its umbrella. For many decades, the UN relied on authentic democratic ideals rather than 
resorting to the very means employed by the dictators to rule their people, such as the killing 
of more than 50,000 civilians by a UN-endorsed force within a period of two weeks. If killing 
the civilian population was the UN/NATO interest in Libya, in what way are the activities of 
these two global organisations better than the Gaddafi’s threat to go house-to-house in 
Benghazi to end the rebellion unless fighters laid down their arms? 
 
The interveners failed at the outset to demonstrate that the intervention would not involve 
high numbers of casualties. This was because bombing began within hours of the UNSC vote 
without any option for peaceful negotiations or diplomatic jockeying. These were clear 
indications that neither the Security Council nor the states involved in the intervention were 
focused on restoring peace and establishing democracy, but on destroying Gaddafi. The 
UN/NATO’s morbid obsession to end the life of Gaddafi explains why no explanation was 






According to Weiss et al. (2011) and Bellamy (2011) the intervention in Libya was anything 
but a last resort. Sanctions, including an arms embargo, had hardly been put in place when 
the bombs began to drop. There was no attempt to use peaceful means to protect civilians 
such as gaining safe passage out of Benghazi. The coalition—NATO, UNSC and the rebels—
became the fighting arm of the rebellion, installing a rebel group as a democratic regime 
amidst serious questions about their intentions and capabilities. This was the reason why the 
apostolic vicar of Tripoli called the decision to bomb and the failure to employ peaceful 
means ‘immoral’ (Weiss et al., 2011). The Arab League which changed its position and 
called for restraint, insisted that it was however, reprehensible for crusaders of democracy 
who invaded a sovereign state to ignore all calls for a peace process and instead remain hell 
bent on installing the rebels. The UN-backed enthronement of the rebels was a desperate 
move to dethrone Gaddafi and ensure the destabilisation of the national security of Libya, not 
to improve the level of security and peace, as the UN Charter authorised. 
 
Despite the inadequacies of the UNSC Resolution 1973, the record of military intervention 
during the last several decades is one of almost unbroken failure if either the human costs or 
the political outcomes are taken into proper account. Such interventionary experiences in the 
Islamic world during the past 50 years have made it impossible to sustain the burden of 
persuasion that would be needed to justify an anti-regime intervention in Libya in ethically 
and legally persuasive ways. This is why Weiss et al.(2011) assert that the coalition’s 
decision was focused on necessity. They ask: if the coalition’s decision for war was not 
focused on necessity, what explains it? France’s Sarkozy and Britain’s Cameron for example, 
led the advocacy for intervention. Both faced tough political and economic situations at 
home. A focus on Libya and a call for humanitarianism could help to deflect attention from 
the home situation. In addition, Sarkozy had been badly embarrassed by his close ties to the 
ousted Tunisian Ben Ali. Support for a war in Libya was his image redeeming strategy. 
 
Similarly, US UN Ambassador Susan Rice was part of the Clinton administration during the 
Rwanda genocide when the US supported the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers. Her 
references to Rwanda appear to be an attempt to remedy that past failure. Other members of 
the administration who joined Rice’s call for intervention have long academic records 
supporting the R2P (Weiss et al., 2011: 15). The R2P as administered in Libya has been 





serious problems, discouraging thinking about creative, peaceful alternatives with a better 
chance of success.  
 
Another aspect of the failed intervention in Libya may well be the further undermining of the 
prohibition on force. Moreover, the coalition went beyond anything authorised by the 
Security Council likely undermining the authority of that body, too. This was due to its secret 
interest in oil gains flowing from intervention in Libya. Weiss et al. (2011) believe that 
protection of civilians is a humanitarian imperative but the intervention in Libya was always 
about controlling Libya’s oil despite all the high-blown rhetoric surrounding it. In this sense, 
Gaddafi may have died but this cannot lead to the conclusion that the coalition-led pro-
democracy revolution was a success. The successful revolutions of the Arab Spring and 
elsewhere have been non-violent ones free from R2P calamities. 
 
5.6. The national security of states versus the UNSC responsibility to 
protect: lessons learned 
 
For a concept that addresses central issues of the world order such as sovereignty, violent 
conflict and human rights, the R2P has had an astonishing career. Introduced by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in the wake of the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the concept survived divisive debates over the invasion of 
Iraq and was adopted by 150 heads of states in the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN 
World Summit. 
 
While trying to guard the national security of state during the R2P discourse, the consensus 
that emerged in 2005 depended to a large extent on efforts to distinguish it from the concept 
of regime change. This was achieved in two principle ways. First, and most importantly, 
paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document stated quite categorically that any 
use of force must be expressly authorised by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter. It reads:  
 
we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, 





manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This provision 
squarely closed the door to the use of force or other means of 
coercion without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. 
Second, the agreement was just as emphatic on the scope of R2P.  
 
Whilst the ICISS had failed to pin down precisely what the R2P entails, the 2005 World 
Summit was absolutely clear that the principle referred to the crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Because each of these crimes was already 
prohibited and because states committed to exercise their “R2P through the UN Charter, the 
principle emerged not as a new legal principle but rather as a political commitment to 
implement already existing law” (World Summit Outcome Document, 2005: 139). Thus 
conceived, the R2P could only give rise to the use of force when the Security Council judged 
it necessary in order to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity or to protect populations from these four crimes. 
  
Lessons were taught and learnt from the UNSC engagements in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya 
respectively. Neither the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (URNOCI)’s activities in 
Cote d’Ivoire nor NATO’s in Libya contravened the letter of this consensus. Both acted 
under Chapter VII resolutions which authorised the use of force to protect civilians. In the 
strictest sense, therefore, the problem was not so much the use of force to protect civilians 
from mass atrocities in both cases –this had been duly authorised by the Security Council – 
but the fact that this use of force resulted in regime change and that this result was intended 
by those responsible for implementing the Security Council’s decisions even though the 
Council itself had not specifically authorised regime change.  
 
Given the sensitivities identified in chapters three and four of this study, and following from 
Serano (2011) and Bellamy (2011) it is safe to suggest that it is not surprising that the Special 
Advisor to the Secretary-General on the R2P, Edward Luck, responded to questions about the 
link between the R2P and regime change by insisting that the two were distinct. Luck told the 
Council on Foreign Relations that “it is not the goal of the responsibility to protect to change 
regimes. The goal is to protect populations. It may be in some cases that the only way to 
protect populations is to change the regime but that certainly is not the goal of the R2P per 
se” (Bellamy, 2011:11). Luck’s answer rightly points to a fundamental dilemma: in situations 





crimes against humanity, how can the international community exercise its responsibility to 
protect populations without imposing regime change?  
 
It may well be that Luck is right to argue that in some situations only regime change will do, 
this study finds a failure to clearly spell out how the R2P will transform the UNSC into a 
regime changing instrument. This is not only because of deep concern on the part of many 
member states that the R2P could give rise to a regime change agenda but also the equally 
deep global opposition to such an agenda. Bellamy (2011) asserts that it is incumbent on 
international actors to explore the relationship more in order to ascertain whether there are 
ways of maintaining a clear distinction between the R2P and regime change without 
sacrificing the protection of civilians. This is particularly urgent given the evidence that 
among other factors, the perception among the BRICS that the UN and NATO, for example, 
went too far in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya has encouraged them to block a timely, decisive and 
united response to the killing of civilians by both the government and rebels in Syria and 
Yemen. Under these circumstances, the R2P is useless, because the civilian population it 
guards and protects dies under the watchful eyes of the protectors but they cannot act, due to 
mischievous previous protection which has cast doubts on the current situation. 
 
5.7. Setting the rules and criteria for interventions  
 
UNSC Resolution 1973 approved military intervention in Libya but ostensibly did not 
develop criteria and modalities for the intervention to avoid the killing of defenceless 
civilians. In this regard, Saxer (2008: 6) argues that the development and codification of a set 
of criteria for international interventions with a clear model of decision-making should be 
discussed in an open and inclusive way. This will prevent actions such as the no-fly zone that 
ultimately decimated humanity in Libya from being hurriedly put in place. A set of codified 
criteria depoliticises the inherently political interest questions in any conflict state. In order to 
address the dictates of Resolution 1973, criteria need to be discussed in a historically 
sensitive way, keeping in mind that the discourse on military intervention legitimised the use 
of force and the perpetuation of the human insecurity paradigm. While internationally 
codified or at least widely accepted criteria, according to Amneus (2008: 18), will help to 
restrain the abuse of the R2P by the major powers and also appease the fears of ‘Trojans’, 





legitimacy of interventions. The set of criteria proposed in the ICISS report (the just cause 
threshold, the precautionary principles, right authority, and the operational principle) 
although clearly abandoned in Libya, must be abided by before any intervention is made. 
 
Recalling three UNSC resolutions, Golaszinsk and Steinhilber, noted in their paper titled: 
New Ground Rules for Interventions, Dialogue on Globalization, which UNSC Resolution 
688 declares that no state may threaten minorities, Resolution 1203 further underscores that 
no country may carry out action of mass displacements, while Resolution 794 reads: or allow 
a human tragedy of inconceivable magnitude (Saxer, 2008: 16). Cordesman and Vira (2011) 
add that the R2P clause was abused in Libya as the concept was not used to provide 
humanitarian assistance for victims or relief corridors during the pogrom. Instead it was used 
to destroy human lives and decimate property. When the R2P mission in Libya is compared 
with UN non-intervention in the R2P-needing Rwanda before the genocide in 1994, it is clear 
that the UNSC intervention system lacks coherence and consistency (Cordesman and Vira, 
2011). This lack of a coherent approach within the UN system of intervention in conflict 
areas under the R2P umbrella aggravate the anger of the intervened state and aid the 
escalation of the conflict.  
 
Chandler (2004: 64) and Yamashita, (2005: 2) asserts that the R2P has to be properly 
implemented as part of an overall strategy to build international consensus on the issue. This 
will not only reduce doubts on the consistency of the UNSC as a neutral arbiter but also 
create a common knowledge of what offence necessitates an R2P action. A common 
understanding of what kinds of crisis qualify as a R2P case will not only allow for the UN’s 
inaction over the British and US invasion of Iraq to be understood, but will also offer clarity 
on differences between cases such as Darfur, Kenya, Rwanda and most notably the 2011 
Libyan crisis. Clearly, the lack of common practice and acting in one crisis while leaving 
another aside raised concerns over double standards and a hidden agenda in the UNSC’s R2P 
humanitarian services. There is a danger that this will undermine the legitimacy of the 







5.8. National security of state versus the concept of sovereignty: lessons 
from Libya  
 
Tom Bruneau cited in Max Manwaring (2007) identified five operational levels of national 
security challenges associated with the transnational gang phenomenon:  
 
He claims that gang phenomenon strains government capacity by 
overwhelming police and legal systems through sheer audacity, 
violence, and numbers.  That, they challenge the legitimacy of the 
state, particularly in regions where the culture of democracy is 
challenged by corruption and reinforced by the inability of political 
systems to function well enough to provide public goods and 
services. That, they act as surrogate or alternate governments in so-
called ungoverned areas. That the gang dominates the informal 
economic sector and establish small businesses and use violence and 
coercion, and co-optation of government authorities, to unfairly 
compete with legitimate businesses. They infiltrate police and 
nongovernmental organizations to further their goals and in doing so 
demonstrate latent political aims. 
 
The gang challenge to national security, stability, and sovereignty and the attempt to 
neutralize, control, or depose governments, takes us to the strategic-level threat. In this 
context, crime, violence, and instability are only symptoms of the threat. The ultimate threat 
is either: (1) state failure or (2) the violent imposition of a radical socio-economic and 
political restructuring of the state and its governance in accordance with criminal value 
(Manwaring, 2007: 3). 
 
In either case, Bellamy (2008) maintains that gangs contribute to the evolutionary state 
failure process by which the state loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its 
fundamental governance and security functions. Over time, the weaknesses inherent in its 
inability to perform the business of the state are likely to lead to the eventual erosion of its 
sovereignty, authority and legitimacy. In the end, the state cannot control its national territory 
or the people in it. These gangster activities are synonymous with those of the P5 – Britain, 
China, France, Russia and the US – in Libya.   
 
Thus, going by the principle state sovereignty  and non-intervention the UNSC Resolution 
1973 and the fortified NATO attack on Libya not only violate the right to internal authority, 
border control, and policy autonomy but also the cardinal virtue of non-intervention in 





suggests that the seal that guard against the invasion of sovereign states are still either loose 
or broken. As such, lessons learned from the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, and Libya call for 
the regulation of the current approaches to peace making and the development of alternative 
measures that will curb elements such as the interpretation of theR2P and the use of the veto 
power in the UNSC to ensure global peace. Barbara Hinkson Craig (1988: 19) observes that 
that overturning the veto capacity is the principle instrument that can guarantee non-
intervention in the veto-holding states. She notes that the veto-holding member states have 
never been intervened in. This could mean that the country is free from violence or has 
managed their conflicts in such a way that there was no need to intervene. 
 
However, Deng and Lyons (1998: 16) contend that lack of intervention in veto-holding 
member states is not based on a lack of conflict but on the presence of nuclear weapons. 
Nonetheless, Deng and Lyons (1998: 16) andBarbara Hinkson Craig (1988: 19) agree on the 
use of the veto mechanism to strike a balance and manage global security and conflict. Tarik 
Kafala (2011) claims that the veto power of the permanent members has been widely 
criticised for its reckless use. He argues that its heavy use by the Soviet Union and the United 
States had gone a long way to discredit the veto system, adding that the threat to use the veto 
often sank a draft resolution. For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (2011) 
reported that “in the run-up to the Iraq war in March 2003, France and Russia indicated that 
they would not support a new resolution sanctioning war”. As a result the US, UK and Spain 
withdrew their draft resolution, and went to war without specific UN backing. During the 
Cold War the Soviet Union vetoed UN resolutions almost as a matter of course.  
 
More recently, the US has used its veto regularly to shield the Israeli Government from 
international criticism or attempts to restrain the behaviour of its military.  Saxer (2008) 
argues that the veto is therefore a source of conflict within the UN system. Having taken a 
closer look at the Libyan conflict, Kafala (2011) asserts that: 
 
[T]he world no longer needs the Security Council veto system. In his 
view, the P5 was given the veto privilege for two reasons that have 
no application in the post-Cold War world. Firstly, the Allied 
powers, with the addition of China, tried to bind themselves to the 
UN Security Council, which was designed to prevent events like 
World War II from repeating themselves. Secondly, the P5 held 
unrivaled strategic might through their possession of nuclear weapon 






The UN is no longer in any danger of collapse and the veto system has become a tool to 
advance the national politics of the veto states. Considering the state of international politics 
and the symbolic meaning of the UN, the P5 can no longer abandon the UN or the cause of 
global peace simply because their veto power is taken away. 
 
Kafala (2011) observes that the veto system has become a threat to global peace and security. 
He contends that the use of the veto is as powerful in preventing resolutions being passed as 
the actual veto itself. In this sense, “the veto-wielding countries often notify promoters of a 
resolution that they will veto it, subsequently causing those promoters to back down and to 
never actually bring legislation to the floor of the general assembly” (Kafala, 2011: 2). He 
adds that one of the ways to resolve this conflict is to reassert the fact that nations agreed to 
join the UN as equal members. In the light of this, as a global constitution, the UN charter 
must uphold sovereign equality to avoid the violation of the principle caused by the veto 
power. 
 
In a fundamental sense, human and state insecurity paradigms, conflicts and civil wars in 
Africa have generally been a function of the interests of a combination of P5 “transnational 
capital/ class, state and global hegemonic states and social forces in search of lucrative but 
cheap commodity and resources on the African continent” (Amuwo, 2009:243). There is 
nothing fundamentally burdensome, let alone accursed, about Africa’s rich human, natural 
and mineral resources. The real burden is the illicit coveting and exploitation of the 
continent’s resources by Western and other powers operating within the confines of 
international organisations such as the UN, which they use to promote their interests. Foreign 
exploitation of Africa’s resources is also a result of the stark lack of leadership on the part of 
African leaders and elites and the complicit attitude of African people. Gaddafi’s death in 
October 2011 was a function this lack of unity. 
 
Chapter one of this study examined Libya’s historical antecedents; it noted that the 2011 
Libyan crisis was not a war for democracy. Rather, it was a war waged by the UN-backed 
NATO to ensure regime change and a war over the control of resources between the Libyan 
government and the governments of Britain, France and the US, as well as retaliation for 





war of survival, designed to free itself from decades of exploitation and imperialism at the 
hands of Western governments in the UN and NATO.The pogrom therefore, was a clear 
reflection of the risks involved in any attempt by a weak and disunited African state to defy 
the P5, take control of its own destiny and chart an autonomous path for itself and the 
continent within an international political and economic environment controlled by the 
superior military capacity. This is not to ignore some of the negative consequences of the 
Gaddafi regime which panicked in the face of continued violent resistance and adopted 
measures that also threatened the normal daily pattern of life of the Libyan population, 
deviated from the dictates of The Green Book and helped plunged Libya into crisis. However, 
the UNSC did not live up to its full potential as an instrument for peace in the state and 
human insecurity paradigm during the 2011Libyan conflict. This is antithetical to its vaunted 
role as the harbinger of social justice, peace, security, transformation and development. 
 
The violent nationalist position assumed by Gaddafi and his loyalists was in sheer response to 
the fierce determination of the Western states – in the form of the UN or NATO – to shape 
the lives of other states without the consent of the people living in them. It is clear that there 
is room for further innovation vis-à-vis the imposition of resolutions on military intervention 
in sovereign states. A better understanding of the steps that need to be taken in terms of the 
R2P before any military intervention is undertaken to provide relief to the civilian population 
is indeed needed. In the areas where UNSC launched military interventions, the conflict 
became more entrenched, leading to untold human suffering, death and, in the aftermath, the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) which further militarises the state. As 
the UNDP (2005:165-166) notes, violent conflicts are neither automatic nor inevitable; 
however, the availability of weapons, although it may not cause conflict, makes conflict more 
likely and increases the likelihood that conflicts will take more violent forms. Libya has been 
infested with weaponry since 2011 and may not escape the consequences in decades to come. 
 
The review of the literature on the UNSC resolutions and direct military interventions in 
Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC and Rwanda has revealed that the promise of a peaceful and 
prosperous post-Cold War world will collapse on the altar of weaponry and unguided R2P 
interventions by the powerful nations in weaker states. The real danger lies in the UNSC’s 
imperial parlance in dictating global interventions and resolutions. An appraisal of Council’s 
involvement in the aforementioned African states shows that the powerful Western states that 





making it difficult for them to achieve development and growth. This was because the 
Council adopted a culture of violence which was a direct consequence of the drive for 
geopolitical hegemony in the New World Order (NWO), whose drivers glorify war for 
economic gain.  Due to its weak position, Africa has become the victim (Amuwo, 2009:243).  
 
Moreover, as observed in the literature review, the international arms trade is arguably one of 
the most lucrative industries in some states in the Council, notably the US. The perpetuation 
of conflicts in Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Rwanda, Libya and elsewhere was dependent on 
the availability of weapons to the civilian populations; arms often supplied by Council 
members in their individual capacities. The US arms industry profited from human deaths in 
all the countries reviewed. According to Campbell cited by Amuwo (2009), Africa also 
witnessed the political assassinations of its most patriotic and nationalist leaders—Patrice 
Lumumba, Muammar Gaddafi—aided by easy access to arms (Campbell, 2000:13). The US 
has, wittingly or otherwise, created a global discourse of war that reinforces the armament 
industry and a culture of violence, the DRC and Angola being the worst cases in Africa. 
 
This study concurs with the view that the lack of emphasis on the use of ‘soft power’ to 
promote people-friendly development, security and a governable environment and the 
creation of a “more balanced and equal partnership with Africa” raises fundamental questions 
about the true intentions of the P5 in Angola and the DRC (Amuwo, 2009: 23). The study 
noted that Africa is continually used by the P5 as litmus and acid tests for power and proxy 
Cold Wars. Scholars such as Amuwo (2009: 243) and Niquet (2003:3) and the UNDP 
(2005:173) assert that no fewer than half a million people in Africa are felled by extremely 
lethal small arms each year. Most of these deaths occur in oil-rich African states. Cyril Obi 
(2007:399) and Nicholas Shanson (2007) cited by Amuwo (2009: 242) argue the powerful 
states in the UNSC ambit and their multinationals, not African governments, should be 
blamed for the ‘paradox of plenty’ of oil-rich African states. They note that, “the real threat is 
not from oil, and other natural resources, it is from those hegemonic global forces—P5—to 
whom oil means everything whose supply at all times, must be guaranteed at any cost”. 
Gaddafi may have died because he rejected this order of things, as shown in chapters three 






5.9. Recommendations for promoting peace and security in Africa 
5.10. Floating Veto System 
 
An ultimate vision for the future is the construction of institutions that will provide member 
nations, especially the parties in conflict and the nations contributing troops, with a platform 
to timely attend formal consultation session/s to contribute to the process of decision making 
on any matter that may result in the invocation of intervention in terms of section of chapter 
VII of the Charter. In this regard, the UNSC should hold at least one open session - to be 
called the Floating Veto System (FVS) congress session - before a major resolution is 
adopted so that all interested and affected parties can express their views.  
 
Further, it would be helpful to institutionalise this consultation forum between the permanent 
members and the affected regional organisations that would wield a Floating Veto Power 
(FVP). The FVP would automatically belong to the regional organisation to which the 
country in conflict belongs. Whether or not the country in conflict is a member of the 
organization, the regional organization with an FVP should have the right to take part in the 
UN global peace process. Under article 29 of the UN Charter, the regional organisation 
should establish a committee with broader representation to monitor the chapter VII 
intentions of the UNSC and make recommendations on intervention. At any stage in the 
application of the said resolution, the regional organisation with an FVP should be able to 
recall aspects of the resolution that were misinterpreted and have the power to halt the 
operation by issuing a statement. The adoption of such a strategy would satisfy demands for a 
more representative, democratic UNSC until the international community is ready to take on 
the challenges of restructuring the entire Council (Johnstone, 1994). The FVP is needed in the 
UNSC to overcome the superiority of the P5 veto power over the sovereignty of states that 
clearly destroyed any chance of dialogue and the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Libya.  
 
To allay accusations of double standards, which have destroyed the credibility and image of 
the UNSC, the FVS should be adopted by the UN not only to mitigate the perceived bias but 
also to lend credence to UNSC interventions and resolutions. In the FVS model, when a 
region in conflict is vested with the FVP, it will prevent the domination of weaker states by 






5.11. The Responsibility to Prevent Model (RTPM) and the Early 
Assessment Report System (EARS) 
 
In terms of the R2P, the ideal approach to every crisis worldwide would be early preventive 
action at all political levels. This study recommends the Responsibility to Prevent Model 
(RTPM) of intervention. Apart from intervention in crisis situations, an RTPM will serve to 
ensure peace in a country. This RTPM would operate in the following manner: the UNSC and 
all regional organisations in the world should develop a peer review mechanism to appraise 
the level of peace and security of all member states. These reviews would be conducted 
regularly and independently of one another to ensure objectivity. The UNSC office should 
issue an assessment check list  containing all the factors that lead to in/security and peace in a 
state. Such factors should include human security needs such as: housing, health, jobs, 
education, food, leadership, security, etc. 
 
This will give the UNSC the opportunity to predict which countries are about to degenerate 
into conflict. The ability to compare objective reports and identify a country that is under 
threat of plunging into crisis and to develop modalities and support systems to assist such 
countries would be a more efficient way to take responsibility than taking up arms against 
defenceless populations. As an organ of the UN, the UNSC currently hugely remains relevant 
by intervening in conflicts; however, interventions by means of addressing a host of global 
security issues such as: the provision of food, healthcare, shelter, resource depletion and 
environmental hazards. 
 
The UNSC should also create an Early Assessment Report System (EARS). The EARS 
would be responsible for compiling reports from the UNSC office and other relevant regional 
organisations and publishing them on the UN website as well as those of relevant regional 
organisations. A table should be created with percentages and categorisations such as: 
excellent = 90% and above, good = 70% to 89%, neutral = 50% to 69%, bad 30% to 49%, 
and poor = 1% to 29%.  These would help the UNSC to determine which countries are 
veering towards crisis. 
 
The responsibility to prevent will require that states either confirm or deny the observations 





the regional organisation of the affected nation, in collaboration with the UNSC, would 
prepare the ground for the necessary reaction as well as the necessary means, ranging from 
the persuasive to the coercive, and respond with adequate financial and technical resources. 
Political will and neutrality in interventions to substantively address crises are said to be very 
scarce resources in the current international community. This has decreased even further 
recently due to increasing domestic opposition to the perceived, prejudiced worldwide 
engagement of Western powers in vulnerable states, Cote d’Ivoire and Libya representing 
examples in Africa. The UNSC EARS would validate the authenticity of intervening in 
sovereign states and would also enjoy global support based on the independent regional and 
UNSC reports. Where there are differences between the regional report and the UNSC report, 
a neutral five-country committee with membership from the affected region, the UNSC and 
three independent observers from three different continents should be tasked to redo the study 
and the findings of this neutral body should supersede the previous reports. This would not 
only decrease the number of interventions and the number of human deaths during the said 
intervention, but also would lend credence to the findings of the committee should 
intervention become necessary. 
 
The bombing campaigns that ousted President Laurent Gbagbo from power and terminated 
Gaddafi’s regime in the same year raise legitimate concerns around the meaning of the 
protection of civilians.  The Libyan government was not a military regime, and Gaddafi and 
all the civilians killed were not members of the Libyan army. So who were the civilian 
population the intervention was protecting? It has been argued that the R2P has shortcomings 
and questions have been raised as to why it was deployed in Libya but not in Syria. This 
tarnished the value of the concept in Libya, delegitimised the UNSC system and highlighted 
the double standards that further delegitimise the R2P as a basis for intervention. 
Inconsistency and double standards could be addressed if the codes of interventions are 
within the reach of both the P5 and in the public domain.  
 
While the R2P has theoretically enjoyed the support of both powerful and weaker states, 
there are certain shortcomings, as became evident in the 2011 Libyan pogrom that call into 
question the viability of the concept. The lack of any universally accepted criteria for military 
intervention is the main concern of “Trojans” and of those who believe in a Westphalian 
interpretation of sovereignty. According to Saxer (2008: 6), a set of codified criteria 





the dictates of Resolution 1973, the formulation of criteria needs to be discussed in a 
historically sensitive way, keeping in mind that the discourse on military intervention 
legitimised the use of force and the perpetuation of the human insecurity paradigm.  
 
Amneus (2008: 18) is of the view that, while internationally codified or at least widely 
accepted criteria will help to restrain the abuse of the R2P by bigger powers and assuage the 
fears of ‘Trojans’, they will also provide a basis for a broad international consensus that 
enhances the legitimacy of interventions. The set of criteria proposed in the ICISS report (the 
just cause threshold, the precautionary principles, right authority, and the operational 
principle), although clearly abandoned in Libya, should be revisited before any intervention is 
made and followed to the letter during interventions. 
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) is correct in 
arguing that crises and violent conflicts worldwide, combined with growing domestic 
resistance to international engagement in conjugal politics under the R2P, undermined the 
sovereignty of states. International engagements added human and state insecurity 
dimensions to the existing conflict in Libya. This was perpetrated by Western-owned media – 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the American owned Cable News Network 
(CNN) including their sister channels such as Sky News.  
 
Western media coverage portraying shocking violence undermines political will for action, 
and pitches citizens against their governments. This kind of media coverage, which was a 
feature of the 2011 Libyan conflict, clearly closes the windows of opportunity for preventive 
dialogue and diplomatic negotiations. This implies that, in reality, the major strength of the 
R2P, its comprehensive approach with a strong emphasis on prevention, will rarely play out, 
unless interveners drum up public sympathy through the media to intervene against assumed 
mass atrocities. The 2011 Libyan conflict was one of the many instances in Africa where the 
Western media was deployed to create a conflict tone, and provoke aggressive military 








5.12. Stitching the holes in the R2P and external intervention 
 
According to Saxer (2008: 15) and Amneus (2008: 12) to subsume a crisis under the R2P, 
one needs to project that genocide, ethnic cleansing, large scale war crimes or crimes against 
humanity will occur at a point in time where such crimes have not (yet) occurred. 
Unsurprisingly, most states (whether colonised or not, from the global North to the global 
South) resist being put on such a watch list, fearing damage to their international reputation. 
The internationalisation of supposedly domestic conflict such as the 2011 Libyan uprising 
and the 2010/2011 Ivorian calamities naturally prompted resistance from the national 
governments. Such resistance, in turn, makes intervention futile and it becomes impossible to 
implement preventive strategies at a time when such strategies still have the potential to make 
a difference.  Following Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) observation that peace cannot be 
enforced on a resistant population, this study agrees that although the UN-backed NATO 
intervention in Libya achieved the interveners’ desire for regime change, it did not allow 
Libyans to play a political role in the government and administration of their country. In this 
regard, this study further supports Busumtwi-Sam’s (2002: 91) observations and recommends 
that action be taken to address the shortcomings of external intervention in sovereign statesin 
order to create the conditions conducive to durable peace. This is important because the 
current nature of such interventions engineers deep divisions during the post-conflict and 
post-intervention period. 
   
5.13. Internationalisation of localised Conflicts  
  
Establishing a moral or (eventually) legal obligation on the part of the international 
community to act on behalf of populations facing genocide, as was the claim in the 2011 
Libyan pogrom, is not difficult, but implementation is hazardous. This is not only because 
such conduct raises expectations on the part of conflicting parties that the external powers 
will tip the balance of the internal conflict in their favour but also that, in terms of the logic of 
asymmetrical warfare, it could provoke overreactions from the opponent in order to drag the 
international community into the conflict (Hurd, 2007: 23 and Saxer, 2007: 220). However 
valid as such assumptions may be, the very existence of such logic could complicate peace 
negotiations. Under such circumstances, it is essential that the state must be supported and if 





to protect the populace.  If needs be, the regional organisation should be fortified to take 
certain disciplinary actions against the said state. Once a conflict situation is placed under the 
UNSC watch, the permutations and political jockeying that characterised the 2011 Libyan 
conflict not only hurt the state in question, but the international political order. 
 
The UNSC resolutions involving the R2P in Africa—DRC, Cote d’Ivoire and Libya—and 
beyond have partially informed the criticism that the R2P continues to attract from 
proponents of Westphalianism. Scholars such as Jeff McCoy (2008: 14) and Leo Gross 
(1948: 3) contend that since the national interests of the P5 dictate the tone of international 
politics, the only strategy to address the R2P impasse is reconfirming the principle of 
sovereignty. Historically, sovereignty was “invented” to end a very similar situation that the 
R2P tried to tackle in Libya. Sovereignty has worked as a “buffer” between rival powers, and 
kept internal conditions out of international disputes, making it harder to declare war over 
questions under the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. In areas where external 
interference has been deployed, such as supporting rebel groups in countries in conflict, the 
donor states have never wanted to be identified in order to avoid being accused of violating 
the sovereignty clause. For many new and weaker states of the global South, sovereignty and 
non-intervention have served – at least in theory – as a “firewall” against external 
interference. Underlining the commitment to the principle of sovereignty could help to 
assuage the fears of traditional “Westphalians” in subsequent UNSC interventions. 
 
5.14. Setting the rules and criteria for interventions  
 
UNSC Resolution 1973 approved military intervention in Libya but did not develop criteria 
and modalities for the intervention to avert the killing of defenceless civilians. In this regard, 
the development and codification of a set of criteria for international interventions with a 
clear decision-making structure should be discussed in an open and inclusive way. This will 
without a doubt curb actions such as the hurriedly imposed no-fly zone that ultimately 
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